My latest column for the Huffington Post discusses the research on quarterbacks and the NFL draft I recently published with Rob Simmons. This research has generated quite a bit of interest.  Malcolm Gladwell discussed this in a New Yorker article in December  of 2008.  This article then became part of Gladwell’s What the Dog Saw, and Steven Pinker – in his review of this book – singled out the story of quarterbacks and the NFL draft as one particular tale he didn’t like. 

Pinker’s reaction led to quite a bit of discussion at Gladwell’s blog.  And it led to two posts in this forum.

The Inconsistent Quarterback Story Told Again in Less than 3,000 Words

Steven Pinker, Malcolm Gladwell, and Me

Brian Burke – of the Advanced NFL Stats – also participated in this discussion last year.  And last month he offered two more posts on the topic.

Are Top Draft QBs Any Better Than Late Round Picks?

Steven Pinker vs. Malcolm Gladwell and Drafting QBs

Brian asked if I could comment on these latest stories.   And after a delay of a few weeks, I finally found the time to write down some thoughts.

Where We Agree

Let me begin by noting two points where I think Brian and I agree.   First, Brian and I both believe one needs to look at per-play performance.  In other words, we know that quarterbacks taken earlier in the draft will see more time on the field.  So if you look at aggregate performance metrics, quarterbacks taken earlier will tend to look better.  But if these quarterbacks are truly offering more – and not just playing more – then we should see evidence in the per-play numbers.

We also appear to agree that the correlation between draft position and performance shouldn’t be very large.   A quarterback’s performance – as Brian notes – is dependent upon more than just the quarterback’s ability.  The performance of teammates and coaches also plays a significant role.  All of these interaction effects would be difficult for scouts to forecast.  So even if the scouts were focusing on the correct factors in evaluating a quarterback’s ability, there would still be a problem.

Given this point, one wonders what this discussion is about.  Brian and I agree on the fundamental issue: Draft position doesn’t do a great job of predicting future performance.  Although it is true we are in more agreement than some might suspect, there are some issues with Brian’s latest approach to this issue that I think I should note.

The Story of the Research

Before I get to my reaction to Brian’s latest, though, let me briefly tell the story of the research Rob and I have published.  The impression one gets from much of the discussion people have offered is that Rob and I simply looked at the correlation between draft position and performance.  Once we saw low correlation coefficients, we wrote our paper.

If one reads the paper, though, one sees there is much more to our tale.  The question that motivated our story was “what determines where a quarterback is selected in the NFL draft?”  The list of factors we considered included a quarterback’s height (in inches), his body mass index (and BMI squared), his Wonderlic score, time in the 40 yard dash, whether or not he played in the Division I-AA or Football Championship Subdivision (as opposed to the Football Bowl Subdivision or what was known as Division I-A), and various performance metrics.  Our list of performance metrics included career plays, completion percentage, interceptions per attempt, yards per attempt, the NFL’s QB rating, and various Wages of Wins metrics (i.e. Wins Produced per play, Net Points per play, and QB Score per play). 

What we found is that draft position is a function of height (taller quarterbacks are drafted first), BMI (and BMI squared), the Wonderlic score (quarterbacks with higher scores get drafted first), 40 yard dash times (faster quarterbacks get drafted first), playing FCS football (playing for an FCS team means you get drafted later), career plays (more plays gets you drafted earlier so it is better to stay in school), and interceptions per attempt (more interceptions and you get drafted later).  We also found – in different estimations – that the NFL’s QB rating and the Wages of Wins metrics mattered.  But completion percentage and yards per attempt did not statistically impact draft position.

Okay, all of this looks good.  Quarterbacks are being evaluated with respect to performance on the field as well as factors measured at the NFL combine. 

