Editor’s Note: Shawn Ryan sent some thoughts before the 2010 draft.  But time ran short and these thoughts were not posted.  Shawn, though, was nice enough to use his analysis to create the post-draft tables.  What follows are tables based on his analysis, some of his pre-draft thoughts, and some stuff the editor (DJ) threw into the post.  So this is essentially a co-authored post. Thanks again to Shawn for getting this material put together.

Shawn Ryan is a 24 year old student currently living in Austin, TX and pursuing dual degrees in Computer Science and Economics. He found the Wages of Wins at a time when he had become newly infatuated with the field of behavioral economics, and it has greatly influenced his educational goals. He has been a fan of basketball from a young age, but has tended to have different favorite teams over time, including the Suns, Cavaliers, Blazers, Hawks, and Rockets among others. He loathes NBA play-by-play commentary, and often has to resort to turning off the sound for the sake of his mental welfare. He is glad to have the opportunity to contribute to this blog, because for some reason, his fiancee tends to fall asleep at unfortunate times while he discusses his very interesting ideas about the NBA with her.

It’s that time of year again. A time when the NBA’s less fortunate fans, whether they hail from New York, or Minnesota, New Jersey or Memphis, can look to the future and just know that things are going to improve. The NBA draft is a time of infinite possibilities, a time when a single draft pick can change the face of a franchise. Fans hope to nab the next MJ, Lebron, Shaq, or Duncan. Does the 2010 NBA draft hold the next big thing, or just the next big letdown? In the following, I hope to offer some insight into that question.

Win Score and PAWS40

This insight is going to rely upon Win Score.  This is a measurement of player performance first noted in The Wages of Wins (and also in Stumbling on Wins).  It’s a simplified version of Wins Produced, built around the notion that points, rebounds, steals, field goal attempts, and turnovers have – in absolute terms – the same impact on wins.  Blocked shots, assists, free throw attempts, and personal fouls also impact wins, but the impact appears smaller.  For simplicity sake, Win Score argues that these factors have ½ the impact of points (and the factors associated with possession of the ball).

Win Score = PTS + REB + STL + ½*BLK + ½*AST – FGA – ½*FTA – TO – ½*PF

As noted in The Wages of Wins (and also in Stumbling on Wins), a player’s Win Score is impacted by position played.  Big men tend to get rebounds and not turn the ball over often. Guards tend to do the opposite.  Consequently, to compare players across positions, an adjustment has to be made for position played.  This adjustment gives us Position Adjusted Win Score (PAWS), a measure that is actually highly correlated with Win Produced.

Before we get to analyzing the NBA draft we need to adjust for minutes played.  Specifically, since a college game lasts for 40 minutes, we consider PAWS40.  This is calculated as follows: 

PAWS40 = Positions Adjusted Win Score per 40 minutes =

(Win Score per 40 minutes – Average Win Score per 40 minutes at position played) +

Average Win Score per 40 minutes for all players

As noted, to calculate PAWS40, one needs to know the average performance at each position.   From 1995 to 2009, the players selected out of college at each position posted the following average WS40:

PG: 7.40

SG: 8.40

SF: 9.95

PF: 12.59

C: 12.32

The average player across all position had a WS40 of 10.17. With these numbers in hand, we can calculate each player’s PAWS40.  For exampe, point guard John Wall – the number one pick in the draft — had a WS40 of 7.2 in 2009-10.  So his PAWS40 would be…

John Wall PAWS40 = (7.2–7.4) + 10.17 = 10.0

A mark of 10.0 is just about average for a player selected out of college from 1995 to 2009.

Since DraftExpress.com is gracious enough to calculate WS40 for almost every NBA prospect outside of high school, we are able to, with relatively little effort, calculate PAWS40 for every player selected out of college in the 2010 draft. 

Analyzing the 2010 NBA Draft

Again, an average player drafted from 1995 to 2009 posted a PAWS40 of 10.2.  Here is a list of players selected in 2010 who equaled or surpassed the 10.2 mark:

And the below average player are in the following table.

Here are some thoughts on the Draft

• First of all, it must be emphasized (as has been noted in prior discussions of the draft), PAWS40 is correlated with future performance in the NBA.  But it is not a crystal ball.  So just because a player is above average, that does not mean he will be an above average NBA player.  And below average players with respect to PAWS40 might become above average NBA players.
• Given the first point, it may not be the case that Damion James will eventually be the top rookie selected in the draft.
• In fact, given the link between draft position and minutes played, even if James is a very productive player he may not lead this class in Wins Produced.  That honor may fall on DeMarcus Cousins and Evan Turner.
• If we look at the below average players, John Wall, Greg Monroe, and Ekpe Udoh top the list.  Again, this doesn’t mean fans of the Wizards, Pistons, and Warriors will definitely be disappointed.  Still, the PAWS40 evidence is not encouraging. 

