Remember Josh Childress?

The Phoenix Suns started free agency by watching Amare Stoudemire take more money from the New York Knicks.  And as noted, Stoudemire is probably not worth the money he will be paid by the Knicks.  In other words, the Suns were wise to let Stoudemire walk.

Of course, fans of the Suns do not really care how much Phoenix was being asked to pay Stoudemire. All they care about are wins on the court.  And Stoudemire moving on means about ten wins have walked out the door.

To replace these wins, the Suns have technically traded for Hakim Warrick and actually traded for Hedo Turkoglu.  These two players produced 5.6 wins in more than 3,800 minutes last season.  Turkoglu, though, is now a year older and will have to move to the power forward position full time.  So the moves made at power forward are probably not going to help much.

The Suns, though, are also acquiring Josh Childress.  In case readers have forgotten, here is what Childress produced for the Atlanta Hawks across his first four seasons in the NBA.

To put these numbers in perspective, here is what Stoudemire did from 2004-05 to 2007-08:

  • 39.1 Wins Produced
  • 8,305 Minutes Played
  • 0.226 WP48

In addition, Childress is younger than Stoudemire.

So why was Childress allowed to depart Atlanta?  For that story, one is referred to the following posts:

The Underrated Josh Childress

The Underrated in 2007-08

So How Much did Atlanta Improve?

The Childress Revolution

Josh Childress is Appreciated in Europe

To summarize, Childress is one of those productive non-scorers that NBA decision-makers tend to undervalue. 

The underestimation of Childress will probably continue in Phoenix.  It’s unlikely he play 2,000 minutes next season for the Suns, since he plays behind Jason Richardson and Grant Hill.  Plus he is part of the second unit with Jared Dudley (who will also take minutes at small forward).

As a consequence, the addition of Childress will not completely overcome the subtraction of Stoudemire.  But I think it helps quite a bit.  And I think it is possible the Suns will still make the playoffs in 2011 (and Stoudemire and the Knicks may be sitting at home).

- DJ

The Baseball Code: A Question and Answer with Jason Turbow

A few weeks ago I noticed – at Amazon.com – The Baseball Code, a book written by Jason Turbow and Michael Duca on the unwritten rules of baseball.   The book caught my eye for two reasons.  First, I like books on sports (obviously).  More than that obvious point, though, is that I was interviewed by Jason for an article in Popular Science a couple of years ago (for a story on statistical measures and professional sports).  This led me to wonder what Jason had to say about baseball.

After ordering and reading the book, I decided to do what other websites have done with respect to Stumbling on Wins.  Yes, I decided to interview the author of the book.  And much to my delight, Jason was thankfully willing to play along. 

What follows are a few questions I had as I read through The Baseball Code.   For those who want even more on this subject, one should order and read the book.  In addition, Jason now has a blog – The Baseball Codes — that continues the conversation in the book.

DJ: Let’s start with the obvious question… what led you to write the book?

JT: The idea initially belonged to my collaborator, Michael Duca, who was one of the freelance writers for a Giants-centric page I edited for the San Francisco Chronicle several years ago. As soon as he mentioned the notion, it seemed like an obvious no-brainer. Why hadn’t someone written a book on this topic before? (Of course, in the four-plus years between selling the pitch and publication, two other books came out about baseball’s unwritten rules. Please allow me the clearly biased observation that The Baseball Codes is the best of the bunch.)

I initially saw the book as two things: an opportunity to get behind the scenes in ways that even as a professional sportswriter I’d been unable to crack; and as a platform from which to tell a huge number of terrific baseball stories. I’m a sucker for baseball stories.

Michael and I set out on our respective duties: we each interviewed as many players and ex-players as we could (which included a large portion of each team’s traveling party as it passed through the Bay Area—players, managers, coaches, broadcasters and scouts).

I did a massive amount of research and wrote the book, and have since maintained www.baseballcodes.com to continue the conversation that started when the book came out.

DJ: Your book discusses the code in baseball. Why do you think such a code developed in baseball but not in the other sports?

JT: There are a few reasons, primary among them being that baseball, alone among the major sports in this country, is one of deliberation. Football, basketball and hockey are games of immediate reaction, players’ actions being dictated at least in part by what the opposition is doing. Those sports are more physical than thoughtful.

Baseball, however, possesses a pace that allows individual actions to become imbued with meaning. A stolen base doesn’t have to mean anything, but if it’s done with the appropriate timing, it could mean something. An inside pitch might be happenstance, or it might be sending a message. Deliberate actions, of course, merit deliberate responses.