We then, though, looked at how these factors predicted future performance.   We considered a variety of performance measures (i.e. Wins Produced per 100 plays, the NFL’s QB rating, completion percentage, interceptions per attempt, and passing yards per attempt).  We also looked at performance at different points in a quarterback’s career.   In sum, we ran many, many regressions.  And here is our basic result (directly quoted from the paper): In all of our formulations, we never found that the combine factors, or the college performance with respect to Wins Produced per 100 plays or QB rating, had a significant impact—of the expected sign—on NFL Wins Produced per play or NFL QB Rating at any level of experience in the NFL.

Now we did find that completion percentage in the NFL was statistically related to college completion percentage (although the explanatory power was somewhat low).  Completion percentage in college, though, did not predict where a quarterback was taken.  And the factors that did predict where a quarterback was taken did not predict future performance. 

Quarterback and Draft Position

In presenting our research we began with the story of draft position and quarterback performance.  But the actual time-line of the research is reversed.  Once we had evidence that the factors that drive draft position were not related to future performance we wondered “does draft position predict future performance?”  It is this research that Brian discusses, but I am not sure I agree with his approach.  What follows are some reactions to his two posts.

            Sample and Draft Order

Beyond the issues discussed above, our study also looked at the link between quarterback performance and where a quarterback was selected in the draft from 1970 to 2007.  Brian has argued that the 1970s should not be included in the data set.  He has also argued that where a quarterback is selected isn’t as important as the order in which the quarterbacks were chosen because the former is impacted by team need.  The order – Brian argues — should tell us more about how decision-makers ranked the quarterbacks.  

Darren Rovell recently asked me to update our analysis for an article he posted at his CNBC blog.  Darren’s article – Is it Time to Abolish the NFL Combine? — offers analysis that incorporates both of Brian’s points.  Specifically, Darren reports the following two tables:

Table One: Performance of Quarterbacks by Draft Pick

Table Two: Correlation between Draft Position and Performance

These two figures get at both of Brian’s suggestions.  And as one can see, our story remains the same.  When we look at performance from 1980 to 2009 we still see that quarterbacks selected from 11-50 outperform those taken from 1-10.  Furthermore, when we look at draft order and performance – as opposed to draft position and performance – we still see very low correlations.

            Evaluating Players Who Didn’t Play (or Play Much)

So why are Brian finding somewhat different results? The key is what to do with quarterbacks who didn’t play or didn’t play much.  The correlations reported in our article (and in the analysis posted by Darren) restricted the sample of quarterbacks to those who attempted at least 100 passes (what we did in the book) or participated in at least 100 plays (what I did for Darren).  In other words, the analysis required that a quarterback play in about four games per season. 

The basic argument for this restriction is that the numbers from a quarterback who didn’t play much in his career are probably not reflective of a quarterback’s value.  To illustrate how the first games of a quarterback’s are misleading, guess the identity of the quarterback who posted the following numbers in his first 73 pass attempts: 384 passing yards, 31 rushing yards (on five attempts), seven interceptions, one touchdown, and a QB Score of -29. 

These numbers indicate this quarterback is very bad. Luckily for this quarterback, he got another chance to play.  And eventually, John Elway – yes, this is what Elway did in his first 73 attempts – got much better. For quarterbacks taken later in the draft, though, their career probably ends after these first 73 attempts. 

Now is it likely that all quarterbacks who play badly will become Elway? No, and that isn’t the point we are making by restricting our study to quarterbacks who actually spent time on the field.  What we are arguing is that a quarterback who really hasn’t played much is not generating numbers that tell us very much.  And since we want to know how draft position relates to performance, we need to include performance measures in our analysis that are indicative of a quarterback’s actual ability.

In Brian’s view, though, these players who didn’t play much or never played at all were simply not good enough.  Consequently, Brian either a) includes players in his analysis who had less than 100 plays (or pass attempts) and/or b) assigns a relatively low value to players who never played. 

The approach taken by Brian increases the correlation between draft position and performance.  By assuming that quarterbacks taken later would be poor quarterbacks, or by including the numbers generated by lower drafted quarterbacks who didn’t play much, Brian biased his evaluation of quarterbacks taken later downwards.  And consequently, the correlation between draft position and performance is increased (although not by much).

