About a month ago an Ian Thomsen story appeared in Sports Illustrated detailing the resurgent New Orleans Hornets.  At the Huffington Post – again, about a month ago — I took issue with Thomsen’s story.  For Thomsen, the story was all about changes to both the team’s roster and the team’s front office.  This focus, though, struck me as largely misplaced.  It seemed to me that the numbers suggested the big story was Chris Paul getting healthy.

Chris Paul and Not Much Else

Okay, another month has passed (as I mentioned).  And now we can see that all the changes the Hornets have made – to both the roster and front office – haven’t really made a difference.  After 32 games, the Hornets have scored 101.8 points per 100 possessions while allowing 100.2.  The team’s efficiency differential – offensive efficiency minus defensive efficiency — of 1.62 is consistent with a team that will win about 45 games across a full season.  Yes, this is better than what we saw last year.  But this is not much of an improvement.  In sum, it doesn’t look like the Hornets – despite all the changes to the roster and the front office – are ready to contend for an NBA title.

When we move from efficiency differential to Wins Produced, we can see why this team is not quite a contender.  As the following table notes, Chris Paul is really very, very, good.  In fact, Paul is once again among the leaders in the NBA in Wins Produced.  And as noted a few weeks ago, Paul is also the primary source of this team’s improvement. Unfortunately – despite all the changes to this team (did I mention, changes to both the roster and front office?) – Paul is still not getting much help.

David West and Emeka Okafor – two of the only four teammates Paul has left from last year – are above average this season (average WP48 – or Wins Produced per 48 minutes — is 0.100).  And that result is not much different from last year.

Unfortunately, the rest of the roster is below average.  And this result is really not that surprising.  The Hornets added eleven new faces.  So far, all eleven are below average players.  Ten of these players played in the NBA last year, and when we look at what each player did in 2009-10 we see that only Jarrett Jack was above average.  In other words, it’s not a surprise that so far the Hornets have struck-out with these additions. 

The Hornets experience appears to put an interesting twist on what was observed about the Detroit Pistons about two weeks ago.  The Pistons – as has been noted before – brought back essentially the same players this year and are getting essentially the same result.   Each time this is noted (and it has been noted more than once) it is argued that players are quite consistent in the NBA.  So if you want your results to change, you need to employ different players.

The Hornets experience this year suggests an addition to this rule.  Specifically, if you want your results to change, you need to employ “better” players. 

And until the Hornets find “better” players, the tragedy of Chris Paul (like the tragedy of Kevin Garnett observed once upon a time in Minnesota) will continue. 

Trevor Ariza and the Usage Story

One player the Hornets added was Trevor Ariza.  In the past Ariza has been above average.  Last year, though, Ariza went to the Houston Rockets and saw his production drop.  Fans of the “usage” argument immediately cited Ariza as evidence that the “usage” story is correct.  Just to review… the usage story is that players who see their shot attempts rise will see their shooting efficiency decline.  Last season, Ariza saw his shot attempts rise with Houston — and just as the usage folks expected — Ariza’s shooting efficiency dropped.  So naturally, the usage story was clearly confirmed.

Last year I noted, though, that a number of other players saw their shot attempts rise with the Rockets and their shooting efficiency didn’t really decline.  In response to this observation, though, people argued that all that matters is what happened to Ariza (yes, people really made such an argument).  Apparently, you only need one piece of evidence to believe a story.

Obviously I found this story unconvincing.  And this is because I have actually looked at the link between shot attempts and shooting efficiency. 