It’s ultimately all about respect, and baseball has deeper roots in gentlemanly behavior than its major-sport counterparts. This also plays a part.

DJ: Your book discusses many ways in which players have historically “cheated.”  Can you briefly list some of the methods your research uncovered?

I must begin this answer by saying that many of the things the public would consider to be cheating—pitchers doctoring baseballs, hitters doctoring bats, stealing signs from the basepaths, etc.—are perfectly acceptable as they pertain to baseball’s Code.

As George Bamberger said, “A guy who cheats in a friendly game of cards is a cheater. A pro who throws a spitball to support his family is a competitor.”

The primary rule regarding cheating in baseball is that once a player is caught, he has to stop. This is why Tony La Russa asked the umpires to have Kenny Rogers wash his hand during the 2006 World Series after a brown clump (believed to be pine tar) was spotted on it, but did not request that they check the pitcher for a foreign substance. What La Russa did leveled the playing field; what he could have done might have gotten Rogers suspended for the duration of the postseason. There’s a huge difference.

In another example, a runner at second, with a clear view into the catcher’s signs, rarely hears about it should the other team catch him signaling pitches to the hitter. Most often, the other team simply changes its signs. (The exception to this comes when somebody tries to steal signs from beyond the field of play via a foreign device such as binoculars, at which point they’re invariably ostracized. This happened earlier in the year with the Philadelphia Phillies.)

DJ: In reading your book it was clear that many baseball players felt comfortable discussing how they essentially had cheated.  Was it surprising to you that people were this forthcoming?  How many baseball players refused to discuss these issues?

JT: Only a handful of people refused to talk out of about 250 interviews. There are obvious reasons for active players to avoid discussion of ways they might flaunt the rules, but when it comes to ex-players, there’s little to hold them back outside their public image. Some have gone so far as to write articles detailing their methods.

Gaylord Perry actually wrote a book, Me and the Spitter, while he was in the middle of his career. He was one of the few players for whom the perception that he was cheating was actually beneficial. His goal was to get hitters thinking that he was loading up every baseball he threw, which kept them from thinking about hitting. It’s why Perry—and notable spitballers before him, primary among them Lew Burdette—was all fidgets and jangles atop the mound. He’d wipe his brow, run his hand across his shirt, feel his arms, rub his pant legs—anything to lend the impression that he was picking up Vaseline from some location on his body. Even when he wasn’t throwing a spitter, this gave him a tremendous edge.

Still, most ex-players, while talking in detail about ways to cheat, ascribed them to unnamed teammates or opponents. Nobody really wants to be known as a cheater.

DJ: One revelation in your book is that Mickey Mantle was often tipped on the pitch that was coming to him.  Obviously Mantle posted some impressive numbers in his career.  Should this revelation diminish our view of Mantle’s accomlishments?

JT: Absolutely not. If a sign is stolen, that means the signaler needs better signs. If a pitcher is tipping his offerings (say, by flaring his glove before throwing a changeup), he can hardly fault the opposition for taking advantage.

Mantle is hardly the only Hall of Famer to benefit from this sort of situation. (He is, however, in the minority who had Bob Turley on the bench, using his mastery of pitchers’ tells to whistle signals about what kind of pitch was on the way.)

Hank Greenberg called himself “the best hitter in the world” when a runner at second accurately tipped him to the type of pitch that was about to be delivered. (Tigers manager Del Baker would tip him from the third-base coach’s box with a series of “all right”s and “come on”s—“All right, Hank, you can do it” indicated that a fastball was on the way, whereas “Come, on Hank” meant curve.)

Willie Mays is said to have hit every one of his four homers on April 30, 1961, off pitches that were signaled to him in advance by coach Wes Westrum.

Even Joe DiMaggio appreciated receiving a stolen sign, whenever it was available.

These guys were all playing by the Code. There’s no reason to penalize them for it.

DJ: The cheating scandle today is steroids.  Assuming steroids can truly alter performance (and there is some dispute on this point), how would you compare this form of cheating with the other forms of cheating reported in your book?

JT: From where I stand, here’s no dispute on whether steroids can alter performance. They can’t help a guy hit a curveball, but they can help a guy who could already hit a curveball hit it a lot farther. That’s a different conversation, however.