In the end, when you assume those drafted in later rounds are poor players, you suddenly discover a somewhat stronger relationship between draft position and performance. But it’s important to emphasize how this analysis is constructed. Brian has essentially assumed his answer. 

And there is reason to think quarterbacks who never played – or played very little – are not evaluated perfectly.  Quarterbacks are not like other players on a football team.  A back-up at almost every other position gets to play some in each game.  Teams, though, want to play their starting quarterback.  Consequently, during the week a back-up quarterback doesn’t get many reps in practices.  And even if the back-up was getting reps, practice – where defensive players don’t get to keep hitting the quarterback – is not the same as a real game.  Therefore, we should not be surprised by stories where a quarterback is traded or cut by one team only to later excel for another franchise (i.e. Kurt Warner).  It simply is hard to evaluate how a quarterback who only gets a few practice reps is going to actually perform week after week as a starting quarterback.

Another Look

The focus on quarterbacks taken later in the draft, though, can obscure the basic story Rob and I are telling.  Let me offer another look at this issue that highlights the basic problem decision-makers have in evaluating future signal callers.  ESPN.com reports that the NFL drafted 14 quarterbacks in 2010.  ESPN.com also lists between 40 to 50 quarterbacks who could have been selected.  And there are even more quarterbacks who played football for an FBS or FCS school who are not listed.  One suspects that there are more than 14 quarterbacks who played college football last year who had the physical skills to play in the NFL.  But because the NFL only needs less than 100 quarterbacks, many of these players do not get the opportunity.

Let’s, though, focus on those that do get an opportunity.   In 2009 the NFL selected nine quarterbacks (of the more than 40 ESPN listed as potential draft picks).  The first of these nine was Matt Stafford.  He received a contract worth $41.7 million in guaranteed money from the Detroit Lions. Four picks later the Jets selected Mark Sanchez.  His contract had $28 million in guaranteed money.  And then with the 17^th pick in the draft, Josh Freeman went to the Tampa Bay Buccaneers.  Freeman signed a contract with a guarantee of $10.2 million.

Such a pattern is hardly unique to the 2009 draft.  A few positions in the NFL draft are literally worth millions of dollars.  But does the NFL know enough to award contracts in this fashion?

Again, we have already seen that many factors that get a quarterback drafted are not related to future performance.  But we can also look at the link between draft position and performance.  This time, though, let’s completely ignore the late round picks and only focus on quarterbacks taken in the first sixty picks.  And let’s consider quarterbacks who averaged at least 50 plays per season (as opposed to 100).  Finally, we will also consider order of selection as well as a quarterback’s draft position.  Looking at data from 1980 to the present, here are the correlations between draft position and performance:

Table Three: Evaluating the Top 60 Selections from 1980 to 2008

As one can see, our story is still the same.  Where a quarterback is taken in these first 60 picks tells us quite a bit about the quarterback’s pay.  But it doesn’t tell us much about his performance in the NFL. 

And again, this shouldn’t be that surprising.  There appear to be significant issues with respect to how quarterbacks are evaluated on draft day.  Many of the factors that drive draft position are not related to future performance. Furthermore – and this is a point often made in this forum (as well as in The Wages of Wins and Stumbling on Wins) – performance of quarterbacks in the NFL is hard to predict even when we are using past NFL performance to make the prediction.  Given all these issues, we should not be surprised by the stories of Tim Couch, Akili Smith, David Carr, Joey Harrington, Alex Smith, JaMarcus Russell, etc.   Each of these quarterbacks was supposed to be a future stars on draft day.  But as fans of the teams that selected these players, the star performances envisioned on draft day never actually appeared.

- DJ

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Andres Alvarez graduated from Colorado State University with an M.S. in Computer Science. He is currently a GIS Analyst who likes to work on geeky stat side projects for fun, including the automated Wins Produced website (which we all appreciate).  He has been a Colorado resident his entire life and a Nuggets fan for most of it.