Here is what we say in Stumbling on Wins (p. 206):

The key issue in looking at scoring is not shots taken but shooting efficiency. It’s thought that a player who takes more shots will see his shooting efficiency decline. If you regress shooting efficiency—measured with points per shot or adjusted field goal percentage—on shot attempts you do not see this relationship. However, if you look at the link between the change in a player’s shooting efficiency from season to season and the change in his per-minute shot attempts, the expected link is seen. The effect, though, is small. To see how small, imagine a player who takes 16.3 shots per 48 minutes and has an adjusted field goal percentage of 48.4% (these are the league average marks). If that player increased his shots per 48 minutes to 25.3 (a two standard deviation increase), his adjusted field goal percentage would be expected to decline to 47.1%. This is a very large increase in shot attempts, but it only appears to reduce shooting efficiency by about 1%. Consequently, players have a clear incentive to shoot as much as they can. Even large increases in shot attempts don’t diminish efficiency very much. But such increases do add to scoring totals, and more scoring will lead to more minutes, money, and fame. One should note that there is no statistical link between a player’s shooting efficiency and the shooting efficiency of his teammates. In other words, playing with teammates who tend to hit their shots will not make a player a more efficient shooter.

The above paragraph reviews a study that looked at thirty years of player data (and thousands of observations). Although such a study might be convincing, we all know that all that matters is Trevor Ariza.  And this year Ariza  — relative to what we saw in 2009-10 – is taking fewer shots.  Again, the usage story is that fewer shots will lead to increases in shooting efficiency.  So we should not be surprised that Ariza’s shooting efficiency has suddenly… okay, it has actually gone down a bit more.

Wait, that can’t be right.  The usage story is that fewer shot attempts leads to much better shooting efficiency.  Again, we see there is a link between shot attempts and efficiency, but it is quite small.  Ariza’s performance is not even consistent with even the small effect we uncover (and that is because the changes in the number of shots a player takes doesn’t explain much of the change in a player’s shooting efficiency) .  And Ariza’s performance in 2010-11 is certainly inconsistent with the usage story people trumpeted last year.

Hopefully, though, another player will start taking more shots in the NBA and see his shooting efficiency decline (or take fewer shots and see his efficiency rise).  Again, fans of the usage argument only need one anecdote to run with.  So let the search begin for a new poster child of the usage argument!!  Surely we can find someone to take the place Trevor Ariza has unfortunately abandoned.

- DJ

Once again, trade talks between the Nets and Nuggets are heating up.  The Nets obviously want Carmelo Anthony.  And it appears the Nets are willing to give up almost anyone to land him.  But there is one name that appears to be untouchable.  According to a story from Adrian Wojnarowski – offered a few days ago at Yahoo! — “center Brook Lopez is the only Nets player not involved in any of the proposals, sources said.”

So Brook Lopez is untouchable?  Really?

Here is what Lopez has offered as an NBA player:

2008-09: 2,501 minutes, 5.4 Wins Produced, 0.104 WP48

2009-10: 3,027 minutes, 5.6 Wins Produced, 0.088 WP48

2009-11 (as of December 27): 1,052 minutes, -1.7 Wins Produced, -0.076 WP48

At this moment, Lopez is on pace to produce -4.6 wins.  And that means he is on pace to be one of the least productive players in the NBA in 2010-11.  Just to summarize… before this season Lopez was about average (and average NBA player post a WP48 — Wins Produced per 48 minutes — of 0.100).  This year, Lopez is far below average.

Why is Lopez doing so little this season?  When we look at his box score stats (I was going to offer a table illustrating all this, but I am lazy today), we see a player who is an inefficient scorer from the field and a poor rebounder.  In addition, he is below average with respect to steals, assists, and blocked shots.  He does get to the free throw line and avoids committing fouls.  But the negatives far out-number the positives.  And yet, he is untouchable.

Obviously the reason Lopez is considered a “keeper” is because he can score.  Per game he is scoring 19.7 points.  Again, this is not because he is an efficient shooter.   No, Lopez is just willing to take shots.  And again, given how much the NBA pays players to take shots and score, if Lopez didn’t take these shots someone else would (for example, if Anthony came he would probably take some of the shots Lopez is currently launching).

