The previous post on Maurice Lucas focused on the greatest power forwards in Blazer history.  In the process of writing this post I had to look at the productivity of every power forward who ever played for Portland.  And that process involved looking at every Blazer in the history of the team.

Actually, let me amend that statement.  The data needed to calculate Wins Produced only goes back to 1977-78.  We can try and estimate what a player likely did (as I did for Lucas and Sidney Wicks).  But I haven’t done this for every player in the NBA yet.  So my list of greatest players in Blazer history – reported in the following table — starts with the 77-78 season. 

Before we discuss the numbers, let me note that a player needed to play at least four seasons in Portland – and average 20 minutes per game – to qualify for the list.  These benchmarks were chosen because the players who received fan votes at ESPN.com all seemed to cross these thresholds (plus I wanted to limit the size of the table).

Our discussion of the above numbers begins with the selections of Portland’s fans.  These fans said the following players were the best in team history:

PG: Terry Porter (54.5% of the vote)

SG: Clyde Drexler (91.2% of the vote)

SF: Kiki Vandeweghe (60.8% of the vote)

PF: Rasheed Wallace (43.5% of the vote)

C: Bill Walton (85.5% of the vote)

It appears that Blazer fans and Wins Produced agree about the point guard and shooting guard positions.  Terry Porter and Clyde Drexler produced more wins at these positions than any other player; although Rod Strickland – with a 0.215 WP48 [Wins Produced per 48 minutes]– is essentially as productive as Porter [0.214 WP48] on a per-minute basis.  So the 37.2% of fans who selected Strickland might have an argument (although as I note below, Porter did have an amazing season in 1990-91). 

And although Bill Walton doesn’t appear in the above list, those who selected Walton at center are also on fairly solid ground.  Across the time period considered, Walton only played one season for the Blazers (that is why he is not listed).  In 1977-78 he posted the following numbers: 16.3 Wins Produced, 0.405 WP48.  This was all done in 58 games.  Walton was hurt after the 60^th game of that season.  At that time the Blazers’ record was 50-10.  Without Walton the team went 8-14.  In other words, with Walton the Blazers were the best team in the NBA.  Without Walton, the Blazers would have had trouble making the playoffs (the Warriors missed the playoffs that season with a mark of 43-39). 

Again, we don’t have all the information we need to measure Wins Produced before 1977. Specifically we are missing turnover data.  But given what we know about Walton we can estimate how many turnovers he probably committed.  Consequently we can estimate what Walton did for the Blazers.

1974-75: 6.6 Wins Produced, 0.277 WP48

1975-76: 7.8 Wins Produced, 0.223 WP48

1976-77: 17.0 Wins Produced, 0.361 WP48

1977-78: 16.3 Wins Produced, 0.405 WP48

Totals with Blazers: 47.8 Wins Produced, 0.326 WP48

Walton’s Wins Produced total only ranks 6^th in team history [again, history begins in 1977-78].  But his WP48 mark is easily the best in team history.  So although Arvydas Sabonis produced more wins at the center position for the Blazers, I think one can easily argue that Walton is the “best” center in Portland history (and the primary reason the Blazers won the only NBA championship in franchise history).

So Wins Produced and the fans appear to agree at the one, two, and five spots.  At the small forward spot, though, there is a clear disagreement.  The fans prefer Kiki Vandeweghe, who came to the Blazers in 1984.  With the Blazers, Vandeweghe played until February of 1989 and averaged 23.5 points per game.  Scoring – as is often mentioned – drives perceptions of performance in the NBA.  Vandeweghe, though, was a classic unproductive scorer.   He only produced 12.0 wins for Portland, and his WP48 was only 0.059 (although he was 6-8 in height, he was apparently allergic to rebounds). In contrast, Jerome Kersey produced 13.6 wins in one year (the 1989-90 season).  Overall, Kersey produced 85.9 wins for Portland, with a 0.190 WP48.