Perhaps what is said in Stumbling on Wins would help.  This is part of one of the end notes in the book:

Comparing college PAWS40 to NBA WP48 revealed that more than 80% of the drafted college players who posted a PAWS40 that was one standard deviation below the mean managed to post a career NBA WP48 that was below the mean (this was true whether you looked at players after three or five seasons). If you look at players with a PAWS40 that was one standard deviation above the mean, though, between 60% to 65% went on to post a career WP48 that was above average. These results suggest that identifying poor NBA performers with college data is easier than identifying outstanding NBA performers. Or in other words, if you play poorly in college, it’s likely that you will play poorly in the NBA. Excelling in college, though, is not a guarantee of future success.

Again, the mean PAWS40 is 10.2.  One standard deviation is 2.8.  So a player who post a PAWS40 below 7.3 have a very good chance of not being very good players.  Posting a mark above 13.0 indicates that above average performance in the NBA is more likely, but not quite a sure thing.

- Shawn Ryan & DJ

While some teams are looking at this year’s free agent market to rebuild their franchises, the Washington Wizards are taking a different approach.  In the past week, the Wizards have drafted John Wall, acquired Kirk Hinrich, and now traded for Yi Jianlian. The results…

well, not impressive.  At least, that is the story told by Rob O’Malley in the following two posts:

Wizards add Captain Kirk

Wizards Acquiring “Assets” – Trade For Yi

I was going to say more but…

• I just got into Portland for the Western Economic Association meetings and I am tired (and we have quite a bit to do over the next few days).
• Rob clearly has this covered.

I will try and get more stuff posted tomorrow (really, I will try).

- DJ

P.S. By the way… did Rob change the look of his blog again?

Rasheed Wallace has announced his retirement.  Wallace was the 4^th player selected in the 1995 draft.  Across the next 15 seasons he posted the following numbers:

• $150 million in salary (according to Basketball-Reference.com)
• 1,088 games played
• 35,947 minutes played
• 15,860 points scored
• 68.2 Wins Produced
• 0.091 Career WP48 [Wins Produced per 48 minutes]

If we consider the first four numbers, Rasheed was an above average player who lived up to his lofty draft status.  His Wins Produced numbers, though, suggest he was little different from an average player who was paid like a star.  Consequently, he earned $2.2 million per win. 

Of course, Wallace’s career WP48 is just an average.  In some years – like 1995-96 [-0.025 WP48] and 2009-10 [-0.039 WP48] – Wallace was well below his career average.  Yes, in Wallace’s first and last season he posted numbers in the negative range.  But from age 25 to 34 he was generally average to slightly above average in most seasons.  In other words, Wallace essentially hit his peak in his mid-twenties and then stayed productive until last season.   But by 35, it looks like he is done.

Wallace actually stayed productive a bit longer than is typical for an NBA player.  In other words, by the time an NBA player reaches 33 or 34 he is – in general — noticeably less productive than what we see in the mid-20s.  Wallace was still able to contribute at that advanced age. Unfortunately for the Celtics, he couldn’t squeeze one more year out of his body.

Okay, that’s all I wanted to say about Rasheed.  We have much better posts coming up in the near future.  In the next few days…

• Shawn Ryan has a review of the 2010 NBA draft.
• Nicholas Yee has a review of the 2009-10 Boston Celtics.
• Devin Dignam has a post on the Toronto Raptors.
• and Arturo Galletti and Andres Alvarez have some very interesting research on the NBA draft that needs to be posted.

I am off to the Western Economic Association meetings in Portland.  As I mentioned in May, there will be more than 60 papers presented on sports and economics at these meetings (unfortunately I agreed to be part of six of these papers, a number of co-authored papers I hope I never see again).  Plus we will have a panel discussion of blogging about sports and economics. So I think we are all looking forward to a very interesting week.

While I am at the meetings, I do hope I can get some of the aforementioned columns posted.  At least, that’s my hope.   If that doesn’t happen, can everyone spend the next week discussing ‘Sheed?

Okay, I really will try to get other stuff posted.

Update:  Robbie O’Malley has offered some thoughts on the Kirk Hinrich trade.  Those thoughts might prove more interesting than what I said about Rasheed (and therefore, might be worth discussing).

- DJ

Editor’s Note: The recent trade between the Kings and Sixers has already been discussed from the Sacremento perspective by Mike Madden (a fan of the Kings).  Now we have the perspective of Sam Cohen, a fan of the Sixers.  One should note, this was submitted before the NBA draft. 

Sam Cohen grew up just outside of Philadelphia and is a life-long 76′ers fan.  He maintains his allegiances to the Philly sports teams despite having lived over the last 14 years in Boston, Anchorage, and now Washington, D.C.  Perhaps foreshadowing his interest in using Wins Produced as a tool to evaluate basketball players, Sam’s favorite players on the 76′er teams of the early 2000s were Eric Snow and George Lynch.  In his real life, Sam is a health care regulatory lawyer.

In 2009-10, the Philadelphia 76’ers won 27 games.  In 2008-09, the Sixers won 41 games.  Not exactly the big step forward that Sixer fans were looking for.  But it also wasn’t unexpected. 