Last year the Denver Nuggets were two bad inbounds passes away from the finals. Many believed we were on track for a repeat performance and maybe one trade away from being crowned champions. This year the Nuggets regressed to a first round exit, raising a few interesting theories.

The first popular theory is that Carmelo needs help. This was accentuated by the fact that Melo said he needed help right before the Nuggets were bumped by the Jazz. The Wages of Win’s Journal, a typical detractor of Melo, stood up and pointed out that he was right.  At least if you were just counting this year’s playoffs. So we need to get Carmelo help, but where?

Another popular theory is the Nuggets needed George Karl’s leadership. Last year with him on the bench, the Nuggets made it to the Western Conference Finals. This year they won the division with him at the helm, but he had to step down for health reasons before the playoffs. The theory is that George Karl is a huge part of their success and his absence hurt them in the playoffs.

Well Melo’s help can be addressed in a very Wizard of Oz way. It was there all along! If only Melo had clicked his heals together three times and looked to his bench, maybe the team would have overcome their problems both this year and last. As for George Karl’s leadership, the answer is not as happy. In fact, maybe it was never there to begin with. 

The answer to both Melo’s Help and Karl’s leadership starts by looking at minute allocation. Looking at Table 1 we see that Denver had 6 players with at least 1,986 minutes this year. On the bench were three above average players in Andersen, Lawson, and Carter.  Andersen played much better than starters Martin and Nene. And in the backcourt, Smith and Afflalo both posted below average WP48 for their 2000+ minutes, while two above average guards in Carter and Lawson sat on the bench. To be fair, Lawson did have some injury troubles. Even a slightly below average Balkman, though, would have been a welcome change to an abysmal J.R. Smith (who apparently played at SF part of the time).

What was Karl’s leadership plan in 2010? He actually followed a very simple formula for his minute assignment. If you were paid more than $5 million you got at least 2,000 minutes of play. After that your minutes were assigned based on the coach’s assessment of you. In this case Afflalo got more minutes for being a “defensive presence”, Andersen for being an “energy player” and Balkman was put in the dog house for not learning the team’s offensive schemes.

What about 2009? Surely Karl must have had the Nuggets stocked full of leadership to get so far. Perhaps, but he still left a lot of Melo’s help on the bench.  Looking at Table 2, we notice that 7 players played 1,750 minutes or more. Andersen, though, played fewer minutes than Nene, Martin and Kleiza. Not only that, Renaldo Balkman played a meager number of minutes despite having the best WP48 of all the players on the team! Finally JR Smith played well last year, but we notice he split a lot of his minutes with Dahntay Jones, whose net contribution to the Nuggets wins was zero.

Essentially, Karl’s method in 2008-09 was the same as we saw in 2009-10.  If you were paid 4.985 million dollars or more, you got more than 2,000 minutes.  After that you were again assigned minutes based on the coach’s assessment of you; Kleiza was an “offensive threat off the bench”, Carter was a “smart veteran presence”, Dantay Jones was a “defensive presence”, Andersen was still an “energy player” and Balkman had a bad attitude limiting his minutes.

Karl’s leadership seemed to amount to two things. First and foremost was pay. In an almost stubborn attitude of “We paid for it, we may as well use it”, he heavily relied on the second or third best option for at least two positions in both 2009 and 2010. His next method was if the player had a good role player term. It was maddening as a Nuggets fan to see Balkman, a WP48 powerhouse, benched for not being an “offensive threat”; while seeing Dahntay Jones and Aaron Afflalo get minutes for being “defensive presences”. What is worse is that Karl’s nice coaching terms for his bench player’s minutes did not actually seem to correlate with their performance.

So despite Melo’s help being there all along, it is possible that Karl’s leadership stopped it from seeing the light of day. Dantley apparently stuck to this plan and potentially hurt the Nuggets. However, the West was crazy this year with only Portland – because of significant injuries — actually being an easy first round opponent. It is impossible to know if the Nuggets fortunes would have changed with a better record.

