Two Perspectives on the Top 10 across the Past Decade

This past week, Kelly Dwyer of Yahoo! Sports constructed a list of The top 10 individual statistical seasons of the last decade.  Dwyer introduced the list with the following statement: “….let’s go cold. Best statistical season. Pure production. I don’t care if a player’s wife gave birth to triplets in the same season he was able to guest star on stage in a David Mamet production the year his team finally won a title while he averaged a career-high in rebounds per game. Don’t care about the sweet story, only care about the sweet stats.”

In looking at the list it was not quite clear what “production” Dwyer was seeking to measure.  He mentioned points, blocks, steals, rebounds, Player Efficiency Rating (PER), Win Shares, etc….   What he never mentioned is how he decided Kevin Garnett’s performance in 2003-04 (ranked 3rd) was better than what Chris Paul did this past season (ranked 7th).  Numbers can be used to differentiate each performance, but you have to have some sort of methodology that allows such differentiation.  And that’s missing from this ranking.

In the comments on my last post, Simon noted the following about Dwyer’s rankings:

“…there’s nothing surprising about the list. It’s basically the list of players’ with highest PER number, with one exception. Dwight Howard’s 08-09 season was actually behind Iverson’s 05-06(25.9) and Elton Brand’s 05-06 season(26.5) in PER but the Superman curiously got the nod as the sole exception.”

The Wins Produced Rankings

So Simon argues that Dwyer – despite mentioning a number of stats – essentially relied on PERs.  Other people – via comments at the WoW Journal and e-mail – have asked that I re-construct the list via Wins Produced.  And without further comment, here is that list:

Rank

Player

Wins Produced

1

Kevin Garnett (2002-03)

30.7

2

Kevin Garnett (2003-04)

29.6

3

Kevin Garnett (2004-05)

29.4

4

Chris Paul (2008-09)

28.2

5

LeBron James (2008-09)

27.8

6

Shaquille O’Neal (1999-00)

27.1

7

Ben Wallace (2002-03)

27.1

8

Kevin Garnett (2005-06)

26.2

9

Ben Wallace (2001-02)

25.6

10

Tim Duncan (2001-02)

25.0

As one can see, Kevin Garnett dominated the NBA from 2002-03 to 2005-06.  Unfortunately, his teammates were not very productive.  So KG had to wait until 2007-08 to finally play for a team that could dominate the NBA as he did individually.

Standard Deviations Above Average (SDAA)

One issue in looking at this list is that it’s dominated by big men.  Wins Produced compares a player to the average at his position.  As noted in the Wages of Wins, though, there’s a “short supply of big men.”  As a consequence, teams are forced to employ big men who are not very productive.  In contrast, as players get smaller the supply increases.  And that means, there are many more productive little guys. All of this means that it’s easier for the very best big men to distance themselves from the pack at their position.

To adjust for this issue – again, as noted in The Wages of Wins — we can examine how many standard deviations a player is above (or below) the mean at his position. For example, in 2002-03 Kevin Garnett posted a 0.443 WP48. The standard deviation of WP48 for a power forward is 0.110.  Consequently, Garnett was 3.11 standard deviations above average (average WP48 is 0.100). 

To put this in perspective, Michael Jordan – in 1990-91 – posted a 0.437 WP48.  If we compare WP48 numbers, KG’s 2002-03 season looks slightly better.  However, the standard deviation of WP48 for a shooting guard is only 0.092.  So Jordan’s performance that season was 3.65 standard deviations above average.  One should note that this wasn’t even Jordan’s best season. In 1988-89 MJ was 4.18 standard deviations above the average shooting guard.  Since 1977-78, only Magic Johnson in 1982-83 managed to perform four standard deviations above the average at his position (Magic’s mark that year was 4.02).  In fact, if we look at the past thirty years, only Magic and Jordan managed to post marks that were 3.5 standard deviations above average (Magic did this six times, Jordan did this three times).

Well, at least that was true until last year.  As the following table reveals, this past year both Chris Paul and LeBron James surpassed the 3.5 mark.

