Last September I made the argument that Jason Kidd Really Did Help the Mavericks in 2007-08.  My argument – summarized below — was based almost entirely on efficiency differential (offensive efficiency minus defensive efficiency).    

What does efficiency differential tell us about the Kidd acquisition?  At the time of the trade Dallas had a differential of 4.3.  When the season ended, the team’s differential stood at 4.9.  For a team to increase its differential from 4.3 to 4.9 in just 29 games, that team would have to post a mark of 6.0 in the final games of the campaign.  In other words, the Mavericks clearly improved after Kidd came to town.

That was the story of 2007-08.  At the midpoint of the 2008-09 season the Mavericks – with essentially the same cast that finished the 2007-08 season – have a differential of 1.50.  In other words, Dallas has declined.  And of course we wonder why?

An answer begins with Table One. 

Table One: The Dallas Mavericks in 2008-09 after 41 games

Table One reports two views of the Mavericks.  The first reports how much this team could have expected to win given what these players did in 2007-08. The second reports what this team can expect given this team’s performance in 2008-09.   As one can see, there’s a substantial difference in the two views.

When we look at the individual players we see a number of players who have declined relative to last year.  Specifically, Dirk Nowitzki, Josh Howard, DeSagana Diop, Jason Kidd, Antoine Wright, Brandon Bass, and Jason Terry are offering a combined 21 fewer projected Wins Produced relative to last year.

Looking for an Explanation

For this many players to suddenly offer less begs for some sort of explanation.  Here are some possibilities.

• Diminishing Returns: When Jason Kidd arrived it was suspected that his immense productivity would have a substantial negative impact on his teammate’s performance. Certainly diminishing returns exists in the NBA. But as we will (briefly) detail in the next book, the effect is not that large. Furthermore, there is reason to think it’s not a very big issue in this instance. Below the standard table reported above is another table that reports what the Mavericks could expect had these players maintained what they did in 2007-08 after Jason Kidd arrived. As one can see, with Kidd in 2007-08 these players were still quite good. The decline did not happen with the arrival of Kidd, but with the end of summer in 2008. In sum, diminishing returns – at least with respect to Kidd’s arrival– doesn’t look like a good explanation.
• Coaching: Last November Slate.com noted a study I co-authored examining coaching in the NBA. Essentially we found that most coaches don’t have a substantial impact on player performance (this study has been expanded greatly for the next book). Given this research we might expect that the move from Avery Johnson to Rick Carlisle might not make a difference. Of course, just because the typical result is that coaches don’t alter performance, it doesn’t mean that a specific coach or coaches can’t have an impact. So perhaps Carlisle is to blame (or Avery Johnson might feel vindicated).
• Age and Injury (and attitude): It’s also possible that we are seeing the impact of age and injury. Nowitzki, Kidd, and Terry have all celebrated their 30^th birthday. So their decline might be due to age (although Dampier has not yet suffered from this problem). As for injury, Howard has missed a number of games. He also might have some attitude issues. Certainly Howard has transformed from a very productive player in 2006-07 to a below average player in 2007-08. Much of this decline is related to Howard focusing on taking more shots and capturing substantially fewer rebounds and steals. In sum, Howard is transforming from a great role player to a not-so-great scorer.

Looking at Players

One observation we made in The Wages of Wins is that looking at the players isn’t going to be good enough.  You also have to look at the numbers and understand the story the numbers are telling.

Some – in an apparent effort to twist our words — have attempted to argue that we actually said you should never watch the players; all you should do is look at the numbers. In reality, we said watching has an important role.  This is what we specifically said on page 125 (of the hard cover version):

One cannot end the analysis when one has measured the value of player performance. Knowing the value of each player is only the starting point of analysis. The next step is determining why the player is productive or unproductive. In our view, this is where coaching should begin. We think we can offer a reasonable measure of a player’s productivity. Although we have offered some insights into why players are productive, ultimately this question can only be answered by additional scrutiny into the construction of a team and the roles a player plays on the floor.

This advice might apply specifically to the Mavericks.  We can see how productive these players were in 2007-08.  And we can see how productive these players have been in 2008-09.  What we cannot say with certainty is why the numbers are so different between each season.  And that is where – as we note above – the coaches need to step up. 

Clearly one place the coaches need to look is the play of Josh Howard.  Kidd, Nowitzki, and Dampier are on pace to 41.8 wins this year.  If Howard can return to what he did in 2006-07 – when he produced 10.9 wins – this team can at least gain some ground in the West.  If not, then Dallas may be making its first trip to the lottery since 2000.  Continue reading →

The NBA season is almost half over (Tuesday night is the official midpoint).  Given the relative consistency we see in basketball (relative to football and baseball), teams that are currently at the bottom of the standings should probably be making plans for the lottery.  In other words, the Washington Wizards – who currently reside in last place in the Eastern Conference – know this season is over.