In closing there is some light at the end of the tunnel. Carmelo may seek his help elsewhere if the Nuggets do not improve this upcoming season (and Melo is really doesn’t produce enough to justify his pay). A healthy Portland, OKC and LAL could ensure this. Kenyon Martin’s contract also comes off the books at the end of the year. The Nuggets can therefore potentially free up cap room for next summer or get a good deal from a team looking to dump salary.

All of this, though, might require Coach Karl to allocate minutes differently.  At least that’s what I hope as a man behind the curtain.

Please note the author does not hold any ill will towards George Karl, and wishes him a full recovery.

- Andres Alvarez

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Doug Robinson of the Deseret News published a lengthy (and I naturally think, quite excellent) article on my research on Sunday: SUU economics professor uses stats to debunk conventional sports wisdom

Readers of this forum are likely familiar with all these stories.   But I wanted to note the picture that went with the story.  On the website there is a photo of Michael Jordan.  If you click on that photo you are given the option to see the second photo in the gallery.  That photo is me holding an object that can best be described as a “money ball”.  It is this picture that appeared on the front page of the Deseret News and also in the Deseret News sport page. 

I would note that this is not my office (it is my sports coat and SUU tie).  This picture is also the result of my first – and perhaps last – photo shoot.  It took the photographer some time to get me to sit correctly for the shot.  Apparently I am not smart enough to handle modeling (and perhaps a lack of smarts is not my only shortcoming in this field :) ).

- DJ

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Arturo Galletti is an electrical engineer and statistician by education (masters in electrical and computer engineering), by vocation (he was worked across the past ten years  for the US government — as well as Baxter and Johnson & Johnson — to convert data into information and improvement actions),  and by passion (Minitab is great for stress relief and winning fantasy leagues). He was born and lives in Puerto Rico.  But his undergrad years were spent in Boston and he bleeds Celtic green. In this post he offers some advice to the two newest members of the NBA’s ownership fraternity.

Recently, two very uncommon new owners have come into the NBA to take over moribund and troubled franchises. I am of course talking about Mikhail Prokhorov with the Nets and Ted Leonsis with the Wizards. What makes them uncommon as owners is not jetting around the world with Russian supermodels, or surviving a plane crash, or their great individual wealth.  No, both these men are shrewd business men who have been involved in successful professional sports ventures (the Washington Capitals in the NHL for Leonsis and CSKA Moscow clubs for Prokhorov). This fact may make these new owners, perhaps in contrast with their predecessors, uniquely qualified to rebuild and run their teams in a way that aligns with the value proposition in the NBA.

Wikipedia defines “the value proposition” as “an analysis and quantified review of the benefits, costs and value that an organization can deliver to customers and other constituent groups within and outside of the organization. It is also a positioning of value, where Value = Benefits – Cost”.  Any new businessman getting started in a new venture must identify what drives value in his enterprise. So a new owner of a failed NBA franchise might ask how exactly does one measure a successful franchise in the Association?  How do I measure the personnel I hire to run my team?

While not typically clear in other industries, value in sports is driven by wins and cost is driven by payroll.  And both of these factors are known. Simply put, a new owner wants to get more wins per dollar spent than his competitors, and any metric measuring an NBA team’s success as an organization must focus on this particular issue.

Our first goal should be to calculate the going rate for a win in the NBA. Let call this metric Value per win for a Season. Logically this should be based on the total number of wins available in the regular season (number of teams in the league times 41) and the total amount of money paid to the players (Total Payroll in the league according to USA Today). Once we have those two numbers we divide Payroll by Number of Wins.  The results for each season from 2004-05 to 2009-10 are as follows.