To your point: I’d compare steroids to greenies, which were in use primarily from the 1960s through the 1980s. Greenies are amphetamine pills, which players would use to amp up before games. They were kept in open bowls in the clubhouse and gobbled like M&Ms. Jim Bouton describes the players’ dilemma before games that could be rained out, using the phrase “to greenie or not to greenie.” Nobody wanted that sort of excess energy if there wasn’t going to be a game during which to expend it.

It should be noted that amphetamines were legal for much of this time, in various forms. The diet pills peddled to housewives were loaded with them.

Obviously, steroids have a different effect than greenies, but they fall into the same general category: a method of enhancing one’s performance that’s widely accepted within a player’s professional circle. As such, while I staunchly advocate a comprehensive testing program, I don’t fault the players who took them. They were all but sanctioned from the highest levels of Major League Baseball, and an essential part of advancing many a career through that era.

The primary reason they’re not mentioned in The Baseball Codes is that entire books have been written on the topic (one, Game of Shadows, came out as TBC was in the research phase), and we’d never be able to approach that level of involvement in the small handful of pages we’d be able to allot to the topic.

DJ: In the book you note that pitchers – such as Bob Gibson and Don Drysdale – would deliberately throw at hitters.  This was admitted by Gibson and Drysdale and well-known by hitters.  This is perhaps an odd question, but if a pitcher is willing to throw an object at a hitter that could cause serious harm, why do the hitters not charge the mound with bat in hand and cause serious harm to the pitcher?  In other words, why do hitters drop their bats when they charge the mound?

JT: That’s a good question. I think it essentially boils down to this: Pitcher hitting batter with ball is part of game action. It can usually be passed off as accidental, if the pitcher so desires.

Batter hitting pitcher with bat is nothing short of assault. (After all, nobody ever got mugged under threat of a guy holding a baseball.)

Even the angriest hitters understand that a well-connected knock with a baseball bat could get them banished from the game should enough damage be done. Players have been known to throw their bats at pitcher in response to being drilled. And, of course, there’s the ever-popular mound-charge. Again, however, it’s difficult to mistake the intent of these actions. Anyone who undertakes them has to be prepared for repercussions—official and otherwise.

Even More LeBron Stories

As my post yesterday indicated, I was unconvinced by the argument that LeBron avoided New York because he couldn’t handle the pressure from playing in the Big Apple.  Today I have noted at Huffington Post three additional LeBron stories that – like the New York pressure story – might best be described as “less than convincing.”  Or, to put it a bit more concisely (if not entirely nice), somewhat “silly”.

In case these stories are not enough to satisfy your interest in LeBron, Arturo Galletti has offered a quick analysis (inspired by Mr. Parker) of how many teams since 1977 have assembled a quartet like the Miami Heat in 2010.  Assuming player performance doesn’t change too much, next year the Heat will have one player with a WP48 [Wins Produced per 48 minutes] in excess of 0.400 (LeBron James).  And three players (Dwyane Wade, Chris Bosh, and Mike Miller) with a mark that exceeds 0.200.  As the following table indicates, only 11 NBA teams have assembled such a foursome (minimum 400 minutes played).  And seven of these teams advanced to the NBA Finals. 

And if that story is not enough, a genuine Wages of Wins Network is gradually being assembled.  The following four websites are now offering analysis of the NBA using Wins Produced  (or in the case of Ty Willihnganz’s Courtside Analyst a Wins Produced inspired metric).

Nerd Numbers the Blog (Andres Alvarez)

Arturo Silly Little Stats  (Arturo Galletti)

Roblog (Robbie O’Malley)

Courtside Analyst (Ty Willihnganz)

So if The Wages of Wins Journal is not enough, you now have four more places to look at each day.  And I am confident, the LeBron stories in all these locations will eventually be replaced with stories all of us might find more interesting (not that the endless LeBron coverage of the past few days hasn’t been fascinating).

- DJ

Did LeBron Avoid the Pressure of New York?

Frank Isola of the New York Daily News has expressed an argument I have heard other New Yorkers make.  LeBron James didn’t go to the Knicks because he couldn’t handle the pressure of New York.

Although I can imagine this argument is pleasing to people from New York (who are apparently handling the pressure of New York), there is another argument that might be just a bit more plausible.  The Knicks – with our without King James – are not going to contend for a title.

Chris Sheridan of ESPN offers an assessment of the current Knicks.  Here is an excerpt that captures why LeBron did not go to New York.