Washington Looks at Next Season

Washington only won eight of their first 39 games.  The team’s efficiency differential (offensive efficiency minus defensive efficiency) is -6.72, a mark that also ranks last in the conference.  For this team to reach the 0.500 mark it would have to win 33 of its last 43 games.  Such a pace would be consistent with an efficiency differential in excess of 8.0.  In sum, the Wizards would have to improve by nearly 15.0 in efficiency differential to just win half their games in 2008-09.  Even if Gilbert Arenas came back (and there are indications that will not happen), Washington is not going to improve this much.

Although the season is effectively over in Washington it doesn’t mean the 2008-09 campaign was entirely negative.  Table One reports the Wins Produced and WP48 [Wins Produced per 48 minutes] of each player employed by the Wizards this season.  As one can see, most of this team is below average. 

Table One:  The Washington Wizards after 39 games in 2008-09

Not surprisingly, Antawn Jamison and Caron Butler – the two stars on this team – are posting above average numbers.  And joining these two – and this might be a surprise – is Dominic McGuire.

McGuire was taken in the second round by the Wizards in 2007.  Last year – in only 695 minutes – McGuire was below average (not surprising for a rookie).  This year he has already played 648 minutes and started 14 games.  And although he is only averaging 3.0 points per game, his WP48 of 0.163 leads the team (primarily because he has improved with respect to rebounds and turnovers).

If McGuire can continue to play well – and Arenas and Brendan Haywood can both play and be productive next season – the Wizards will have a formidable starting five in 2009-10 (Arenas, Butler, McGuire, Jamison, and Haywood).

The remainder of this season, though, is not going to look good.  At least, not for fans of Washington.

The Pacers Have Some Hope this Season

If we look at the team just above Washington in the standings, though, a different story could be told.  Again, if a team is out of contention today it will probably be seated at the lottery in a few months.  An exception to this story, though, might be the Indiana Pacers. Continue reading →

A few days ago I was asked by a journalist to comment on the Sacramento Kings.  Specifically, I was asked why the value of this franchise isn’t what it used to be.

The explanation offered by some (like people associated with the Kings) is that the economy in Sacramento is the problem. Although I think the local economy isn’t helping, I argued that the biggest problem is the quality of the product on the court. 

Sacramento History

Once upon a time the Kings were synonymous with bad basketball.  The Kings arrived in Sacramento in 1985 and proceeded to post an efficiency differential (offensive efficiency minus defensive efficiency) below -1.0 for thirteen consecutive season.  The last season in this string was the 1997-98 campaign.  That year Sacramento’s differential was -5.87 and the team only won 27 games (only the 1990-91 Sacramento Kings — when the Kings posted a -6.94 mark — offered a lower differential).

As Table One indicates, the 1997-98 Kings were led in Wins Produced by Billy Owens, Mitch Richmond, and Michael Stewart.  This trio produced 23.3 wins.  Unfortunately the rest of the roster produced fewer than three wins.  In fact, after the team’s top threesome, there was not a single player who played more than 500 minutes and posted an above average WP48 [Wins Produced per 48 minutes]. 

Table One: The Sacramento Kings in 1997-98

In 1998 Chris Webber – and Peja Stojakovic and Vlade Divac (and Jon Barry, Lawrence Funderburke, and Scott Pollard) – came to town.  This infusion of talent led the Kings to a winning record in 1998-99. And from 1999-2000 to 2005-06, Sacramento posted a positive efficiency differential each season.

In 2006-07, though, the happy days in Sacramento ended as the team’s efficiency differential fell to -1.84. Then last season the differential was only -2.29, the worst mark since the 1994-95 campaign.

Although the past two seasons were bad, it’s nothing compared to the disaster that’s the 2008-09 season. After 40 games, Sacramento’s differential is -9.03.  To put this mark in perspective:

• No team – not even the Oklahoma City Thunder – has a lower differential this season.
• No team – in the dreadful history of this franchise – has posted a lower differential.

Yes, this edition of the Kings is the worst edition ever.

The Bad Kings

So why is this team so bad?  For an answer we turn to Table Two.

Table Two: The Sacramento Kings after 40 games in 2008-09

From Table Two we see that the entire population of above average Sacramento players (who have played at least 200 minutes) consists of one player. Yes, Brad Miller is the only above average player employed in Sacramento. 

If we look at what these players did last year we see this population double.  Kevin Martin, who has been hurt this season, was very good last year.  So Martin’s injury has hurt more than just Martin. 

But even if Martin was healthy this team would be struggling.  This team – like the 1997-98 edition — simply doesn’t have enough talent.  And ultimately – I think – this is why the value of this franchise has fallen.  According to ESPN.com, the Kings – a team that sold out every home game two years ago — are currently ranked last in attendance.  This decline in attendance is clearly associated with a decline in the quality of the team on the floor.  And the performance of this team is clearly related to the player selections this team has made.

