A few weeks ago Bill Simmons of ESPN.com referred to Mike Dunleavy – head coach and general manager of the LA Clippers – as “Dumbleavy” (see A dumbfounding night in the ‘Dumbleavy Era’).  Beyond the issue of Simmons calling someone else on the planet dumb (see Speeding Up Time for Bill Simmons & I Like Bill Simmons, Really I Do for two examples of Simmons being less than brilliant) is the general idea that Dunleavy is not helping the Clippers.

Apparently the disenchantment with Dunleavy has reached a point where Isiah Thomas is considered a person who can help.  Last week Chris Sheridan wrote an article detailing the contact between Isiah and the Clippers.  This article included the following two paragraphs outlining where Dunleavy has failed:

Dunleavy has generally won praise for his salary cap management and his most recent personnel moves such as signing Baron Davis, acquiring Zach Randolph from New York for Tim Thomas and Cuttino Mobley, drafting Eric Gordon and acquiring roughly $2 million in cash considerations over the course of this season from teams dumping salaries.

Dunleavy’s coaching is actually the area where the most justifiable criticism could be directed. The Clippers entered Wednesday night’s game against New York 37 games under .500. He has clashed with some Clippers players, most notably Davis and Chris Kaman, although Sterling has been publicly supportive of Dunleavy and overtly critical of his players, most recently when he went on a postgame rant in the locker room after a loss to San Antonio earlier this month.

Sheridan appears to be arguing that the issue isn’t Dunleavy the general manager; but rather, the general manager has been let down by Coach Dunleavy.   In other words, Dunleavy has picked the right players.  The players, though, are not living up to expectations.

Two Views of the Clippers

To see if this is true, let’s compare what the Clippers have done in 2008-09 to what we could have expected if we made the very simple assumption that what we saw last year from this team’s players we would see this year.

Table One: The LA Clippers in 2008-09 After 74 Games

As Table One indicates — given what these players did last year — the Clippers could have expected to win about 31 of their first 74 games in 2008-09.  Instead the team’s Wins Produced stands at 16.5.  If we look at the individual players we can see that about 80% of the difference between these two views can be tied to the play of just four players: Baron Davis, Chris Kaman, Ricky Davis, and Al Thornton. Continue reading →

Chris Broussard – of ESPN the Magazine and ESPN.com – offered a profile of Danny Granger this past week with the following provocative title: What’s The Difference Between Danny Granger and Kobe Bryant?: Their stats suggest not much. Then again, some will tell you stats lie. Particularly when your team isn’t all that.

Despite the title, Broussard’s story barely mentions Kobe.  What it does do is tell us how the stats suggest Granger is a really good NBA player.

Unfortunately – as often happens when sports writers start discussing stats – the actual statistical arguments are quite weak.  The primary stat Broussard is scoring totals.  Yes, he does mention factors like shooting efficiency and blocked shots.  But it’s clear when you read the article that Broussard’s primary focus – as the following paragraph from the article indicates — is Granger’s scoring. 

Being able to reconcile the space between a player’s stats and his team’s record is a big part of what separates championship-level talent evaluators from the recycled masses. All sorts of x factors come into play: Who is the guy scoring against? How does he get his points? Is he effective in crunch time? And the consensus on Granger, not just in front offices, but on sidelines and in locker rooms as well, is that he’s legit.

When we look at this paragraph it becomes clear that for Broussard, the proper word is not “stats” but “stat”.  In other words, he is primarily interested in scoring. And scoring is captured for Broussard by one stat, the number of points credited to a player.  When we move past this one stat, though, a very different story is told about Granger and Kobe.

Granger vs. Kobe

A couple of weeks ago I offered an entire column detailing how all the statistics – not just scoring totals – indicate Granger is not very different from an average NBA player.  What was missing from the earlier post was a comparison between Granger and Kobe (it was missing since I had no idea someone would make such a comparison). 

That is offered in Table One below.

Table One: Comparing Danny Granger and Kobe Bryant

If we focus just on scoring we see some similarities between the two players. Both take more than 30 shots from the field per 48 minutes and both are efficient. 

When we move past scoring, though, we see clear differences.  Relative to an average small forward, Granger is below average with respect to everything except blocked shots and assists.  In contrast, Kobe is above average – relative to an average shooting guard – with respect to almost everything.  Consequently when we look at the big picture – via Win Score – was see that Kobe is much more productive.

Win Score is easy to calculate but not so easy to interpret.  In other words, we can see Kobe has a higher Win Score, but what do the differences mean in terms of wins?  To answer that question we turn to Wins Produced. Continue reading →

A few days ago the following article was posted by Mike Kurylo of Knickerblogger:

Haven’t the Knicks Improved?

