Here is the Wins Produced view of the NBA Finals after Game Six:And here are a few additional thoughts…

• Before Game Six the story for the Lakers was Pau Gasol, Kobe Bryant, and not much else.  After Game Six, the story is now Pau Gasol, Kobe Bryant, and Lamar Odom.  After this trio, though, there isn’t much else.  This trio, though, might just be enough. 
• The gap between Kobe and Pau Gasol has narrowed.  But Gasol has still produced more wins than Kobe. Of course, as Kobe fans argue, this is because Gasol plays with Kobe; and Kobe makes Gasol hit a higher percentage of his shots.  And apparently, playing with Kobe also makes Gasol grab more rebounds and turn the ball over less. You might guess that I am somewhat skeptical of this story.  I would add, Gasol posted a 0.556 ADJ P48 in Memphis in 2006-07 (his last full season in Memphis). He posted a 0.563 ADJ P48 with the Lakers in 2008-09 (his first full season with the Lakers).  Gasol did post a 0.616 mark this past season.  So it seems the Kobe effect takes a year to appear. 
• It also seems to me that it was good that Kobe shot less in Game Six.  As I noted after Game Five, I suspect the Lakers would be better off if a few shots Kobe would like to take would go to Gasol (or Lamar Odom).  That would be probably be good for the Lakers (but not so good for Kobe).
• The loss of Kendrick Perkins is certainly not good news for the Celtics.  If you look at regular season production (see the Wins Produced numbers from Andres Alvarez), you see that Perkins was above average in the regular season. In contrast, Rasheed Wallace and Glenn Davis were in the negative range.  Yes, Davis has generally played well in the Finals.  The careers of Perkins and Davis, though, suggest that Boston is better off with the former on the floor.
• That being said, Davis has guaranteed a victory and Perkins (as far as I know) never made any such guarantee.  So Davis is already having an impact.  By the way, we all know Joe Namath made a successful guarantee in Super Bowl III.  What is the record on these guarantees across the past 40 years?  I have to think it is well below 0.500.
• If the Celtics somehow make good on the Davis guarantee and overcome the loss of Perkins – and the love affair with Kobe doesn’t still give Kobe the MVP – someone on the Celtics will have to be chosen as MVP.  The leading scorer is Paul Pierce. But the leading producer of wins has been Rajon Rondo.  Look for more on the Rondo story on Friday (regardless of who wins tonight). 

- DJ

Here is a quick table to think about before tonight’s game.

The story being told is that Kobe is doing everything he can to win a title but his teammates aren’t helping.  The Wins Produced story is almost the same.  Except the story would be “Pau Gasol and Kobe are doing everything they can to win a title, but their teammates aren’t helping.”  And by the way, Gasol is doing slightly more than Kobe. 

That last point is hard to see if you focus on points scored per game — or metrics dominated by points scored (i.e. the Player Efficiency Rating).  Kobe has taken 120 field goal attempts for the Lakers.  That mark doubles the number of shots Gasol has attempted from the field.  Consequently, Kobe has scored many more point than Gasol.  But is this the best allocation of shot attempts for the Lakers?  Currently Gasol, Lamar Odom, and Andrew Bynum have all posted a higher True Shooting Percentage in the NBA Finals.  Given this observation, maybe Kobe could think about passing the ball a bit more often tonight.

One last point about the above table:  The calculations of Wins Produced employ ADJP48 and all the steps noted in Stumbling on Wins (and at Stumblingonwins.com). As one can see, the series has been very close.  Of the 5 wins in the series, 2.54 have been produced by the Celtics and 2.41 by the Lakers. 

Hope everyone enjoys the game tonight.  If there is a need for a Game 7 I might update this analysis.

- DJ

P.S. The data used for the above calculations came from NBA.com, a site that reports the statistics for each round of the playoffs.

