The big story this weekend was the two trades made by the Orlando Magic.  Much of the discussion of these transactions focused on the Magic.  And that discussion – at least around the Wages of Wins Network (and I also think, in many other places) – concluded that the Magic didn’t help themselves. But what about the Suns?

To answer that question, let’s look at where the Suns are at after 26 games.  So far the Suns have won half their games. The team’s efficiency differential (offensive efficiency – minus defensive efficiency), though, suggests the team is not quite a 0.500 team.  On offense the team is scoring 109.o points per 100 possessions, a mark that is only bested by the San Antonio Spurs.  However, on defense this team is giving up 110.7 points per 100 possessions.  This is easily the worst defense in the league (the Warriors are giving up 108.4 points per 100 possessions for the second worst defense in the league).  If we put both efficiency marks together, we see a differential of -1.47.  This mark ranks 11^th in the Western Conference.   So although the Suns currently are tied for the 8^th spot in the Western Conference, Phoenix –after 26 games – doesn’t look like a playoff team.  And that means this team’s season — if no changes were made — would probably end at the conclusion of the regular season.

When we move from efficiency differential to Wins Produced we can see the source of this team’s struggles.

The above table indicates that the Suns are being led in Wins Produced by Steve Nash, Jason Richardson, Grant Hill, and Josh Childress.  All four were above average last year (Childress was above average in 2007-08, or the last time he played in the NBA) and all four are above average this year (average WP48 – or Wins Produced per 48 minutes – is 0.100).

As we move down towards the bottom of the list, though, we start to see problems for this team.  The team has employed four players who have apparently spent all their time at the center position.  All four have been below average this year.  And Channing Frye, Robin Lopez, and Earl Barron have all declined from what we saw in 2009-10 (although Frye and Lopez are not tremendously different from what we have seen in past years) . 

Had this trio maintained what they were last year – when all three were still below average – the Suns would currently be on pace to win about 47 games.  In fact, if just Earl Barron maintained what he did last year, this team would be on pace to win 43 games.  Yes, Barron – in just 183 minutes of playing time – has significantly hurt the Suns this year.

Why is Barron such a problem?  He is currently hitting only 23.5% of his field goal attempts and he is below average with respect to every statistic except steals.  Consequently, his ADJ P48 is currently in the negative range.  It is not very uncommon for a player’s WP48 to be below zero.  But to post a negative ADJ P48 – when an average center posted a 0.433 mark last year – is quite an accomplishment.

To fix this position, the Suns have sent Jason Richardson, Hedo Turkoglu, and Earl Clark to the Magic for Vince Carter, Mickael Pietrus, and Marcin Gortat.  The focus of this trade for Phoenix fans might be Carter.  But given the team’s problem at the center position, Gortat is the player who can make a substantial difference.

This season Gortat has posted a 0.172 WP48.  If Gortat just replaces Barron the rest of the season (and Gortat doesn’t play any more minutes than Barron was projected to play) the Suns projected wins rises to 42 wins.  Obviously if Gortat plays even more minutes – and maintains what he did in Orlando this year – the Suns are even better.

What of the other pieces in the trade?  Carter’s ADJ P48 this year has been 0.301 while Richardson has posted a 0.300 mark.  So exchanging Richardson for Carter is not going to change much.  At least, on the court this year this move doesn’t change much.  Carter is more expensive than Richardson.  And he is older.  So in terms of money and the team’s age, Richardson for Carter is not a fantastic move for the Suns. 

As for Pietrus… well, he is not nearly as productive as any other small forward or shooting guard the Suns employ.  So if Pietrus takes minutes from anyone else on the roster…. well, that won’t help either.

So for this year: If Carter can maintain his per-minute performance and Pietrus stays on the bench, the acquisition of Gortat – and the decision to keep Barron firmly on the bench — might be enough to move the Suns more firmly into the playoff picture.