One might note that the most of the “most productive” Blazers played on the same team. The 1990-91 Blazers had an efficiency differential (offensive efficiency minus defensive efficiency) of 8.3.  This mark was the best mark in team history, and easily bests the mark of the 1976-77 championship team (5.0 differential, which was better than the 76ers and everyone else that season, but only ranked 8^th in franchise history).  The 1990-91 team started the following players:

PG: Terry Porter: 0.377 WP48

SG: Clyde Drexler: 0.337 WP48

SF: Jerome Kersey: 0.185 WP48

PF: Buck Williams: 0.231 WP48

C: Kevin Duckworth: -0.062 WP48

Obviously the weak link was Duckworth (who 0.9% of fans thought was the best center in Portland history).  Sabonis was originally drafted by the Blazers in 1986. Had he arrived by the 1990-91 season (he didn’t come to the team until 1995) – and if Sabonis posted a WP48 of 0.276 (what he averaged in his career with the Blazers) – I think the Blazers would have been better than the 1990-91 Bulls (who had a differential of 10.6).  In other words, the Blazers – with Sabonis – might have won the title in 1991. 

With Duckworth, though, the Bulls were the better team.  And that means that Kersey and Williams are not generally seen as great players.

And this is especially true with respect to Buck Williams. Here is Henry Abbott’s response to my discussion of Maurice Lucas:

David Berri says that the best power forward in Blazer history was not my candidate, Maurice Lucas, but Buck Williams. The difference, fair or not, is that Lucas was the inspirational leader of a title team, while Williams was a role player on a two-time runner-up. No, that doesn’t prove Lucas was more productive. Yes, I think it does give Lucas a special place in history, and a reputation that may extend beyond his production.

What if Sabonis played back in 1990-91 with the Blazers and that team won the title? Would the perspective on Williams change?  My sense is that a ring on his finger would make Williams appear to be a better player.  And I think that is incorrect.  A player should be evaluated independent of his teammates.  Lucas got to play with Walton, and that means Lucas got to win a title.  Sabonis could have come to the Blazers in 1989, but decided to play in the Spanish League instead.  As a result, Williams didn’t get his title.  The decision made by Sabonis, though, shouldn’t change how we perceive the value of Williams (but of course, I think it does).

- DJ

As we wait patiently for the 2010-11 season to get started, ESPN.com is entertaining fans by holding a vote for the greatest players in the history of each NBA franchise.  Henry Abbott – of TrueHoop – checked in on this vote on Monday and discovered a result that left him unhappy.

Something terrible has happened.  …Perhaps the most important player in Blazer history didn’t even make the starting five. Maurice Lucas should come in first or second as the franchise’s all-time MVP, and instead finished behind both Rasheed Wallace and Sidney Wicks. Lucas got just 14.6% of the lousy power forward vote.

For those unfamiliar with NBA history, Lucas began playing in the ABA in 1974.  When the ABA merged with the NBA, Lucas joined the Portland Trail Blazers in 1976.   That first season, Lucas produced approximately 10.2 wins* with a WP48 [Wins Produced per 48 minutes] of 0.171.  So Lucas was an above average performer on a team that went on to win the NBA title in 1977.

The next season the productivity of Lucas slipped to only 5.8 wins and a 0.131 WP48.  In 1978-79, though Lucas returned to what we saw in the championship season.  His WP48 that season was 0.166 and he produced 8.5 wins.  In sum, Lucas was an above average performer from 1976-77 to 1978-79, posting numbers that are similar to what we saw from Amare Stoudemire this past season (Stoudemire’s WP48 was 0.170 in 2009-10).

Despite these numbers, Portland fans prefer Rasheed Wallace and Sidney Wicks.   Both of these players, though, offered less than Lucas.  Rasheed’s very best season – in terms of Wins Produced — was in 2001-02 when he produced 8.5 wins and posted a 0.138 WP48.  In other words, Wallace at his very best, was not as good as Maurice Lucas.

Sidney Wicks, though, might have been a little bit better.  At least for one season.  In 1974-75, Wicks** produced 11.8 wins with a 0.179 WP48.  Wicks, though, was below average in 1973-74 and 1974-75, and produced in the negative range for the Clippers the last three years of his career (1978-79 to 1980-81).