As the NBA draft approaches, I thought of the story of Red Auerbach’s acquisition of Bill Russell.  This story*– told in “Let Me Tell a Story: A Lifetime in the Game”, the autobiography Auerbach wrote with John Feinstein, (a book I very much recommend and is available for less than $6 at Amazon.com) – was going to be re-told in Stumbling on Wins.  Unfortunately – in the process of editing the book — it ended up on the proverbial cutting room floor.  As we think about how much teams think about today, it is interesting pick this story up from the floor and look back a time when teams had far less information before the NBA draft.

The NBA draft has always been a part of the league.  But the resources teams could devote to the process were initially quite limited.

To illustrate, consider how the Boston Celtics came to draft Hall-of-Fame center Bill Russell. The person responsible for acquiring Russell was Red Auerbach.  Back in 1950 Auerbach became the Celtics head coach, as well as “general manager, chief scout, and marketing guru.” 

For the first six years of Auerbach’s tenure the Celtics consistently posted a winning record but could never get past the Eastern Division Finals.  And then in 1956 Auerbach got a call from Bill Reinhart, his old college coach. Reinhart had just visited the West Coast and seen a player from the University of San Francisco named Bill Russell.  When Reinhart returned from California he called Auerbach and said: “I’ve seen this guy who can make you into a championship team. You have to get this guy.”  Reinhart went on to discuss Russell’s ability to get rebounds and play defense.

Of course Auerbach wondered if Russell could contribute on offense.  In Reinhart’s view, Russell was not a very good shooter and couldn’t help Boston much on offense.  Nevertheless, Reinhart thought Russell was a player who could help the Celtics win games.

For the remainder of the college season Auerbach tracked Russell and the University of San Francisco (primarily via newspaper reports). When the season was over Russell’s team was undefeated and had won a second straight NCAA title. 

We should emphasize that Auerbach claims he never saw Russell play before he was drafted.  Auerbach’s interest in Russell was entirely based on what Reinhart told him about his play and the record Russell’s team achieved.  Based on this limited information, Auerbach took the following steps to acquire Russell.

The Celtics entered the 1956 draft with the 7^th pick.  This pick was sent to the St. Louis Hawks – along with Ed Macauley and Cliff Hagan, for the 2^nd pick.  It was believed that the Rochester Royals – who had the first pick – might want to take Russell. Auerbach, though, had a secret weapon.  The owner of the Celtics, Walter Brown, was also the president of the Ice Capades.  Brown called up the owner of the Royals– Lee Harrison — with the following offer:  Brown would send the Ice Capades to Rochester for one week if the Royals would pass on Russell. 

Harrison agreed and with the first overall choice in the 1956 draft the Royals selected Si Green, a guard from Duquesne.  Green only played 33 games with the Rochester-Cincinnati Royals before he was sent to the St. Louis Hawks.  After the Hawks he played for a franchise that transformed from the Chicago Packers, to the Chicago Zephyrs, and finally to the Baltimore Bullets.  And then he finished his career in 1965-66 with the Boston Celtics.  Across his nine season career Green never averaged more than 12.7 points per game and he was below average in shooting efficiency.  Although we can’t measure Wins Produced prior to 1977, one suspects given the data that is available that Green was not one of the better NBA player in the game during his career.  In sum, one hopes the shows the Ice Capades put on for that one week in Rochester were simply amazing; because it certainly appears Si Green never came close to the productivity of Bill Russell. 

Lessons Learned

Okay, beyond this being a fascinating story about Red Auerbach, what do we learn from this tale?

1. Back in the 1950s, the NBA was a very small business.  Can one imagine a team trading the rights to host a show over taking a player with the number on pick?  If that is the still the case, what show would the Wizards take to pass on John Wall?

2. This story highlights how little information decision-makers had before drafting talent in the 1950s.  Although I believe you need to do more than just watch a player, I wouldn’t think anyone would want to draft a talent they never even saw play.   Certainly one wouldn’t expect anyone today to go to this much effort for a player they had never met.