• 2005   $1,351,875.37
• 2006   $1,347,250.02
• 2007   $1,478,280.47
• 2008  $1,610,619.97
• 2009   $1,755,324.58
• 2010   $1,730,023.66

By combining this with WP48 & Win Produced, any billionaire in the NBA worth his salt  should be able to evaluate the value of the players in his roster.  Specifically, we can calculate Player Net Value, which equals Wins Produced* Value of a Win – Player Salary. For the Nets and Wizards this looks as follows:  

For the Nets, only six of the seventeen players who donned their uniforms in 2009-10 were worth what they were paid. The Wizards did better (11 of 24 players), but the situation is reversed when we look at players under contract for 2010-11. The Nets have nine players under contract, and five should be worth what they will be paid. The Wizards, however, can look forward to starting 2010-11 in the hole with six of the eight players under contract. 

Now that we’ve looked at player evaluation, let’s start looking at evaluating an overall organization. First, let’s figure out the value of all the players on the payroll. We’ll call this Roster Value by Season. This will be determined by multiplying the number of wins a team achieved (we are using actual wins but one could also use total Wins Produced) by the Value per win for a Season. We have a choice here as to whether or not we use regular season wins exclusively or include playoff wins as well. For the sake of simplicity, we will stick with just the regular season wins (in the future, though, this analysis can be expanded to incorporate playoff success or failure). 

To illustrate, let’s look at the Phoenix Suns in 2004-05.  The Suns won 62 games that season.   With each win costing an NBA team $1,351,875 in 2004-05, the Suns Roster Value was $83,816,273.  In other words, this is what the Suns — if they were paying for wins at the average NBA rate — should have had to pay to achieve 62 wins in 2004-05.

When we look at actual cost, though, we see that the Suns had an outstanding season (even if the Spurs bounced this team in the Western Conference Finals in 2005).  To see this point we will calculate GM Value (or GMV), which is simply Roster Value by Season minus a Team’s Payroll.  The Suns in 2004-05 had a payroll (according to USA Today) of $35,259,424.  Consequently, the team’s GM Value was $48,556,849.  So the Suns spent nearly $50 million less than one would expect (given the number of wins the team won and the cost of each win to a typical NBA team in 2004-05).

So now that we have this shiny new tool let’s put it thru some paces.  Specifically, let’s look at all NBA teams – since 2004-05 – and see if any lessons can be learned.

What can our new owners learn from the above tables? It might be a good idea for both owners to look at the Spurs and Suns.  You’ll note that these two teams were the only franchises to have a positive GM Value for every year (or pay less than the going rate for wins each season). Both these teams have consistently put a quality basketball product in front of their fans over the last six years. And they have not overpaid for talent in the process. 

The Suns are an especially interesting case.  The media has often lambasted the decisions of this franchise.  The 2004-05 Suns, though, are in fact — according to the numbers assembled – the best team from the past six seasons.  And again, the Suns have maintained a positive GM Value in every season since. 

Can the Nets and Wizards transform themselves into franchises similar to what we see in Phoenix and San Antonio?  It is certainly possible for teams to turn things around quickly.  For example, Oklahoma City (from 23^rd in 2008-09 to 2^nd in 2009-10) and  Portland (from 29^th in 2004-05 and 2005-06 to 1^st in both 2008-09 and 2009-10) provide ample proof that course corrections are possible with patient management and (mostly) good drafting.

For Mikhail and Ted wholesale changes and new beginnings are not only desirable, but certainly possible (as this analysis suggests). The road to recovery may be long (or short) but the path has been travelled before. But patience and frugality — not panic and splurging — are the orders of the day.

Update: It has been noted that salary numbers from USA Today differ from what is reported elsewhere.  Another source of salary data is the website of Patricia Bender.  The analysis can be re-done with these salary numbers and here is what you find.  The Value per win for a Season would be as follows:

• 2005   $1,437,764
• 2006   $1,537,971
• 2007   $1,572,602
• 2008  $1,671,230
• 2009   $1,747,932
• 2010   $1,708,642

The Phoenix Suns GM Value with these numbers was $44,884,629.  And here is what we see for each team.