Rank

Player

Standard Deviations Above Average

1

Chris Paul (2008-09)

3.68

2

LeBron James (2008-09)

3.50

3

Kevin Garnett (2004-05)

3.18

4

Shawn Marion (2000-01)

3.16

5

Jason Kidd (2006-07)

3.12

6

Kevin Garnett (2002-03)

3.11

7

Kevin Garnett (2003-04)

3.08

8

Ben Wallace (2002-03)

3.06

9

Chris Paul (2007-08)

3.02

10

Kevin Garnett (2005-06)

2.94

So if we consider how far a player statistically surpasses the average productivity at his position, both CP3 and King James this past season offered the best performance across the past decade.  In fact, one has to go back to the 1990-91 season to find a player who performed at the level of Paul and James in 2008-09.

Let me close by briefly commenting on Kobe Bryant. Dwyer argues that what Kobe did in 2005-06 ranks in the top 10; and if we focus on scoring (or PERs) that might be true.  Kobe’s WP48 in 2005-06, though, was only 0.203; or only 1.12 standard deviations above average.  And that wasn’t even Kobe’s best season. In 2002-03, Kobe posted a 0.260 WP48, a mark that was only 1.73 standard deviations above average.

Kobe is often compared to Jordan.  However, when we compare Kobe to MJ – via Wins Produced, WP48, or SDAA – it’s clear that Kobe is not like Mike.  Kobe is more like MJ Lite.  Or perhaps, MJ Very Lite.

- DJ

The WoW Journal Comments Policy

Our research on the NBA was summarized HERE.

The Technical Notes at wagesofwins.com provides substantially more information on the published research behind Wins Produced and Win Score

Wins Produced, Win Score, and PAWSmin are also discussed in the following posts:

Simple Models of Player Performance

Wins Produced vs. Win Score

What Wins Produced Says and What It Does Not Say

Introducing PAWSmin — and a Defense of Box Score Statistics

Finally, A Guide to Evaluating Models contains useful hints on how to interpret and evaluate statistical models.

The Historical Nets Return

A few weeks ago Scott Howard-Cooper of SI.com penned the following: Nets are putting the pieces in place.  The article focuses on why fans of the New Jersey Nets should be optimistic. Here is part of Howard-Cooper’s story:

Suddenly, there is a lineup of the future:

PG — Harris, 26 years old, an All-Star, good defender.

SG — Lee, 23 years old, 45 percent from the field and 40.4 percent on three-pointers in the regular season as a rookie before getting hurt early in the playoffs and struggling against the Lakers in the NBA Finals.

SF — Williams, 22 years old, arguably the best perimeter defender in the draft, a strong rebounder at 6-foot-6 and with enough ball-handling skills that some teams would have considered him a potential point forward. Not that Williams — who isn’t a great shooter and has been knocked for lacking focus — is a sure thing. One executive said before the draft, “He could be a substantial player. And he could be out of the league in three years.”

PF — Maybe Yi, 22 years old the night before the season opener. The Nets would obviously love him to take control of the position, but he shot only 38.2 percent last season and lost his starting job in late March. Power forward is New Jersey’s greatest uncertainty.

C — Lopez, 21 years old, All-Rookie team, very good offensive skills with the chance to reach double-figure rebounds.

The Nets are set at point guard and center, and those are the toughest spots to fill. They have reason to be encouraged at shooting guard and small forward. The obvious reality check is that Harris is the only elite player at his position right now. Stars win games, and stars especially win playoff games, but the current roster is mostly complementary pieces.

Fans of the Nets might read such an article and start dreaming of the days when the Nets will be in contention.  When I read this article, though, I had a different reaction.

New Jersey History

This reaction begins with what the Nets looked like before the 2001-02 season.  Across the Nets first 24 seasons in the NBA the team averaged 32.9 wins per season and only won more than half their games seven times.  And never once did the team win more than 49 games.

In 2001 Jason Kidd arrived.  Across the next seven seasons the Nets averaged 45 wins per season (winning 52 games in 2001-02), won at least half their games six times, and reached the NBA Finals twice.   Kidd was a big part of this success.  As a Net, Kidd produced 135.4 wins and posted a 0.347 WP48 [Wins Produced per 48 minutes].  To put that number in perspective, the Nets have won 1,128 games since the franchise entered the NBA.  Twelve percent of these wins can be linked back to Kidd. 