In contrast, Lucas just got better after leaving Portland.  Lucas was sent to the New Jersey Nets in the midst of the 1979-80 season.  Across the next five seasons, Lucas posted the following numbers:

• 1980-81 (Nets): 5.5 Wins Produced, 0.122 WP48
• 1981-82 (Knicks): 14.9 Wins Produced, 0.267 WP48
• 1982-83 (Suns): 9.7 Wins Produced, 0.180 WP48
• 1983-84 (Suns): 11.9 Wins Produced, 0.248 WP48
• 1984-85 (Suns): 6.3 Wins Produced, 0.180 WP48

After the 1984-85 season, Lucas was 33 years old.  He then played three more seasons with the Lakers, Sonics, and then Blazers.  But across these three years, though, he only produced 6.7 wins. 

Prior to age taking its toll, though, Lucas was very productive.  And his career WP48 of 0.159 easily tops what we see from Wallace [0.089 career WP48] and Wicks [0.079 career WP48].  So if your choice is Lucas, Wallace, or Wicks, then I think Henry is on to something.  Lucas was the more productive power forward in this trio.

Of course, Portland fans did have another choice.  About 6% of fans chose Charles Linwood Williams as the best power forward in team history.  Buck Williams began his career in 1981 and came to the Blazers before the 1989-90 season.  Williams had his best season in his career with the Nets in 1981-82.  That year he produced 22.3 wins and posted a 0.362 WP48.  Williams never surpassed the o.300 mark again, but he did post WP48 marks beyond the 0.200 threshold in eight more seasons (something Lucas only did twice in the NBA).  Three of these were with the Blazers, with the best season coming in 1990-91.  That year Williams produced 12.4 wins with a 0.231 WP48.  Those numbers surpass anything offered by Lucas, Wallace, or Wicks.  In sum, I think one can argue that Buck Williams was the “best” power forward in Portland team history.

Let me close by noting two issues.  First, Buck Williams – relative to Maurice Lucas – was the more efficient scorer.  And this is primarily why Williams was more productive.  Secondly, I have a table ranking the most productive players in Blazer history.  And it appears Wins Produced strongly disagrees with the fans of the Blazers at another position.  My hope is to post this table — and a corresponding discussion—tomorrow (or some day soon).

- DJ

*-The NBA did not start tracking turnovers for individuals until 1977-78, but given what we know about his career, we can estimate for Lucas how many turnovers he committed in 1976-77. Therefore we can estimate his Win Score – and therefore Wins Produced – for the 76-77 season.

** – Wicks began his career in 1971-72. Until the 1973-74 campaign, the NBA did not track steals, blocked shots, or turnovers for individuals.  Given what we know of his performance later in his career, though, we can estimate what Wicks did with respect to these statistics.  It is with these estimates that we can approximate his Win Score and Wins Produced.

The following was noted in the comments section in the previous post (by ilikeflowers): Henry Abbott was discussing the proposed trade of Joakim Noah (and other stuff) for Carmelo Anthony today.  In the course of the discussion he stated:

Noah is a promising young big man, but by almost any metric Carmelo Anthony’s production is vastly superior. Many have called Anthony the best pure scorer in the NBA.

Any metric?

Okay, here is one metric: 

Joakim Noah WP48 [Wins Produced per 48 minutes]: 0.270

Carmelo Anthony WP48: 0.108

Now maybe you don’t like Wins Produced (not sure how that could be possible, but for the sake of this discussion…).  What about Win Shares?

Joakim Noah Win Shares per 48 minutes: 0.154

Carmelo Anthony Win Shares per 48 minutes: 0.145

Yes, not as big a difference. But Win Shares is a metric that also favors Noah.

If you turn to scoring and Player Efficiency Rating (which is dominated by scoring), Anthony would be thought of as “vastly superior”.  But there is more to the game than scoring.  And if the Bulls do this trade, they will discover that winning will become a bit more difficult.