At this moment, Melo is an upgrade over the small forwards the Nets are employing (again, a table would be good here, but again, I am lazy today).  No, Melo isn’t worth maximum money (even if he has improved this year).  But he would help the Nets a bit on the court.  If somehow the Nets could lose Lopez in the deal, that would help even more.

But because the NBA over-emphasizes points per game, Lopez can’t be dealt. 

One has to remember that the issue isn’t just how the Nets perceive the value of Lopez.  It is also how Anthony perceives Lopez.  It has been reported that the only way Anthony will sign with the Nets is if he believes the Nets can win.  If the Nets trade a player Anthony believes helps the team win – even if that isn’t true – the deal will never get done.

So at this point I am not sure if the Nets believe Lopez really is untouchable (although I suspect they do).  One does suspect that Anthony won’t come if Lopez goes.  So that means if this deal gets done, Lopez probably can’t help the Nets out by leaving.  Nevertheless, given what Lopez is offering this year, the Nets really would be helped if this particular  “keeper” could be kept by someone else.

- DJ

Prior to the 2009-10 season I offered a review/preview of the Atlanta Hawks that was titled: Hoping for a Plan in Atlanta.  During the summer of 2009 the Hawks made very few moves to improve their roster.   So it was clear the Hawks were simply hoping that players already on the team would improve.

At the time I questioned how likely this plan would result in success.  NBA players – relative to what we see in the football or baseball – are very consistent.  Therefore, hoping that existing players would improve enough to dramatically change a team’s results seems unrealistic.

A few weeks after the 2009-10 season started, though, it was clear the Hawks “plan” had met with some success.   Josh Smith – who has never posted a WP48 [Wins Produced per 48 minutes] beyond 0.148 in five NBA seasons – was suddenly posted a mark beyond 0.200.  Many thought this improvement was linked to Smith’s decision to stop launching three-pointers.  More importantly, though, was Smith’s ability to grab more rebounds, get more steals and assists, and block more shots.  In sum, Smith’s improvement can be traced to a number of statistics, and as a consequence, Smith produced 7.7 more wins than his 2008-09 performance would suggest he would offer last year.

It was primarily because of Smith’s improvement that the Hawks were able to advance from a 47 win team in 2008-09 to a 53 win team in 2009-10.  The playoff results, though, were identical.  In both 2009 and 2010 the Hawks were swept out of the playoffs in the second round.

This season the Hawks appear to be following the same plan implemented during the summer of 2009.  As Michael Cunningham of the Atlanta Journal-Constitution noted a few days ago:

Re-signing free agent Joe Johnson was the Hawks’ only major move over the summer and there’s no indication they believe they can or should do more to keep pace in the Eastern Conference. 

General manager Rick Sund is taking the same wait-and-see approach he did prior to the start of the season. 

“We’ve improved every year; now we will see if we can get one step closer to a championship,” Sund said.

Cunningham goes on to note:  With no indication the Hawks are looking to make trades, they have to hope the current group can improve enough to make them true East contenders.

The Hawks Decline

After 31 games in 2010-11 it seems like a good time to see how this plan is working out.  The teams’ record is currently 19-12 and the team’s efficiency differential (offensive efficiency minus defensive efficiency) is 1.91.  To put this in perspective, the team won 53 games last season (a record consistent with a 20-11 team after 31 games) and posted a 4.93 differential.  So in terms of both wins and the efficiency marks, the Hawks have declined.

When we move from efficiency differential to Wins Produced we can see who specifically has declined.   

Before we get to the declines, let’s mention briefly that Atlanta’s plan is working with respect to Al Horford.  In his fourth season – and at the age of 24 – Horford is posting his best numbers yet.  But despite Horford’s improvement, the Hawks have declined primarily because of the play of Maurice Evans, Joe Johnson, and Jamal Crawford.

The Joe Johnson Story 

Okay, the plan is not working.  Yes, Josh Smith did improve last year.  And Horford improved this year.  But just as some players can get better, others can actually get worse.  And it is the decline of one particular player that I think illustrates two key issues in the NBA’s labor market— and also why the Hawks hope for title contention in the future will not be realized.