3. And finally, this story also highlights a point we made in Stumbling on Wins. Often the first pick in the NBA draft is far more productive than the second pick (although in this case, Russell was technically the second pick). Therefore NBA teams have an incentive to do whatever they can to land that first pick. 

Of course, “often the first pick…” is not “always.”  If John Wall does go first in 2010, I am not sure he will necessarily be much better than the players who go afterwards.

Update: Some people have questioned whether the Celtics gave up the seventh pick in the 1956 draft to acquire Bill Russell.  Here is what Auerbach and Feinstein said in their book: “(Auerbach) called his old boss Ben Kerner, who by then owned the team in St. Louis. He offered (Ed) Macauley and a swap of first round draft picks — Kerner’s number two slot for Red’s number seven slot. According to Red, Kerner said, “Deal”.” 

- DJ

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*-This story is told in Feinstein and Auerbach (2004), pp. 73-76.

Here is another wayof looking at the lists Arturo and Andres presented yesterday.

A few quick observations on the top rookies since 1977…

• The only other rookie to reach the 10.0 mark in Wins Produced was Kevin Love in 2008-09.
• In other words, there have been 330 top 10 picks since 1977.  Only 34 rookies – including those in and out of the top 10 picks – have produced 10 wins his rookie season.  So once again, chances are the players chosen at the end of the month are not going to have a large impact on their new NBA team.
• The top names – David Robinson, Michael Jordan, Shaquille O’Neal, Magic Johnson, and Tim Duncan – would probably make anyone’s list of top rookies since 1977.  In other words, Wins Produced does tend to fit conventional wisdom for the very best players.
• Some surprising names, though, are Larry Smith, Clark Kellogg, Nate McMillan, Jeff Ruland, and Sam Bowie. Yes, before injuries struck Bowie down, he was actually a very good NBA player.

Posts have been offered before on Clark Kellogg and Sam Bowie.  Perhaps a post on the other surprising rookies might be a good idea.

- DJ

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Andres Alvarez is a software engineer.  Arturo Galletti is an electrical engineer and statistician. Both are avid NBA fans that have been looking over draft data from the last thirty years. The following is an article that started as a long e-mail conversation and hopefully will be the first of several interesting articles on the NBA draft.

Some quick background
This article uses Wins Produced and WP48 [Wins Produced per 48 minutes] to evaluate player’s performance.* This measure uses three key components to evaluate a player:

• The player’s per minute box score statistics
• The player’s team’s per minute box score statistics
• The average performance at the player’s position (PG, SG, SF, PF or C)

A full explanation can be found here. To give a general scale, an average player has a WP48 score of 0.100. The very best players in the league usually have a WP48 over 0.300. To put this in perspective; an average player who plays a full season at 24 minutes a game would generate around four wins for their team.  In contrast, a player posting a 0.300 WP48 would generate more than twelve wins in this time on the court.

Two for one special in the draft lottery

With measure in hand, let’s start with the story of two fans (who we will call Fan A and Fan B).  Both of their teams did poorly last year and both fans want hope for the upcoming season. Fan A finds out that their team managed to draft a rookie who is believed to be a hot prospect. Fan B finds out that their GM has signed two average role players (i.e. two players who can post a 0.100 WP48]. Which fan should feel happier about their team’s upcoming season?

Many analysts and fans will of course point to Fan A.  After all, the draft is a magical place that can change the fortune of any team. The bounce of a ping pong ball can turn a team from a bottom dweller to a contender, or so we are lead to believe.
However, the reality is much more sobering. Each year many rookies are considered “hot prospects”.  But how many of these “hot prospects” actually become elite rookies?  Again, an average player (with a WP48 of 0.100) that plays 24 minutes a game will generate around four wins a year for their team. What are the odds that our “hot prospect” can be twice as productive as an average player and generate eight wins?  The answer from the data – revealed in the following tables — won’t make Fan A very happy.