To see how much Kidd meant to New Jersey, let’s look back to these seven years and imagine what the Nets would have looked like had Kidd been replaced by a player who was just as productive as Kidd’s actual teammates. 

Projecting the Nets without Kidd

2001-02: 37.5 Wins Produced

2002-03: 40.3 Wins Produced

2003-04: 37.1 Wins Produced

2004-05: 20.9 Wins Produced

2005-06: 24.6 Wins Produced

2006-07: 17.2 Wins Produced

2007-08: 15.9 Wins Produced

Average performance without Kidd: 27.6 Wins Produced

Looking at the numbers, it appears the Nets from 2001-02 to 2007-08 without Kidd look similar to the Nets from 1977-78 to 2000-01 (when Kidd didn’t play).  In sum, the Nets have historically been a bad NBA team.  And only the play of Jason Kidd changed that reality.

Looking Back and Forward

When we look at the 2008-09 season we see the story continue.   As Table One indicates, last season the Nets did receive above average performances from Vince Carter, Devin Harris, Brook Lopez, and Bobby Simmons. 

Table One: The New Jersey Nets in 2008-09

These above-average players, though, only combined to produce 27.9 wins.  And since the remaining eleven players could only produce about seven wins, the team was once again below 0.500.

And looking forward we see a more dismal picture.  Vince Carter – the team’s leader in Wins Produced in 2008-09 – has departed for the Orlando Magic.  This departure leaves the Nets with the following depth chart (taken mostly from ESPN.com, with Wins Produced numbers from the 2008-09 season).

First String

PG: Devin Harris (8.0 Wins Produced, 0.154 WP48, 2,494 minutes)

SG: Courtney Lee (3.0 Wins Produced, 0.075 WP48, 1,939 minutes)

SF: Bobby Simmons (4.3 Wins Produced, 0.119 WP48, 1,729 minutes)

PF: Yi Jianlian (0.0 Wins Produced, 0.001 WP48, 1,421 minutes)

C: Brook Lopez (5.4 Wins Produced, 0.104 WP48, 2,501 minutes)

Second String

PG: Keyon Dooling (3.4 Wins Produced, 0.079 WP48, 2,074 minutes)

SG: Trenton Hassell (1.2 Wins Produced, 0.053 WP48, 1,094 minutes)

SF: Jarvis Hayes (0.4 Wins Produced, 0.011 WP48, 1,832 minutes)

PF: Tony Battie (1.7 Wins Produced, 0.067 WP48, 1,202 minutes)

C: Josh Boone (1.3 Wins Produced, 0.063 WP48, 995 minutes)

In addition to these ten players, the Nets also have these players:

PG: Rafer Alston (4.4 Wins Produced, 0.087 WP48, 2,447 minutes)

SG: Chris Douglas-Roberts (0.5 Wins Produced, 0.037 WP48, 584 minutes)

SF: Eduardo Najera (-0.3 Wins Produced, -0.038 WP48, 319 minutes)

PF: Sean Williams (-0.9 Wins Produced, -0.123 WP48, 366 minutes)

In the draft the Nets added Terrence Williams, who appears to be one of the better players chosen last summer.  Unfortunately, even if Williams is an above average rookie, this roster has problems.  Based on last year’s performance, only three veteran players exceeded the mark of an average player [0.100 WP48].  And only Harris exceeds the 0.150 mark (and only barely).   

Harris argues that this roster is equivalent to a “quality” team: “If you look at our team from top to bottom, we don’t have a lot of big names, but we have a lot of good players.” —G Devin Harris stressing the Nets can be a competent, quality team without superstar players.

When we consider past performance, though, the Nets this next season look quite similar to the historical Nets.  This team has a few productive players.  But no one on this roster has shown that they can produce wins in large quantities.

To illustrate the problem of not having one extremely productive player, let’s imagine that Devin Harris is as productive in 09-10 as he was last season and everyone else on the roster manages to match the productivity of Bobby Simmons [the second most productive returning veteran with a 0.119 WP48].  Such a roster, consisting entirely of slightly above average players, would only be expected to win 51 games. 

Of course, the Nets don’t have such a roster. What they have is a roster where the second most productive returning player is Bobby Simmons, and every other returning veteran offered less.  And this means the 2009-10 season will not likely be a happy one for Nets fans.