In the 2008-09 season, the Sixers were led in Wins Produced by Andre Igoudala (12.46 WP), Andre Miller (12.03 WP), and Samuel Dalembert (7.13 WP).  And the season before that (2007-08), the Sixers were led in Wins Produced by the same trio (Igoudala: 11.14 WP, Miller: 10.18 WP, Dalembert:  9.31 WP).   Continuing a pattern, the same trio also led the Sixers in Wins Produced in 2006-07 (Igoudala: 11.61, Dalembert: 8.34, Miller: 7.41).  So when the Sixers didn’t resign Miller before the 2009-10 season and didn’t make any significant roster additions, Sixer fans could have taken a quick look at Wins Produced and resigned themselves to a long (and unproductive) season.  And that was even before the Allen Iverson and Eddie Jordan soap operas took center stage.

When we look at Table 1, we can see that this long and unproductive season is exactly what the Sixers provided.

As shown in Table 1, the Sixers could have expected the players on their roster to produce 26.60 wins this year based on their production in 2008-09 (and the minutes they played this season).  Instead, they produced 30.87 wins (although they only actually won 27 games).

The most straightforward story we could tell about this result is the story we began with- the Sixers let Andre Miller, a player who had produced 12 wins the previous season, leave.  And, not surprisingly, the Sixers lost about 12 more games than they did the season before.  But the numbers in Table 1 actually tell a slightly more complicated story.

Andre Miller and Louis Williams produced about 13 wins for the Sixers in 2008-09, primarily from the point guard position.  Thanks to the improved play of Louis Williams and the play of rookie Jrue Holiday, the Sixers received about 9 wins from the point guard position in 2009-10.  So trading away Miller was a big blow to the Sixers, but not nearly as big a blow as might have been expected going into the season.

The bigger blow was the play of the Sixers’ frontcourt players.  Elton Brand, Thaddeus Young , and Marreese Speights all played worse in 2009-10 than they had in 2008-09.  And, not shown in Table 1, was the loss during the off-season of Reggie Evans and his 3.59 Wins Produced from 2008-09.  All told, the declining play of the three returning players, coupled with the absence of Evans, resulted in 10.5 fewer wins in 2009-10.

For Sixers fans, the drop off in production from Brand, Young, and Speights is troubling for the future.  Brand’s poor showing in 2009-10 put the nail in the coffin to any thoughts that Brand’s diminished play in 2008-09 was the lingering result of his injury and that he would return to his formerly productive ways.  And after a promising rookie year, Young has now seen a decrease in his productivity for two straight seasons (at a time in his career when his productivity should be improving).  And while Speights only has experienced a small one-year decline, his failure to show improvement from his rookie season to his second season does not bode well for the future.

But not everything was bad news for the Sixers in 2009-10.  Andre Igoudala continued his stellar (and mostly unappreciated) play.  And noticeably absent from the discussion of disappointing Sixer frontcourt players was Samuel Dalembert.  Dalembert has been one of the Sixers three most productive players for the last few seasons.  With the departure of Miller, Dalembert continued his strong play and was the second most productive Sixer in 2009-10.  In fact, 2009-10 was arguably Dalembert’s best season as a Sixer (at least since 2006 when the WP numbers provided by Andres Alvarez begin).  From 2005-06 to 2008-09, Dalembert had a WP48 between .158 and .168 every season.  But in 2009-10, Dalembert posted an impressive .241 WP48 (and 10.75 WP). 

Unfortunately, this stellar production by Dalembert seems not to have been noticed by the Sixers’ coaches or front office.  The coaches played Dalembert almost the exact same number of minutes in 2009-10 as in 2008-09, which also happened to be fewer minutes than the much less productive Elton Brand and Thaddeus Young.  And now the Sixers’ front office has compounded the problem by trading Dalembert to the Sacramento Kings. 

Since getting rid of their second most productive player before the season didn’t improve the team in 2009-10, apparently the Sixers have now decided to double-down on this tactic for 2010-11.  Given the career year that Dalembert had in 2009-10, trading him at presumably the “height” of his trade value could have made sense.  But that clearly is not what the Sixers were doing.  Rather, they appear to have been trying to give Dalembert away, as evidenced by the fact that they traded him for a bag of chips.  Technically, they traded him for Andres Nocioni and Spencer Hawes, but given that both of these players had negative WP48 in 2009-10, I’m not sure that there’s a big difference.  In fact, the bag of chips would probably be more exciting.  At least I could eat the bag of chips.  (For a slightly more nuanced evaluation of the trade (with which I agree), you can see the discussion offered by Robbie O’Malley.

Hope springs eternal that new coach Doug Collins and the front office have a plan, but the early indications look no more promising than the season that the Sixers just finished.

- Sam Cohen

The Utah Jazz took Gordon Hayward with the 9th pick in the NBA draft.  Imagine a world where Butler does not advance to the Final Four.  In such a world, does a sophomore from Butler — who averaged only 15.5 point per game and shot less than 30% from the college three-point line — go in the lottery?  That is the question the Utah Jazz should have asked.  I get the sense, though, that this question didn’t enter the minds of the people in Salt Lake City.

- DJ