The analysis with Bender’s numbers appear quite similar.  Again, Phoenix and San Antonio look very good. And the Knicks are quite poor across the entire sample why the Nets are the worst team in 2009-10. Thanks again for these comments. 

- Arturo Galletti

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Jamie Vann Struth is an economist based in Vancouver, BC. He owns an economic development consulting firm and crunches sports statistics for fun. His history with the Grizzlies goes back to the beginning, when they were born in 1995 at the exact time that he arrived in Vancouver to attend graduate school at Simon Fraser University. He has continued to follow the Grizzlies in Memphis and waits patiently for the NBA’s inevitable return to Vancouver.

This is part two of a two-part post on the Memphis Grizzlies.  In the first part, Jamie reviewed the 2009-10 season.  In this part, he addresses the team’s young players and the specific question of whether or not the Grizzlies should re-sign Rudy Gay.

In my previous post I addressed how the Grizzlies improved from 2008-09 to 2009-10.  Left out of this discussion was the role of the young players the Grizzlies have on their roster.  When we look at the numbers we see – and these numbers shouldn’t be a surprise – the young players employed by Memphis have improved.

• Marc Gasol, age 25 (0.180 WP48 this year, 0.098 WP48 last year)
• Rudy Gay, age 23 (0.054 WP48 this year, 0.029 WP48 last year)
• O.J. Mayo, age 22 (0.065 WP48 this year, 0.042 WP48 last year)
• Mike Conley, age 22 (0.069 WP 48 this year, 0.144 WP48 last year)

The typical career arc for NBA players sees several years of improvement early in a career, with a peak around age 24 or 25.  This is followed by a slow decline through the late 20s and a faster decline starting around age 30. Of course the specific arc for each player will vary somewhat around this general trend, but it provides a guideline for evaluating the Grizzlies four young starters.

Figure 1 – Career Trajectories of the Grizzlies Youthful Core, by WP48

The trend line (seen in Figure 1) for all of the young veterans is positive, but the trio of Gay, Mayo and Conley are all still below-average performers.   

• Conley regressed significantly, producing less than half as many wins as his sophomore production would indicate. He specifically regressed with respect to shooting efficiency, free throw shooting, rebounding, turnovers and personal fouls. He did play much better in the second half of the season, and there is a sentiment that Allen Iverson’s brief presence at the beginning of the season affected Conley’s mental approach and led to a drop in performance. Regardless, the fact that he was a solid above-average performer in 2008-09 suggests the potential to once again be an above-average performer.
• O.J. Mayo showed only minor improvement from his rookie to sophomore seasons, becoming a more efficient shooter and improving slightly with respect to blocks, turnovers, and personal fouls. He is still on an upward trajectory, but if stardom was in his future, a much greater improvement might have been expected (such as fellow top-three pick Kevin Durant’s improvement from an abysmal -0.034 WP48 as a rookie, to 0.165 as a sophomore, and then a starry 0.280 this past season).
• Marc Gasol improved from an average player as a rookie in 2008-09 (0.98 WP48) to approach the unofficial “star” status of a 0.200 WP48. He became a much more efficient shooter and also improved with respect to rebounds, assists, steals, blocks, turnovers and personal fouls. A decline with respect to free throw shooting (from 73.3% to 67.0%) was his only blemish. As the oldest of the young core, Gasol may have little or no further improvement to come, but should be a very productive player for the next half-decade at least.
• Hasheem Thabeet is also shown on the graph with his 0.084 WP48. He began his career two years younger than Gasol and could be poised for a similar improvement over the next few years. Unfortunately they both play the same position, meaning one may be on the trade block within a couple of years.  This also raises the question of why the Grizzlies used the #2 pick on a redundant position.

That question, though, pales in significance to the issue the Grizzlies must address this summer.  Should Memphis keep Rudy Gay?