Looking back at the words of Howard-Cooper, it doesn’t appear we disagree on the likely outcome of the 2009-10 season.  Where we differ is on the assessment of where this team is going.  Howard-Cooper sees some building blocks in place and consequently sees a glass that is half-filled.  When I look at this roster, though, I see one huge building block that is missing and therefore the glass is more than half empty.  And until a truly productive player is added to this roster, the Nets before Kidd will once again be the norm. 

- DJ

The WoW Journal Comments Policy

Our research on the NBA was summarized HERE.

The Technical Notes at wagesofwins.com provides substantially more information on the published research behind Wins Produced and Win Score

Wins Produced, Win Score, and PAWSmin are also discussed in the following posts:

Simple Models of Player Performance

Wins Produced vs. Win Score

What Wins Produced Says and What It Does Not Say

Introducing PAWSmin — and a Defense of Box Score Statistics

Finally, A Guide to Evaluating Models contains useful hints on how to interpret and evaluate statistical models.

Two Announcements

The big news for today is that “the next book” is finished!!!  Actually, it was finished on August 30.  At that point all the chapters were completed.  Since then, though, we had to write a preface (which includes acknowledgements of the many people who helped us) and organize the references.  All of this was completed this past weekend.  And today we were told the book has moved in to production at FT Press.

Now production takes a few months.  So the book – as Amazon.com indicates — will not be available to everyone until next March.  But at this point – after more than a year of work – the entire book does exist; and we look forward to the day when everyone gets a chance to read the stories we have told.

Now that the book is completed, I will now be giving more attention to this blog.  The first task is to complete the review of the 2008-09 season.  As indicated at NBA Team Reviews: 2008-09, the following teams have been examined.

Charlotte Bobcats: Is this the Year a Charlotte Basketball Team – and MJ – Return to the Playoffs?

Chicago Bulls: Chicago Hope

Golden State Warriors: Stephen Jackson Wants a Better Team, What if Don Nelson Embraced Tradition?

Memphis Grizzlies: The Memphis Lions Try and Roar

Miami Heat: Miami Fails to Build on Flash, Beasley or Boozer?

Milwaukee Bucks: Revising Expectations Upwards in Milwaukee

Philadelphia 76ers: No Longer Miller Time in Philadelphia

Portland Trail Blazers: Portland Misses and Misses and… Wins Again, Portland Misses and Misses and…Wins?

Washington Wizards: Are the Wizards one of the ten best teams in the NBA?

The season begins in five weeks, so I am going to need to review four teams per week if I am going to complete the 2008-09 season review on time.  Now that the book is completed, I think this is possible.

Let me briefly note the purpose of these reviews.  First, I wish to report each player’s Wins Produced and WP48 [Wins Produced per 48 minutes] for the 2008-09 season.  Such numbers are the starting point of my review of what happened last season.   With numbers in hand, I then look forward to next season.   The look forward is not intended to specify the exact number of games a team will win in 2009-10.  No, the purpose is to outline some possibilities (i.e. if player A does X, the team will likely win Z). 

All that being said, let me note that the next team I will cover is the Nets.  After that, I am open to suggestions.

Again, across the next five weeks these reviews will be the focus.  This means I do not play on discussing the NFL and quarterbacks – as I did each of the past three seasons – until after these reviews are finished (unless there is a big demand for this analysis).

One last note… as we wrote the book I was not as responsive as I would like.  E-mails went unanswered and other research projects were delayed.   Going forward I hope to do a bit better (and I apologize for being so slow this past year). 

- DJ

The WoW Journal Comments Policy

Our research on the NBA was summarized HERE.

The Technical Notes at wagesofwins.com provides substantially more information on the published research behind Wins Produced and Win Score

Wins Produced, Win Score, and PAWSmin are also discussed in the following posts:

Simple Models of Player Performance

Wins Produced vs. Win Score

What Wins Produced Says and What It Does Not Say

Introducing PAWSmin — and a Defense of Box Score Statistics

Finally, A Guide to Evaluating Models contains useful hints on how to interpret and evaluate statistical models.

Buying and Selling Losers in Professional Sports

Matthew Yglesias – in The Trouble With “Redskins” – reveals how he came to follow Washington’s NFL team. 