As for the Nuggets… well, the fans may not appreciate this yet.  But if this trade happens, fans in Denver will ultimately be happier.

- DJ

P.S. By the way… let me defend what Henry is saying. First of all, Henry had heard of Wins Produced and Win Shares.  The column he wrote was actually a fairly involved discussion of the pros and cons of this trade (and there is much to like about the column).  It was also posted at 4:30pm, so I am guessing Henry might have thrown this all together fairly quickly (again, that is just a guess).  And technically one could argue he is correct.  Most metrics (or at least, a fair number) are dominated by scoring (i.e. PER, NBA Efficiency, TENDEX, Points Created).  So one could say “almost any metric” favors Melo.  If you restrict yourself to measures that actually try and connect the box score statistics to wins (and I think both Wins Produced and Win Shares are trying to do this), though, then Melo is not “vastly superior.”

A few days ago the Minnesota Timberwolves told their fans that they will probably not be contending for a title in 2011.  Most people – except for Michael Beasley – would tend to agree with the T-Wolves.  So although we are surprised by the honesty, we are not surprised with this assessment.

Such honesty, though, leads one to ask: Who else in the NBA should offer a similar confession?  The beginning of an answer was offered by Arturo Galletti, who is currently working on a forecast for the 2010-11 season. 

This past week he offered a very preliminary view.  Essentially, he ranked each team according to how the team’s veteran players performed last year.  In other words, he ignored rookies and injuries.  He also did not consider how minutes could be allocated or how age might impact performance (and please read his post carefully for all of the details behind what Arturo did).

So the following table is not really a forecast of next season.  But it does give someone an idea of which teams have any chance to contend.  And of course, that also means we now have some idea which teams might want to follow Minnesota’s example.

The key column is in the middle (Adjusted Wins – Minutes and Available Wins).  According to this view, only three teams – Philadelphia, the LA Clippers, and the Washington Wizards – rank below the T-Wolves.  Again, rookies are not considered and the Clippers do have Blake Griffin.  Nevertheless, one rookie is not going to transform this team into a title contender.  So an “honest assessment” should be forthcoming from these franchises as well.

One could also add to this list the Knicks, Pistons, Raptors, and Pacers.  These teams are not favorites to land in the playoffs. And you can’t win a title if you can’t make the playoffs.

Beyond this list we have teams that have better odds of making the playoffs.  Of course, just making the playoffs isn’t good enough.  In other words, every team that makes the playoffs isn’t a title contender.

But if we start noting the non-title contenders in the playoffs, then we might start expecting “honest assessments” from virtually every team in the Association.  After all, Miami is the clear favorite to win the 2011 title. And right now, the list of teams that might prevent LeBron and company from being happy next summer is fairly short.  From Arturo’s list, we might place the following teams on that list: Portland, LA Lakers, Orlando, and maybe Boston.  We might also consider Chicago, Dallas, and San Antonio.  After these teams, though, Arturo’s first look is less optimistic.

It is very important to remember that this is a first glance at these teams, and much has been left out of the analysis.  But I do think we can see that even in September, Minnesota is not the only team that can promise their fans that a championship parade will not interfere with city traffic next summer. 

And that is what makes basketball very different from the other major sports.  In the other sports, fans can believe until the games start being played.  In basketball, we know (again, except for Michael Beasley) that the season for some teams is over before it begins.  Yes, it is sort of sad.  But I think that is an honest assessment.

- DJ

Tom Haberstroh has ranked the “Feeble Five” in the history of each NBA franchise (insider access required).  His criteria were as follows:

Picking a franchise’s five best players is a wide-open layup compared to identifying the most detrimental players of an organization’s history. But we’ve accomplished the feat with a little help from John Hollinger’s player efficiency rating (PER), which provides a handy productivity measure using a player’s box score statistics.

It’s pretty obvious that the worst NBA player is the one who never plays, but such a list would be no fun to read or write. We’re targeting guys you actually might remember but wish you couldn’t (Nikoloz Tskitishvili, anyone?). So, in order to qualify for this list, a player needed to have played at least 10 minutes per contest over the course of at least 100 career games with the franchise. Furthermore, we’ve added the “Bruce Bowen Corollary” to exempt players who started for championship teams.