The particular player I am talking about is Joe Johnson.  As noted, Johnson was re-signed in the off-season.  Entering the 2010-11 season, Johnson had already played nine NBA seasons.  And here are his career numbers:

Minutes: 25,794

Wins Produced: 57.0

WP48: 0.106 [average WP48 is 0.100]

Points per game: 17.6

Salary: $75 million

And here is what Johnson did last year at the age of 28:

Minutes: 2,886

Wins Produced: 10.0

WP48: 0.167

Points per game: 21.3

Salary: $15 million

Johnson’s most productive season was 2009-10.   However, Johnson will turn 30 next June.  And as I have noted in the past, NBA players age like milk.  In other words, Johnson is likely to offer to less in the future (this is one key feature of the NBA’s labor market decision-makers need to consider).

But let’s assume that didn’t happen for Johnson.  And let’s assume that Johnson could keep offering what he did last year across the next six years.   That means Johnson would produce 60.2 wins from 2010-11 to 2015-16.  How much should a team be willing to pay for this production?

If you said “nearly $124 million”, then you would be the Atlanta Hawks.  And such an amount says that Johnson – if he could maintain his production from last year until he is 34 years of age – will receive more than $2 million for each win (the NBA average is around $1.7 million).  So Johnson — if he didn’t really age — would still be overpaid.

So far this year, though, Johnson is only on pace to 3.7 wins.  Now Johnson has missed nine games due to injury.  If he was on pace to play as many minutes as he did last year –but still offered the same per-minute production as this year – then Johnson would be on pace to produce 5.1 wins.  And for that production, he will be paid $16.3 million.

That annual salary figure will only increase going forward.  In 2013-14, Johnson will be paid more than $21.5 million.  And again, it seems unlikely Johnson will be that productive at the age of 32.   But despite this expectation, Johnson is scheduled to receive $9 million more than Al Horford in 2013-14. 

Beyond 2013-14 the story gets even worse for the Hawks.  In 2015-16 – when Johnson is 34 years of age – he will be get paid more than $24 million.  Again, if he offered 10 wins at that age – or what he did last year – he would still be overpaid.  Given how players age, though, it is likely Johnson will actually offer much less.

So why did Johnson get this contract?  As frequently reported before, the NBA labor market rewards players who score (this is second key feature the labor market I wish to emphasize). And since arriving in Atlanta, Johnson has consistently led the Hawks in points per game. Not coincidently, he has also led that Hawks in field goal attempts. 

Once again, we see the same familiar story.  Johnson has not been a particularly efficient scorer across his career.  But he is willing to take shots.  And when Johnson’s career is over his willingness to shoot will result in career earnings that approach $200 million. 

As reported in Stumbling on Wins, though, field goal attempts are the easiest statistic for an NBA team to replace.  In other words, if Johnson didn’t take all those shots, someone else on the Hawks probably would have been willing to shoot.  In fact, given how much the NBA pays players to shoot, one imagines that almost everyone on the Hawks would love to take those shots.

Summarizing the Story

So let’s summarize the story. The Hawks plan is to hope existing players improve.  That hope has been realized in the play of Josh Smith in 2009-10 and Al Horford this season. Despite this improvement, though, the Hawks are not a top team in the East because other players are offering less (yes, players can both improve and decline). 

That suggests the Hawks will need to add better players if this team wishes to contend.  The ability of the Hawks to substantially alter their roster has been hindered, though, by the Hawks promise to pay Joe Johnson more than $124 million.   This promise is certainly driven by the logic of the NBA player’s market.  Unfortunately for fans of Atlanta, scoring totals are not the best measure of a player’s contribution to wins.  So although the Hawks were not “wrong” to give Johnson so much money, all that money going to a player who doesn’t produce that many wins is going to make it very hard for this team to contend for a title.