When I realized I was most likely going to stay in Washington, DC and write about politics forever and ever and ever, I decided to abandon my New York sports heritage and adopt DC’s teams. I know it’s a minority view, but I don’t think it makes sense to let the dead hand of where you happened to spend the first 18 years of your life dictate behavior for decades and decades going forward.

Yglesias then goes on to note that the name “Redskins” is “ridiculous”. And I would add “offensive” (note: Martin Schmidt is a lifetime fan of the Redskins, but also dislikes the name).  Although this is an important point, I wish to return to what Yglesias had to say about changing his NFL loyalties.

Loyal to the Lions

As I have noted in the past, I was born in Detroit.  My family left the Motor City in 1981, and since this time I have lived in Nebraska, Colorado, Iowa, California, and now Utah.  Like Yglesias, I have decided that my current home is going to remain my permanent place of residence.  Unlike Yglesias, though, I maintain my allegiance to teams from my original home town.  And this means I remain – even after 19 consecutive losses – a fan of the Detroit Lions.

The Lions had their home opener today and it appears I am not alone.  Despite all the losses – and a recession that has devastated Detroit — the Lions still managed to fill the stadium. 

In sports, such loyalty is often considered a virtue.  But most everywhere else, such loyalty to an inferior product could be thought of as “irrational.”  The Lions are bad.  They have essentially been bad since the Ford family took over the Lions fifty years in an apparent effort to conclusively demonstrate that managerial ability is not something a person inherits.  Despite this history of “badness”, I remain a fan of this team and spend part of my Sundays in the fall watching this team lose.

There is some comfort in knowing I am not alone.  Not only are there other fans of the Lions, other sports teams have also inspired such behavior.  Perhaps the most famous of these teams is the Chicago Cubs.  And hence we turn to the actual point of this post.

A Lesson in Sports Economics

Josh Peter of Yahoo! Sports has penned a wonderful story detailing the effort Tom Ricketts has made to purchase the “lovable losers” in Chicago.  I did offer a comment for Peter’s story.  Once you get past what I had to say, though, you get to the true value in Peter’s work.  In a fantastic lesson for students of sports economics, Peter’s work provides substantial details behind the sale of the Cubs.  These details review all the revenue streams Ricketts is purchasing, and furthermore, provides evidence that buying a “loser” can be a good buy in professional sports.  And that’s because you can often sell that “loser” to sports fans that simply can’t bear to look away.

- DJ

Here is the complete story from Josh Peter:

 

Buying Cubs could be a steal for Ricketts

A businessman has agreed to pay $845 million for the Chicago Cubs, and details of the team’s finances and profit potential might have prompted the late Harry Caray to exclaim, “Holy Cash Cow!”

Bleacher Bums swilling Old Style and crowds of 40,000 vowing to “root, root, root for the Cubbies” are among the most time-honored and lucrative rituals in baseball. The Cubs pocket more than $2 million for each of their 81 regular-season home games, based on financial information Yahoo! Sports obtained from three people familiar with the pending deal between Chicago businessman Tom Ricketts and the Tribune Co., current owner of the team. The sources spoke on the condition they remain unidentified because they are not authorized to share the figures.

And game-day profits are only one reason Ricketts is prepared to pay more than anyone has for an American sports franchise – provided the deal is approved by a bankruptcy judge who must decide if creditors owed by Tribune Co. are getting their money’s worth. Tax breaks will enable both Ricketts and Tribune to save hundreds of millions of dollars.

Despite failing to win a World Series for 101 years and counting, the Cubs remain one of the most profitable teams in sports. The following is a look at how the Cubs make money, and why the deal makes sense for Ricketts.

GATE RECEIPTS

Estimated annual revenue: $140 million

Maybe there’s a reason Ricketts rhymes with tickets.

Cubs fans might consider the team’s playoff appearances in 2003 and 2007 as the most memorable recent seasons. But for Ricketts, the most reassuring years would be 2005 and 2006.

In 2005, the Cubs went 79-83 but still drew more than three million fans, the sixth highest MLB attendance that year. The next year the Cubs imploded, finishing 66-96, and yet drew more than 3.1 million fans, again the sixth highest in MLB.

The Lovable Losers, indeed, especially for an owner who can count on steady ticket sales.