Kurylo’s column was in response to an article in Pro Basketball News – Courtside View: Knicks said to be improving, but are they really? – that argued the Knicks have not really gotten better in Mike D’Antoni’s first season as head coach.  The following paragraph from this article specifically attracted Kurylo’s attention.

The Knicks have improved from 21st in scoring last season (96.9 ppg) to fourth this season (105.6 ppg) but they have dropped from 22nd in points allowed (103.5 ppg) to 28th (108.2 ppg) and their point differential of -2.6 ppg ranks in the bottom third of the league (22nd), only a few spots better than last season (-6.6 ppg, 25th). The Knicks were last in field-goal percentage differential last season (-.036) and they are last again this season (-.038). Although Lee has emerged as a nightly double-double threat, the Knicks have markedly declined overall on the boards, dropping from 18th in rebounding differential (-.1) to 27th (-3.9). A team that consistently gets out-shot and out-rebounded obviously has no realistic chance to be successful, no matter how many points it scores or how many players post career high individual numbers.

The primary issue Kurylo raised upon presenting this paragraph is that the author focused on points-per-game, rather than points-per-possession.  The former ignores pace and consequently it doesn’t accurately reflect the quality of a team.  Having read both the article in Pro Basketball News and Kurylo’s discussion, I thought I would spend today’s column reflecting on the dispute.

The Knicks Have Improved

Let me begin with another quote from the Pro Basketball News article:

“….the Knicks are not much better than they were when Isiah Thomas ran the show; Thomas had a .402 winning percentage in his first season on New York’s bench, virtually identical to the .406 winning percentage that D’Antoni has posted so far in his first season in New York.”

As Kurylo notes, such a comparison is cherry-picking at its worst.  D’Antoni did not inherit the Knicks from 2004-05.  The team he inherited from Isiah Thomas posted a 23-59 record last season.

And if we compare the 2007-08 team to the Knicks in 2008-09, it’s clear this team has improved.

In 2007-08 the Knicks scored 101.2 points per 100 offensive possessions and allowed 108.1 points per 100 defensive possessions.  So the Knicks efficiency differential – offensive efficiency minus defensive efficiency – was -6.9.  Obviously this is bad.  In fact, it was the worst differential for the Knicks since these numbers could be fully calculated (complete calculations go back to 1973-74).  

Now that we have established what D’Antoni inherited, let’s make a proper comparison.  After 71 games in 2008-09 the Knicks have posted the following numbers:

Offensive Efficiency: 105.2 points per 100 possessions

Defensive Efficiency: 107.8 points per 100 possessions

Efficiency Differential: -2.6

Looking at these numbers it’s clear the Knicks have improved on offense and defense.  Consequently it’s not surprising that this team has already surpassed last year’s wins.

Why Have the Knicks Improved?

Much of what I said was already noted in Kurylo’s column.  Now let me offer something more. Continue reading →

Today’s guest post is yet another excellent offering from Erich Doerr, updating his analysis on the NCAA Tournament. I should note that Erich sent this to me on Sunday night, but apparently my e-mail at Southern Utah ate it for a late night snack. Fortunately Erich was able to re-send it.  As I have noted before, outside of his basketball writing, Erich does consulting work for major software products by day and has started a fledgling sports-themed Open Source software initiative by night. 

The committee can stand proud this year as 14 of the 16 top seeds advanced through the opening weekend.  Only 5^th seeded Purdue and 12^th seeded Arizona broke the committee’s vision of the top 16.

With all the excitement suspended until Thursday, let’s take a step back to reflect and preview what lies ahead.  Table One, linked below, offers updated National Championship and Final Four odds for the remaining teams. 

Table One: Updated Odds (also see same table HERE)

The table offers each team’s original ratings and odds as of last week with a comparison to the current ratings and odds. 

Outside of the top contenders, most teams improved their chances by merely surviving, though some also got help from upsets that made their path easier.  In particular, Kansas and Louisville benefited from this phenomenon.  Originally, Kansas’s path seemed destined to go through a tough 6 seed in West Virginia, though Dayton spoiled that matchup and subsequently lost to the Jayhawks.  Kansas’s Final Four probability improved from the original 11% to the current 24% mostly due to this good fortune.

Louisville is now more likely than not to reach the Final Four, given their 50.3% odds.  Most of this improvement can be traced back to their region’s 4^th and 5^th seed upsets in round one, setting Louisville up for an Elite 8 match against the only remaining double digit seed.