But that shouldn’t stop people from hoping (well it should, but let’s close on an optimistic note).  After all, that is the plan in Atlanta.

- DJ

Last season, the Charlotte Bobcats won 44 games while posting an efficiency differential (offensive efficiency minus defensive efficiency) of 1.55.  Although this mark wouldn’t be impressive for most NBA teams, Charlotte’s efficiency differential in 2009-10 was the best differential in franchise history (a history that dates back to 2004-05).

The team’s success resulted in the first playoff berth in team history.  Unfortunately, the first playoff win proved elusive.  Nevertheless, Charlotte fans were optimistic at the end of last season.

This past summer, though, Raymond Felton departed for New York.  Felton produced 8.9 wins for the Bobcats in 2009-10; while posted a 0.162 WP48 [Wins Produced per 48 minutes].   Although Felton was not the most productive player on the Bobcats, without his nearly nine wins the Bobcats would have missed the playoffs.

Despite this loss, Michael Jordan – the owner of the Bobcats – was very optimistic when the season started: “I think we’re going to be a better off team than we were last year.  We’re together, we’re coming off some success from last year. Granted, Raymond’s not here. …At the minimum, we should make the playoffs.”

Larry Brown – the team’s head coach – was less optimistic.   As ESPN.com reported: “A day before training camp opened, Brown said, ‘I died’ when Felton left, then questioned his team’s front line.”

After 28 games, it looks like Brown’s assessment was closer to the mark. The team has only won nine games and Charlotte’s efficiency differential of -6.2 matches what the team achieved during its first season in 2004-05.   And now Brown – in a move that says “I can’t win with this group” – has left the team.

Of course, some might argue that the coach was the actual problem.  In other words, MJ did assemble a collection of talent that could win if only the Bobcats had the “right” coach.

Readers of Stumbling on Wins know that I am skeptical of the “right” coach argument.  Still, let’s look at the team and see if we can figure out the problem in Charlotte.

Finding the Problem in Charlotte

The following table reports the Wins Produced of each player on the Bobcats this year. It also tells us how much Wins Produced has changed from what we would have seen if each player maintained the per-minute performance [specifically ADJ P48] we saw last year.  As one can easily see, the player whose performance has changed the most is Gerald Wallace.

Had Wallace maintained what we saw last year (with the minutes and position played of his year), he would currently be on pace to produce 18.25 wins.  Although Wallace still leads the team in Wins Produced in 2010-11, he is on pace to produce nearly ten fewer wins than his 2009-10 performance would suggest.   

If Wallace had maintained his productivity, this team would currently be on pace to win 35 games.  Yes, that isn’t quite as good as what we saw last year.  But Wallace’s decline explains much of the difference between 2009-10 and the Bobcats after 28 games this year.

So why has Wallace declined?  When we look at his numbers, we see that Wallace is offering less with respect to shooting efficiency from the field, shooting efficiency from the free throw line, and rebounds.  He is also committing more turnovers and personal fouls, and swiping fewer steals.  Of all these changes, it is the declines seen with respect to shooting that are having the biggest effect. 

Okay, Wallace is offering less with respect to a number of statistics.  Is this coaching? Wallace had his best season [in terms of ADJ P48] last season (although his mark of 0.501 wasn’t much different from the 0.498 mark he posted in 2005-06).  So Wallace had played well for Larry Brown.

What about the loss of Felton?  Well, Wallace posted his two best career marks with Felton as his point guard.  But in 2007-08 –with Felton as his point guard – Wallace posted an ADJ P48 of 0.317 (a bit off what he is doing this year). 

So maybe Wallace is hurt?  Or maybe his shots just aren’t falling? Or maybe…  well, maybe I don’t know (although I suspect people will offer some “answers” in the comment section).

Is it Brown or Is it MJ?