“It is pure genius from a marketing perspective, that we support a team that is bad,” said David Berri, a professor at Southern Utah University who specializes in sports economics. “It’s the only entertainment where, ‘We have failed, but we would still like you to pay us.’

“Imagine if you had a restaurant like that. We serve crappy food! That’s what’s so great about us!”

Cubs fans appear to be undeterred by bad baseball and expensive tickets. In the past decade, the average ticket price for a Cubs game has increased by more than 300 percent, and that includes sharp hikes during the past two years.

The team bumped prices by 18 percent before the 2008 season and another 10 percent before this season. Yet even in the face of a recession, season-ticket holders renewed at a rate of about 98 percent.

This year the Cubs are on pace to draw more than 3.2 million fans even though their average ticket price of $47.75 is the third highest in baseball behind only the New York Yankees and Boston Red Sox.

Game-day profits

The Cubs make, on average, more than $2 million for each of their 81 regular-season home games. Here’s a breakdown of the estimated income per game:

Tickets $1.8 million
Broadcast rights $275,000
Luxury boxes $120,000
Concessions $185,000
Merchandise $50,000

BROADCAST RIGHTS

Estimated annual revenue: $70 million

Chicagoans aren’t the only gluttons for punishment. Legions of Cubs fans outside the Windy City who watch the team on TV spike ratings and, in turn, the broadcast fees the team can charge.

Comcast SportsNet Chicago is televising 80 games this season and pays the Cubs about $350,000 a game. WGN is televising 70 games this season and pays the Cubs about $200,000 a game.

The Cubs also collect $28 million from MLB’s national package, with equal shares distributed to each of the 30 teams. Throw in another $5 million for the Cubs radio deal with WGN, and they’ve topped $70 million for broadcast rights.

CONCESSIONS

Estimated annual revenue: $15 million

When a Cubs fan threw a beer on Philadelphia Phillies outfielder Shane Victorino(notes) this season, it led to misdemeanor charges of battery and illegal conduct in a sports facility. But Ricketts or anybody else watching the team’s bottom line might have viewed the airborne beer this way: another $6.

Even when this franchise can’t hit, pitch or play defense, it sure can sell beer. At $6 a cup, the Cubs sell more than any team in the major leagues. It’s one of the reasons they make a bundle in concessions.

COMCAST SPORTSNET CHICAGO

Estimated annual income: $15 million

In addition to acquiring the Cubs, Ricketts stands to gain 25 percent ownership of Comcast SportsNet Chicago. The cable station also broadcasts White Sox, Bulls and Blackhawks games.

The Cubs make an estimated $15 million a year from Comcast – a quarter of the regional network’s profits – and the ownership stake is worth far more. Three people involved in the pending sale valued the 25 percent stake at no less than $180 million. The big payoff could begin a decade from now.

When the rights agreement between the Cubs, Comcast and WGN expires in 2019, the Cubs could start their own regional sports network similar to YES, the cable network that generates more than $200 million a year for the Yankees.

“Generally speaking, these networks generate a lot more profits than the teams do,” said Neil Begley, an analyst for Moody’s Investors Service. “If you’re buying a team, in my opinion, financially it’s a better transaction if you own part or all of a regional sports network.”

Ticket price hike

Over the past decade, the average ticket price for Cubs games has increased by almost 300 percent. Cubs tickets are the third most expensive in baseball behind only those sold by the New York Yankees and Boston Red Sox. In 1999, the average Cubs ticket price of $17.46 was the ninth most expensive in MLB.

Cubs average ticket price
1999 $17.46
2009 $47.75

Based on rate increase over the past decade.

WRIGLEY FIELD

Chunks of concrete fell from the upper deck in 2004, serving as a reminder that the 95-year-old stadium needs renovation. Who pays for the inevitable sprucing will determine exactly how much more money can be squeezed out of the ballpark.

Taxpayers kicked in $400 million for the Chicago Bears’ revamped stadium that re-opened in 2003, and the new Cubs owner could seek public help for a vast renovation that those involved in the deal say would cost between $200 million and $400 million.

In a renovated ballpark, the Cubs could increase annual revenue by about $100 million, according to the calculations of Premier Partnerships, a sports marketing firm that worked with an investor group that had expressed interest in buying the team. The increased revenue would come from a variety of sources, such as naming rights, added sponsorship and high-end retail and hospitality, according to a presentation Premier made to the investor group.