The Hawks Soar (sort of)

One choice the Kings made was sending Mike Bibby to the Atlanta Hawks.  This season Bibby has posted a 0.205 WP48 and is on pace to produce 12.1 wins. Had the Kings kept Bibby, Sacramento would currently …. well, they would still be bad.  But Bibby is clearly helping the Hawks be good. Continue reading →

According to Dictionary.com, boring is defined as follows: To make weary by being dull, repetitive, or tedious.  Given this definition, I think the Spurs are somewhat boring.  Consider the following:

• For the past five seasons this team has won between 56 and 63 regular season games.
• The team’s Wins Produced for the past five seasons has ranged from 53.5 to 63.1.
• In each season the team has been led in Wins Produced by the exact same trio (this is the really repetitive or boring aspect of this team). The trio consists of Tim Duncan, Manu Ginobili, and Tony Parker, and the Wins Production of these three players has ranged from 35.5 to 44.4.
• Prior to last season, the Wins Produced of every Spur not named Duncan, Ginobili, and Parker ranged from 18.7 to 24.3.

In sum, the Spurs are quite repetitive.  And for someone who is not particularly a fan of this team, such repetition seems kind of boring.

The Story this Season

It’s my goal to offer one comment on every NBA team before the midpoint of the season.  So despite the repetitive nature of this team, I feel compelled to say something about San Antonio.  Continue reading →

The New Jersey Nets – led by Dr. J. — won the final ABA championship in 1976.  The next season – without Dr. J. – the Nets won only 22 games in their inaugural NBA campaign.

That first NBA season proved to be a harbinger of things to come.  In the first 25 years this team played in the NBA, the Nets made the playoffs just ten times and only reached the second round of the playoffs once.  In other words, Dr. J. made the second round of the NBA playoffs (nine times) in his career almost as often as the entire New Jersey franchise made the playoffs in the first 25 years the team played in the Association.

And then in 2001, Jason Kidd arrived.  Over the next six seasons the Nets made the playoffs six times.  New Jersey also found some post-season success, moving past the first round on four occasions (and twice reaching the Finals).

Last season, though, Kidd was traded to the Dallas Mavericks and the Nets stayed home from the playoffs.  As noted last May, the departure of Kidd was not the entire story.  The Nets also suffered from a failure to build around Kidd and a substantial decline in the productivity of Richard Jefferson.

The Nets in the Playoffs?

Regardless of the reasons, the Nets failed to contend in the Eastern Conference last season.  This year, though, it looks like this team is back.  At least, through games of Saturday night, the Nets are currently a playoff team.   If the season were to end today the Nets would hold the seventh seed in the Eastern Conference.

Although the current standing of this team may give hope to this team’s fans, the won-loss record of the Nets is a bit misleading.  When we look at efficiency differential (offensive efficiency minus defensive efficiency) we see that New Jersey currently has a mark of -2.03.  So far eight teams in the Eastern Conference have a better mark.  And the Raptors and Pacers currently sport a differential of -2.2 and -2.3 respectively (and the Pacers just got back Mike Dunleavy, the team’s most productive player from last season).  In sum, right now it doesn’t look like the Nets are clearly headed for the playoffs.

That being said, it does appear that this team has improved.  And when we look at Table One, we can see why this team is a bit better.

Table One: The New Jersey Nets after 37 games in 2008-09

Devin Harris Shoots and Shoots

The big story is the play of Devin Harris.  In his first four seasons, he posted WP48 [Wins Produced per 48 minutes] marks that ranged from 0.099 (his rookie season) to 0.135 (what he did for the Nets last season).  In sum, Harris was a bit above average for most of his career.  This season, though, his WP48 has increased to 0.226.

When we look at Table Two we can see how Harris improved.  In general we focus on shooting efficiency, rebounds, steals, and turnovers when we wish to see why a player’s productivity has changed.  For Harris, though, we see very little difference with respect to these statistics. He’s a bit better with respect to turnovers and steals, but he’s doing less with respect to rebounds.  And with respect to shooting efficiency from the field he’s about the same.  In sum, with respect to the statistics that tend to drive performance, Harris hasn’t changed much.

Table Two: Evaluating Devin Harris in 2008-09

And yet, his Wins Produced has clearly risen.  When we look carefully at Table Two we can see the reason.  The primary difference is shot attempts. Whether we look at shots from the field or shots from the line, Harris is simply launching more basketballs towards the hoop.  And because Harris is an above average scorer – both from the line and the field (and despite a field goal percentage below 50%, Harris is above average from the field) – the more shots he takes the more wins he produces.  Continue reading →