It is clear that the Bobcats would be a better team if Wallace was producing like he did last year.  Yes, the team is getting less from Nazr Mohammed (who is now 33 years old) and Boris Diaw.  But again, the declines in Wallace’s production seem to be the most important change.

In defense of Larry Brown, even if Wallace produced as he did last year the Bobcats would still not be as good as they were in 2009-10.  Again, Felton isn’t in Charlotte anymore.  And although D.J. Augustin is posting the best numbers of his career, he is not quite as productive as Felton.

Okay, Augustin isn’t quite Felton.   But he is posting a WP48 mark that is above average (average WP48 is 0.100). And on the Bobcats, only Wallace, Tyrus Thomas, and Derrick Brown are posting better WP48 marks than Augustin.  Yes, this team doesn’t have many above average performers (and last year, only Wallace, Thomas, and Mohammed offered WP48 marks beyond what Augustin is offering this year).

Despite this lack of talent, the latest story (from Adrian Wojnarowski ) is that MJ wants to trade Augustin – along with DeSagana Diop and Matt Carroll – to the Clippers for Baron Davis.  Diop and Carroll are currently producing in the negative range (in very limited minutes).  But according to the automated Wins Produced numbers of Andres Alvarez, Davis is currently producing in the negative range in more minutes.  In defense of Davis, last season he posted a 0.112 WP48 with the Clippers.  Such a mark, though, isn’t much different from what Augustin is giving the Bobcats this year.  When we factor in the difference in these player’s ages – Davis will be 32 before the season ends while Augustin is only 23 – it is hard to see why this trade works for Jordan and the Bobcats.

The article from Wojnarowski also notes that MJ didn’t want to draft Augustin originally.  The player Jordan actually wanted was Brook Lopez, but Larry Brown insisted on Augustin.  According to the automated numbers, Lopez is currently posting a -0.050 WP48.  In fact, only four players – Andrea Bargnani, J.J. Hickson, Earl Barron, and Timofey Mozgov – have produced fewer wins than Brook Lopez this season.  Yes Lopez – like Bargnani – can score.  But this season Lopez is an inefficient scorer and is simply not rebounding.  In sum, given what Lopez is doing this season no one should regret passing on his services.

Let’s summarize where I think the problem lies in Charlotte. 

• Larry Brown was one of the few coaches we found to have a statistically significant impact on player performance (Brown’s impact was only significant at the 10% level).  Yes, Wallace has declined. But I am not sure that is about Brown (I am not sure why that has happened, but I don’t think it is about Brown). 
• Even if Wallace had not declined, though, the Bobcats were not likely to be as good as they were last year.  This is because MJ hasn’t been able to find very many productive players. 

And now we hear Jordan really wanted Brook Lopez and he might want Baron Davis. If these stories are true, that again doesn’t speak well of the talent evaluation skills of Jordan.   Remember, Jordan once drafted Kwame Brown with the first pick in the draft (a player who is once again with Jordan in Charlotte) and Adam Morrison with the 3^rd pick (a player who Jordan could easily have again).  So the track record is not encouraging.  And it is this track record that leads me to think the problem in Charlotte wasn’t the person making the dinner, it was the person buying the groceries.

Let me close by saying I hope everyone has a Merry Christmas and/or a Happy Holidays!!  And although Phil Jackson doesn’t want to work on Christmas, I think most NBA fans are happy he is. Jackson should also remember if he coached the Bobcats, he probably wouldn’t be working on Christmas (yes, Jackson is good, but even the Zen Master couldn’t save this collection of players).  But then — like Larry Brown (and now Paul Silas) — Jackson would have other issues to worry about.

- DJ

Michele Steele – the Sports Business reporter at Bloomberg Television – e-mailed on Monday with the following question:  Who are the least efficiently run teams in basketball (i.e. the teams who spend the most wastefully above the luxury tax threshold)?

The answer to this question was reported by Michele this morning on Bloomberg TV. 

And here are some details behind my analysis.