“There is an opportunity when this market turns to unlock a lot of hidden value,” Jeff Marks, COO of Premier Partnerships, wrote in an email.

ADDITIONAL REVENUE STREAMS

Estimated: $45 million-plus

Don’t forget the snowbirds who attend games at the Cubs’ spring training complex in Arizona. Or the fat cats who prefer to sit in luxury boxes. Or the fans who fork over $20 for a Cubs cap and god knows how much – well, Ricketts and Tribune Co. do – for other merchandise. Or the fans who click-click-click on MLB.com. Those revenue streams and others generate more than $45 million.

But the Cubs also have to kick back about $35 million to MLB as part of the revenue-sharing plan.

TAX BENEFITS

Estimate: $100 million

Even perennial losers like the Cubs are world-beaters when it comes to avoiding taxes.

“April 15 is the official claim on the value of this interesting special depreciation for team owners,” Rodney Fort, a professor of sports management at the University of Michigan, tartly noted in an email.

As Fort was among the first to discover, the federal government allows sports franchises to be depreciated, which in turn creates an annual deduction and shelters income from taxes. This will come in handy for Ricketts.

In 2008, the Cubs made about $45 million in profits, according to sources familiar with the deal. That $45 million is subject to a 35 percent tax, meaning the government ought to get almost $16 million. But an owner enjoying the special depreciation pays nothing in taxes.

The easiest way to calculate the value is to project depreciation of the asset over 15 years and do some quick math. Divide the $845 million purchase price by 15. That’s $56 million that can be deducted against team income and personal income each year for the next 15 years.

The $56 million exceeds the Cubs’ yearly profit, sheltering it all from taxes. The owner must pay capital gain taxes if he sells the team at a profit. But until then, he keeps it all to do with as he pleases.

The maximum tax savings would be $19.7 million a year. Assuming Ricketts can earn an average of 7 percent yearly interest, his annual return from the accrued tax deduction over the next 15 years could reach $105 million.

Buying a ballclub

A list of the 12 MLB teams sold this decade and their selling prices.

Year Team Sold for
2000 Kansas City Royals $96 million
2000 Toronto Blue Jays $140 million
2002 Boston Red Sox $700 million
2002 Florida Marlins $158 million
2003 New York Mets $391 million
2003 Los Angeles Angels $184 million
2004 Los Angeles Dodgers $371 million
2005 Cincinnati Reds $270 million
2005 Milwaukee Brewers $223 million
2005 Oakland Athletics $180 million
2006 Washington Nationals $450 million
2007 Atlanta Braves $450 million

SETTLING ON A PRICE

In 1981, Tribune Co. bought the Cubs for $21 million. Three decades later, the company is selling the club for more than 40 times that amount. How to put a price on an asset that can appreciate so dramatically? Is Ricketts getting a good deal?

A widely used formula involves using a multiple of a team’s annual revenue. In the case of the Cubs, the $845 million purchase price is 3½ times more than the $241 million in revenue the Cubs reported in 2008. Experts say that’s within the expected range for a large-market team, even though Tribune Co. initially indicated it wanted at least $1 billion for the club.

Because Tribune Co. is in the midst of bankruptcy proceedings, a creditors committee and the bankruptcy judge will have to sign off on the deal. But approval is all but a foregone conclusion considering how negotiations were handled. Essentially, the team has been on the auction block since April 2007, and key creditors have been kept apprised of the negotiations.

But if the Tribune Co. was holding out for $1 billion, its plan backfired. Mark Cuban, the deep-pocketed owner of the Dallas Mavericks NBA franchise, hinted he would have been willing to pay that much.

”I never thought it conceivable that it would be hard to spend a billion dollars on a sports team,” he wrote in January on blogmaverick.com.

Cuban first expressed interest in buying the Cubs in 2007 but the two sides could not agree to terms or the structure of a potential deal. He withdrew from the bidding about the same time the economy tanked, which made raising money for the purchase more difficult for all prospective owners and the prospect of fetching $1 billion unrealistic.

The original pool of about 10 bidders narrowed to two.