In the past 33 years, only 64 rookies have produced more than eight wins his rookie season.  In other words, only about two rookies per year reach this level.  And that means the vast majority of rookies really don’t make a substantial impact on their new NBA team during their initial season in the Association.

Table 1: Elite Rookies from 1977-1979Table 2: Elite Rookies from 1980-1989

Table 3: Elite Rookies from 1990-1999

Table 4: Elite Rookies from 2000-2009The Story Decade by Decade

Okay, the big story is that finding an impact rookie is difficult.  Here are a few more stories we see as we look at the few players who actually were able to produce eight wins his rookie season.

The 1970s: The Start of the Draft Myth

As we do not have data for the full 1970s it is hard to give a full analysis of this decade. What we can note is that the current image of the draft may be drawn from this period. In our small sample of three years a total of twelve rookies that played twice as good as an average player were seen. Additionally, Magic Johnson and Larry Bird entered the league the same year and immediately managed to turn their respective franchises around.  The experience with Magic and Bird might have led people in the NBA to believe that it was not that difficult to find a rookie who could turn a team into a championship contender.

1980s to 1990s: A Widening Market

The 1970s and 1980s were an amazing time for elite rookies.  From 1977 to 1989, eight rookies entered the league and produced a WP48 mark that was three times the mark of an average player.  In contrast, this only happened twice after 1990 (Shaquille O’Neal and Chris Paul). 

To explain such differences we can look at what happened to the population of players the NBA could draw upon.  In the 1970s and 1980s, the NBA primarily took its talent from the United States.  In the 1990s, though, talent was taken from around the world.  As the population of players available increased, the ability of any one player to substantially differentiate himself from the league average diminished (because there are now more and more good players in the league). 

Given this observation, perhaps we should not be surprised to see that the quality of the elite rookies declined in the 1990s. Even with 130 more minutes per season, rookies generated almost two fewer wins for their teams, going from an average of 13.5 wins each to 11.1 wins each. 

1990s to 2000s: A Youth Movement

In the 2000s we notice another trend. The number of elite rookies drops from eighteen or nineteen (what we saw in the 1980s and 1990s) to only twelve. And an elite rookie only appears in six years in the 2000s.

Beyond the impact of population, there is also the issue of age.  Specifically, the age of the few elite rookies we see in the 2000s had decline.  Prior to 2000, the elite rookies joined the league near their 22^nd birthday. As a player’s peak is at age 24 or 25, it would seem older would be better.  In other words, a player at 19 or 20 is not expected to produce as much as a player at 21 or 22.

Advice to Management

Consequently, given the impact of population and age, finding an impact rookie has become even more difficult.   Of course, even when we look at the entire data set this is not an easy task.  And it is still true if we just look at the top 10 picks. 

Of the 64 elite rookies, 47 were drafted using a top ten pick. At first glance, it seems the draft makers may actually be able to spot good rookies.  There are two observations, though, to be made.

First of all, there have been 330 rookies selected in the top 10 since 1977.  So less than 15% of these rookies – who were generally considered “hot prospects” – have made substantial impact his rookie season (and only 13 of the 33 players chosen with the first pick).  Furthermore – and perhaps more importantly – there is a clear bias when we look at the link between draft position and overall production.  Published research (as detailed in Stumbling on Wins) has shown that there is a clear link between playing time and draft position (even after you control for player performance).  Given this bias, we should not look at the aggregate performance of the top draft picks and conclude that these players were clearly better.  

All in all, elite rookies are not commonly found in the draft.  This is problematic for GMs of troubled franchises, who clearly would like to deliver quick results to their fans. The advice for GMs looking for quick results would be two-fold. First, a GM should lose illusions about the draft holding the immediate answer. Second, the GM should focus on other decisions that are more likely to help the team in the short-term, such as free agent signings and keeping any existing talent (Ahem! Minnesota and New York).

- Andres Alvarez and Arturo Galletti

* – the Wins Produced numbers discussed come from the calculations of Dave Berri.  These will be posted on-line in the near future.

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