My answer began with 2010-11 payroll data from HoopsHype.com (this data – I believe – reflects the trades from this past weekend).  This data was adjusted for the luxury tax (which was set at $70.307 million for this season). I then took each team’s efficiency differential (offensive efficiency minus defensive efficiency) to project each team’s final won-loss record for the 2010-11 season (numbers were as of games completed on Sunday).  With data on payroll and final projected records in hand, I then determined how much money each team is projected to spend on each regular season win in 2010-11.

Here are some observations on this data:

• Although the initial question focused on the least efficient, the team that Michele focused upon in her report was the Miami Heat.  This past summer the Heat committed millions to acquire LeBron James and Chris Bosh.  Yet, despite this expenditure, the Miami Heat is currently the most efficient teams. 
• This is a combination of a surprisingly low payroll and nearly 68 projected wins.   This also reflects the fact that very productive stars – like LeBron James and Dwyane Wade – are really bargains. The NBA limits how much money a team can pay a player.  For example, LeBron will be paid $14.5 million this year and is on pace to produce 18.3 wins.  So LeBron’s cost per win is less than $1 million (below the league average).  A similar story can be told about Dwyane Wade.  He will be paid $14 million and is projected to produce 18.7 wins.  So again, Wade’s cost per win is less than $1 million.
• If we project wins from current won-loss records, then the San Antonio Spurs – with a cost per win of $0.931 million –lead the NBA.  Using current won-loss records also raises the cost of Miami’s wins to $1.139 million, a mark that would rank the Heat 4^th in the league (behind Oklahoma City and Chicago).
• The Knicks – who have been wasting money for years — are not over the luxury tax threshold this year.  And currently the Knicks are ranked fifth in cost per win (using efficiency differential to project wins).  Part of this is due to the amazing Landry Fields (a very productive and cheap second-round draft pick).
• There are only seven teams that are supposed to be paying the tax according to HoopsHype.  These include the LA Lakers, Orlando Magic, Dallas Mavericks, Boston Celtics, Denver Nuggets, Utah Jazz, and Houston Rockets.  When we consider how much money teams spend per win in the NBA this season (about $1.71 million when we consider the luxury tax) and how many wins these teams are projected to get (given the team’s current efficiency numbers), the Magic are currently the least efficient luxury tax team. Right now the Magic are projected to spend about $2.1 million per win (the salary numbers are after the trades this weekend, the on-court numbers though are somewhat inflated since the recent trades probably left them worse off).
• Following the Magic on the list of inefficient luxury tax teams are the Nuggets, Mavericks, Rockets, and Lakers.  The Jazz and Celtics — despite paying the luxury tax — are actually projected to get more wins per dollar spent than the league average.
• If we consider all teams, the least efficient (in terms of cost per win) are the Washington Wizards, Cleveland Cavaliers, Detroit Pistons, Golden State Warriors, and Charlotte Bobcats.

To add some perspective to this story, here is the same analysis for the 2009-10 season (payroll data taken from the website of Patricia Bender; the luxury tax threshold last year was $69.92 million).

And here are three observations regarding the analysis of the 2009-10 season:

• Last year the Knicks were one of the least efficient teams.  Per projected wins (quick note: I am using projected wins because I am repeating the same analysis I did for this season) the Knicks spent $3.3 million. Of all the teams that surpassed the luxury tax threshold, the Knicks were the least efficient.
• As inefficient as the Knicks were last year, the Nets and T-Wolves were even less efficient.  Washington — the least efficient team this year — ranked 27th in efficiency in 2009-10.
• The Trail Blazers were the most efficient last year, but not as efficient as the Heat are projected to be in 2010-11.

Let me close by thanking Michele for sending along the question.  I certainly didn’t think Miami was the most cost effective team when I started looking into this yesterday afternoon.  However, as noted, given how salaries are determined in the NBA this result isn’t that surprising.

- DJ