A group of investors led by businessman Marc Utay reportedly offered more than $845 million. But Ricketts guaranteed more cash up front and allowed Tribune to keep 5 percent of the team, which gives the company a shrewd tax break. Sources said that by accepting the lower purchase price in exchange for retaining a portion of team ownership, Tribune will save about $400 million in capital gains taxes. This also delays Ricketts’ ability to depreciate part of his $845 million purchase.

Which makes perfect sense, said Tom Brennan, a tax law expert who teaches at Northwestern University.

“Saving capital gains tax dollars today generally is more valuable than having higher depreciation deductions tomorrow,” he said.

The bankruptcy judge, who is expected to issue a final ruling in the next two months, may agree the team is worth $1 billion – then acknowledge the creditors benefit most from Ricketts’ offer. At which point the Chicago businessman will pay $845 million for a team that has failed to win a World Series championship in more than a century – and get that team and related assets for a relative steal.

The WoW Journal Comments Policy

Steve Nash for the Hall?

Henry Abbott – of TrueHoop – linked to an article on Wednesday that argued Steve Nash might be considered by some a Hall-of-Fame player, but a full examination of his career reveals a different story.

The article led me to think about where Nash ranks relative to current Hall-of-Fame players. Complete data on NBA players only extends back to 1977-78.  Looking at all point guards who entered the league since 1977, only three are currently in the Hall-of-Fame: Magic Johnson, Isiah Thomas, and John Stockton.  Of course, other point guards might someday be selected.  So I expanded my search to all point guards who

  • began their career after 1977.
  • were selected at least once to an All-NBA team (first, second, and/or third).
  • have played more than 10 seasons in the NBA.

Given these criteria, I found 15 players (by my count).  And here is how these players rank in terms of career Wins Produced (after the 2008-09 season).

Point Guard Minutes Wins Produced WP48
John Stockton 47,764 311.1 0.313
Magic Johnson 33,245 297.3 0.429
Jason Kidd 41,160 258.8 0.302
Gary Payton 47,117 169.5 0.173
Fat Lever 23,814 137.7 0.278
Steve Nash 29,016 130.9 0.216
Rod Strickland 33,634 125.3 0.179
Kevin Johnson 25,061 108.8 0.208
Chauncey Billups 26,877 98.3 0.176
Tim Hardaway 30,626 92.0 0.144
Isiah Thomas 35,516 85.5 0.116
Sam Cassell 29,813 80.9 0.130
Mark Price 21,560 78.3 0.174
Stephon Marbury 31,886 64.3 0.097
Allen Iverson 36,719 61.3 0.080

 

 

Topping the list is John Stockton.  Again, the players are ranked in terms of career Wins Produced.  If we considered WP48 [Wins Produced per 48 minutes], Magic Johnson would lead the way (by a wide margin).

Steve Nash ranks 6th on the list.  He is certainly more productive than Isiah Thomas.  But he trails Jason Kidd, Gary Payton, and Fat Lever.  So if Wins Produced is how Hall-of-Fame players should be judged (it isn’t, but if it was), then Nash would certainly deserve some consideration.  But Kidd, Payton, and Lever might deserve some attention as well. 

If we look towards the bottom of the list we see Stephon Marbury and Allen Iverson.  One suspects that Iverson will definitely be considered for the Hall-of-Fame when he retires. But Starbury? Wins Produced suggests that neither player belongs in the Hall-of-Fame.   But if Iverson is selected, then Wins Produced says that Marbury is just as deserving.

Let me close this brief post by noting that this comment simply serves as a break from the team reviews.  For my next post I am going to focus on the New Jersey Nets.  I am also going to post a list of all the teams that have been reviewed and which teams remain.  Of course, requests will certainly be taken and considered (and other comments are always encouraged).

- DJ

The WoW Journal Comments Policy

Our research on the NBA was summarized HERE.

The Technical Notes at wagesofwins.com provides substantially more information on the published research behind Wins Produced and Win Score

Wins Produced, Win Score, and PAWSmin are also discussed in the following posts:

Simple Models of Player Performance

Wins Produced vs. Win Score

What Wins Produced Says and What It Does Not Say

Introducing PAWSmin — and a Defense of Box Score Statistics

Finally, A Guide to Evaluating Models contains useful hints on how to interpret and evaluate statistical models.