The Crux of the Matter: The Future of Rudy Gay

Before specifically addressing the Rudy Gay question,  I would like to raise a topic frequently addressed on this blog. The Pareto Principle suggests that 80% of a team’s production is tied to the top 20% of performers. In the NBA, that means the top 3 players produce most of the wins on a team.

If we assume for argument’s sake that the minimum number of wins required to be a legitimate championship contender is 55, then a team’s top 3 players need to produce 44 wins (80% of the total). If these top 3 players each play 3,000 minutes, they must then average a WP48 of 0.235.

The Grizzlies top 3 players in 2009-10 were Zach Randolph, Marc Gasol and O.J. Mayo, who combined to produce 28 wins. How many had a WP48 of 0.235? None (although Randolph was very close). Simply put, this team needs stars. If Randolph and Gasol maintain their current production, then a superstar with a WP48 of 0.294 is needed to reach this minimum contending threshold. What kind of player has a WP48 at that level? Jason Kidd or Chris Paul at the point, Dwyane Wade or Manu Ginobili at shooting guard, or Kevin Durant or Gerald Wallace at small forward. Could Rudy Gay ultimately reach this level? Based on the evidence of his first four seasons, there is absolutely no indication that Gay will ever approach this level of productivity.

From the perspective of Wins Produced, Rudy Gay is a bel0w-average NBA player.  He may continue to improve for a few more years, but the chance of improving from substantially below-average to star level (WP48 of 0.200 or above) is extremely unlikely. However, he is an above-average scorer who is only 23 years old. And that means he may be the most notable restricted free agent in the NBA this offseason. There are a number of teams that have created cap space to take a run at a marquee unrestricted free agent (LeBron James, Dwyane Wade, Chris Bosh, Amar’e Stoudamire, Joe Johnson, etc.).  Obviously some of these teams (or most of these teams?) will not be successful.  When that happens, some have argued that one of these teams will make a desperate attempt to save face with their fans (or their owner) by signing Rudy Gay to an offer sheet approaching the NBA maximum salary.

Based on his first four seasons, Gay will not come anywhere close to producing enough to justify a contract close to the NBA maximum.  But the Grizzlies will face severe pressure to match any offer he might receive. They are struggling to attract fans and want to continue improving in the final year of the Three-Year Plan.

Viewing Gay in the context of Wins Produced suggests the following options, in descending order of preference:

1. Execute a sign-and-trade.

This is the best option provided the assets coming in return for Gay have value and are cap-friendly enough that they do not impinge on future team-improving moves. If one accepts that scoring is over-valued in the NBA, this market inefficiency makes it eminently possible for the Grizzlies to trade Gay and receive one or more players in return who score less, but ultimately contribute more to a winning team.

2.  Let him walk away with no compensation.

This option would create a short-term public relations pain.  However, the reality is that Gay is not a major contributor to wins.  Therefore signing him to a massive contract (in a small market, with an owner who clearly places great value on fiscal responsibility) would almost certainly limit the team’s future options. Gay will never be the star the team needs, so he should not be paid like it.

3.  Sign Gay, and HOPE that he has several years of substantial improvement ahead of him.

Ultimately this seems like the most likely option to be realized. Ideally the value of the contract is substantially less than the maximum, but given the market for scorers like Gay, any contract that he signs will pay him more than he is worth. Like David Berri has said in the past in this forum, hope is not a plan.

In Conclusion

Will Grizzlies management learn the lessons of Stumbling on Wins and make a rational evaluation of their team? If so, they will realize that the 2009-10 team was not as good as its record indicates and benefited from very good health. Young players like Mayo, Conley, Thabeet and the other rookies should improve, but none (except maybe Thabeet) looks like he has the potential to be a future star (i.e. WP48 in excess of 0.200). Most importantly they must accept that the one player who has provided the most evidence that he will not achieve stardom, based on four below-average years in the NBA, is Rudy Gay.

Given this evidence I have to say the following:  Mr. Heisley, you must say goodbye to Rudy.

- Jamie Vann Struth

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