As things stand now, here is your 2010-11 opening night lineup, Knicks fans (get the tissues out):

PG: Toney Douglas, TBD.
SG:
Wilson Chandler, Azubuike, Rautins.
SF: Gallinari, Bill Walker, Landry Fields.
PF: Stoudemire, Randolph.
C: Turiaf, Curry, Jerome Jordan.

Right now, they have a better chance of chasing the 2009-10 Nets than they do of becoming even the slightest bit relevant in this city. Oh, and let’s not forget: They have no first-round draft pick in 2012, and the Rockets have the right to swap picks with them next year. So it doesn’t look as though it’s getting any better anytime soon.

Let me just add some WP48 numbers to this roster.  Here is the starting line-up:

Toney Douglas: 0.083

Wilson Chandler: 0.092

Danilo Gallinari: 0.040

Amare Stoudemire: 0.170

Ronny Turiaf: 0.063

The Knicks do have Anthony Randolph off the bench, and Randolph – before he got hurt – posted a 0.153 WP48 with Golden State last year.  Randolph, though, plays the same position as Stoudemire.  So the Knicks have two players at power forward, and then nothing else.  Why would LeBron go to such a roster?  If he was going to fail to win titles, he could just stay in Cleveland and avoid the hassle of moving.

Yes, I know.  If LeBron would have come, then a number of other free agents might have come as well.  After all, LeBron is very persuasive.  That is why Chris Bosh decided to join LeBron in Cleveland.  Okay, maybe it is Dwyane Wade that is the persuasive one.

Let me close by noting that LeBron’s special last night was not the highlight of the summer TV schedule.  And I can understand why teams that missed out on LeBron are unhappy.  But I think that LeBron’s choice of Miami can be best explained by LeBron’s actual explanation.  He thinks he can win a title in Miami playing with Wade and Bosh.  And he is willing to accept less money to make this happen. 

- DJ

Does a Dynamic Trio Guarantee a Title?

As David Biderman noted in the Wall Street Journal, King James, Flash, and Chris Bosh (who needs a nickname) are maybe one of the best trios in NBA history.  Last season, James, Wade, and Bosh produced 56.7 wins [James 27.2, Wade 17.8, Bosh 11.7].  That mark – as the following table indicates — would have ranked 5th all-time for the top three players on a team since 1977.

Player performance is impacted by age.  If we factor in the impact of age – and how many games these players have played across their respective careers – we would expect this trio to produce 54.5 wins next season [LeBron 27.9, Wade 14.4, Bosh 12.2]. That would also be the 5th best mark for a trio. 

One might think that having a top trip guarantees a team a title (and certainly I am inclined to favor the Heat in 2010-11, although we still don’t know everyone’s roster). Only six of the top 20 trios, though, actually won a title.  All but one of these (the Lakers in 1980) employed Michael Jordan.  Five additional teams lost in the NBA Finals. So having a top trio does seem to lead to playoff success, although perhaps not as much as fans of Miami might like.

That being said, this trio is much better than anything we saw last year. The top trio from last year was employed by the Cavaliers (James, Varejao, Mo Williams). This trio combined for 40.1 wins. The Lakers — who won the title — were led by Gasol, Odom, and Kobe. This trio produced 40.0 wins (ranked 2nd in the league).

And here is one more observation, that may or may not be applicable (but I like histoy, so I am throwing this out there).  As I noted in the comments just moments before we learned of LeBron’s destination, the construction of the 2010-11 Heat  reminds me of the 1996-97 Houston Rockets.  For those who don’t remember, the Rockets allocated a bit more than $19 million to Hakeem Olajuwon, Clyde Drexler, and Charles Barkley.  The remaining eleven players were paid about $7 million, with eight players earning the NBA minimum.  In 1995-96, Hakeem, Drexler, and Sir Charles combined to produce 45.2 wins.  And Drexler only played 52 games in 1995-96.  If you believed Drexler could play an entire season in 1996-97 – and maintain his per-minute performance – then one would expect this trio to combine for 50 wins. 

Unfortunately, that’s not what happened.  In 1996-97 this trio produced only 38.9 wins (Barkley  16.4, Drexler 12.4, and Olajuwon 10.0).  The remaining members of the team only produced 14.2 additional wins.  And the Rockets eventually fell to the Utah Jazz in the Western Conference finals.

It is important to note that Houston’s trio were all at least 33 years old. So unlike the Heat’s trio, age was a very big factor back in 1996 for the Rockets.  So perhaps what we saw in Houston 15 years ago is not entirely applicable.  Still, I thought I would just toss that historical episode out there for discussion.

- DJ