Haberstroh’s reliance on PER (a model that rewards inefficient scoring) is odd given what he argued last August.  At that time, Haberstroh said he did not believe Carmelo Anthony was a maximum player. Haberstroh’s reasoning was summarized in a column I wrote at the Huffington Post.

Haberstroh is arguing that scoring totals are a poor measure of player performance. A better approach is to consider shooting efficiency and the other factors that determine wins. And in considering these other factors, one needs to consider what one might expect to see from an average player at a player’s position.

One should note that Haberstroh never mentions Wins Produced (a measure of performance introduced in The Wages of Wins in 2006 and utilized in Stumbling on Wins) in constructing his argument. But this argument is essentially the Wins Produced story. When we look at how offensive and defensive efficiency relate to wins, we see that success in the NBA is driven by shooting efficiency and factors that gain and keep possession of the ball (i.e. rebounds, steals, and turnovers). Assists, blocked shots, and personal fouls (what Justin Wolfers and Joe Price refer to as “help” factors) do matter. But not as much as the possession factors.

Once we understand what drives wins, we also have to note that position played also matters. Big men tend to get rebounds and not commit many turnovers. Guards tend to do the opposite. Consequently, in evaluating players one has to consider what an average player in the same position would offer.

With the Carmelo Anthony argument in mind I wondered what would happen if we re-visited Haberstroh’s discussion of the Feeble Five.  This time, though, we will ignore PER and focus instead on Wins Produced.

When we look at the Pistons (the team I follow), we see that PER ranks the following five as the most feeble in team history:

• Eric Montross
• Michael Curry
• Earl Lloyd
• Aaron Afflalo
• Chuck Noble

Lloyd and Noble played prior to 1977, or the first year all the data needed to calculate Wins Produced was tracked by the league.  So our analysis with WP48 [Wins Produced per 48 minutes] can only consider Montross, Curry, and Afflalo [PER is a per-minute measure, so we need to consider WP48].

The metric considered will be the only change we will make.  Players still have to play 100 games and average at least 10 minutes per contest.  And given his criteria, the new Feeble Five for the Pistons are as follows:

• James Edwards [-0.088 WP48]
• Tony Campbell [-0.061 WP48]
• Clifford Robinson [-0.050 WP48]
• Paul Mokeski [-0.039 WP48]
• Eric Montross [-0.035 WP48

Michael Curry – with a -0.016 WP48 – finishes 6^th.  And Afflalo – with a 0.058 WP48 – finished 27^th.   There are only 63 players on the list, so Afflalo is fairly close to the middle of the pack.  But since he doesn’t score, PER does not think very highly of his contributions.

In contrast, James Edwards could score.  Given Haberstroh’s last criteria (i.e. can’t be feeble if you started for a title team), Edwards shouldn’t be on the list.  Furthermore, with a career PER of 14.7 [15.0 is average] – and a career points per 48 minutes of 25.2 – Edwards is not generally regarded as a player who is well below average.  Wins Produced, though, tells a different story.  For his career, Edwards produced -22.7 wins.  In his best season – at the age of 25 – he only produced 3.4 wins with a 0.069 WP48 [with Indiana in 1980-81].  Yes, Edwards could score. But he didn’t do much else to help his team win.

Let me close by noting the top twenty feeble Pistons.  As the following table reveals, a few familiar names rank among the least productive Pistons since 1977.  Allan Houston, Lindsey Hunter, Kelly Tripucka, and John Long were considered to be “star” players for the Pistons when they played.  This quartet, though, only produced 41.5 wins in 30 year of action. 

Allan Houston’s performance is especially interesting.  Houston could score.  And as a consequence, he was paid more than $100 million in his career.  But he didn’t produce wins.  Now there is talk he might someday be the general manager with the Knicks. Given his career, what sort of players do you expect Houston to choose if he ever become a general manager? 

- DJ