Beyond just surviving, ratings improvements have also boosted the chances of Oklahoma, Villanova, and Connecticut heading to Detroit.  Both Pomeroy and Sagarin statistics suggest these three teams are getting better at just the right time, and these improvements factor into their improved forecasts.

Graphically, the charts below offer a day-by-day account of the top 8 teams and their chances.

Graph One

In the first graph, Louisville’s luck jumps upward as Friday’s upsets occur.  Memphis and Connecticut’s odds merge as a potential showdown looms.  The second chart offers a visual of the ratings boosts earned by Oklahoma and Connecticut.

Overall, the best of this year’s tournament has yet to come.  Remember to drop by the comments this weekend for updates as the field dwindles.

- Erich

On Sunday, while most basketball fans were tuned to CBS to watch the NCAA Tournament, ESPN telecast a game between the Miami Heat and Detroit Pistons.  As a fan of Detroit, I decided to look away from the tournament and look in on the Pistons basketball.  The picture was almost good.  Specifically the Pistons — without the services of Allen Iverson, Rasheed Wallace, and Richard Hamilton – managed to lead most of the way before faltering at the end. 

Although the game was entertaining, the comments of Mark Jackson and Jeff Van Gundy were more interesting.  At different points in the broadcast the conversation turned to why the Pistons have faltered.  And once again the viewers were able to see “expert” broadcasters try and reconcile these three “facts.”

• Allen Iverson is one of the greatest players to ever play the game.
• Chauncey Billups is a very good player, but not one of the greatest players to ever play the game.
• The Pistons with Allen Iverson are clearly worse than the Pistons with Billups.

The simplest way to reconcile these three statements is to acknowledge that the first is not true.  At least, if we focus on productivity, Iverson is not one of the most productive NBA players in history. 

But if you can’t make that leap, then you have to resort to words like “team chemistry”.  Unfortunately, since “team chemistry” can’t be quantified (unlike player productivity) we can never properly evaluate the merits of the “chemistry” argument.

As I have noted throughout the season – most recently last month – one does not need “chemistry” to explain the Pistons demise.  No, much of the decline (although not all) is tied to the fact that Iverson is not as productive as Billups.

Another Reason Why Trading Billups was a Good Idea

Again, I have said this before.  What I wished to add to the subject is something I observed in looking at the numbers Billups is posting in Denver this season. 

Table One: The Denver Nuggets after 70 games in 2008-09

As Table One notes, Billups has produced more wins than any other player on Denver’s roster this season.  But if we compare his production to what he did last year in Detroit, he clearly has declined.  Last year he posted a 0.304 WP48. This year in Denver his mark is only 0.188.  Yes, he is still above average (average is 0.100). But he clearly is offering less.

When we look at the individual numbers – posted in Table Two – we can see where he has declined.  This season Billups has seen declines with respect to both his shooting efficiency and assists. 

Table Two: Evaluating Chauncey Billups

The next question we should ask is why Billups is doing less.  And one issue I would emphasize is his age.  Billups is 32 and will turn 33 in September.   This means he is rapidly approaching the age where playing basketball in the NBA is not possible.  To illustrate, across the past 30 years, 95% of player seasons were played by players who were younger than 35 years of age.   In sum, the clock is approaching midnight for Mr. Big Shot and when it hits 12, he won’t be of much use to an NBA team.

All of this suggests that the Iverson-Billups trade was a good move by Joe Dumars (Detroit’s GM).  Yes, fans of Detroit are suffering this year.  But as noted previously, Iverson’s contract expires and this gives Detroit hope for next year.  Plus, Dumars got rid of a player that will be approaching 35 years of age in 2010-11 while collecting $13 million. 

In sum, it looks like Dumars has done the same thing to Billups he did to Ben Wallace.  He let a player depart whose production was destined to slip.  And this is something every prudent general manager should be doing.  As the late Cotton Fitzsimmons once said (and I can’t find the quote but I think he said something like this): “Please don’t let my great players retire on me.” 

Forecasting Wins

The predictability of age brings me to the issue of prediction.  If we look back at Table One we see two projections of the Nuggets. The first assumes that what the players did in the past (typically last year) is what they will do in the future.  The second looks at how many wins a team should get given what the players are doing this season.  When we look at these two projections we see that despite the decline we see in the production of Billups, Denver’s Wins Produced this season is consistent with what we would have expected if we believed that Denver’s players would keep doing exactly what they did in the most recent past.

The approach presented in Table One is the standard approach I take in evaluating a team.  But I think it has led to some confusion.  Continue reading →