Let me close by noting that this move does not transform the Suns into a real threat in the Western Conference. The team is probably still well behind the Spurs, Lakers, and Mavericks.  And that means that if the team cannot get to at least the 5^th seed in the West, a first round playoff defeat seems likely.  But this trade does increase the probability that the fans in Phoenix can at least see a few playoff games this year (as opposed to waiting on lottery balls when the season ends).  

- DJ

Once upon a time the Orlando Magic were the “best” team in the NBA (where “best” is defined in terms of efficiency differential).   

Okay, it was just last year.  The Magic’s efficiency differential (offensive efficiency minus defensive efficiency) was 7.95 last season.  This mark actually led the NBA in 2009-10.  And only 25 teams since 1973-74 posted a better mark.  So although the Magic faltered in the Eastern Conference Finals last year, the Magic in 2009-10 were actually one of the better teams across the past four decades.

Being among the best, though, isn’t good enough.  The Magic want to win a title.  And after 26 games in 2010-11 it is clear the Magic are no longer the “best” team in the NBA.  As of Sunday morning, here are the top teams in terms of efficiency differential:

• Miami Heat: 10.48
• Boston Celtics: 10.11
• San Antonio Spurs: 9.46
• Los Angeles Lakers: 8.73
• Dallas Mavericks: 6.51
• Orlando Magic: 4.01

This list reveals…

• The Magic are now ranked 6^th in efficiency differential.
• Even if the Magic were as good as last year, the team would only rank 5^th.
• And if the Heat and Celtics maintain these marks (and that is a big if), this will be the first time (since 1973-74) that two teams in a single season posted a 10.0 differential.  In fact, if this happens it will be the first time a team posted a 10.0 differential and failed to win the title (the previous four teams – Chicago Bulls in 1991-92, 1995-96, and 1996-97 and the Boston Celtics in 2007-08 – all won the title).

The dominance of the Heat and Celtics this season is certainly an interesting story. But for now, let’s talk about the Magic.

We can see the Magic have slipped a bit since last year.  The team’s efficiency differential in 2009-10 suggests a team that should win about 61 games.  The team’s efficiency differential this season is consistent with about 51 victories.  So what explains the ten-game decline?

To answer this question, let’s move from efficiency differential to Wins Produced.  The following table reveals that if these players had performed as they did last year the Magic would currently be on pace to win about 56 games.  Again, last year the team’s differential suggested 61 wins; and we can explain the move from 61 wins to 56 victories by noting the team lost Matt Barnes (8.8 Wins Produced last year – a mark that is somewhat mitigated by the addition of Quentin Richardson) and both Jason Williams and Ryan Anderson have missed some time.

What about the move from 56 wins to 51?  Well, that story seems to be mostly about Dwight Howard.  Had Howard maintained his per-minute productivity from last year he would be on pace to produce about 21 wins this year.  Instead, he is only on pace to produce 16.3 wins.  This is certainly an excellent mark.  But it appears Superman has slipped a bit. 

When we look at the individual stats, we see Howard has declined with respect to shooting efficiency (from the field and the line), rebounds, assists, and blocked shots.  Again, Howard is still amazing.  But all of these small declines result in Howard moving from really amazing to just amazing.

Even if Howard had maintained what he did last year (and the team had the services of Jason Williams and Ryan Anderson for the entire season, and Richardson fully replaced the loss of Barnes’ productivity), the Magic still wouldn’t be as good as the Heat and Celtics.  And since this team wants to win a title, and you are not likely to win a title if you enter the playoffs with a team that is not as good as the top teams in the league, changes had to be made.

Those changes came in two big trades yesterday.  Coming to the Magic are the following players (with WP48 – Wins Produced per 48 minutes – reported for each player):

• Gilbert Arenas: 29 years old, 0.033 WP48
• Jason Richardson: 30 years old, 0.169 WP48
• Hedo Turkoglu: 31 years old, 0.010 WP48
• Earl Clark: 23 years old, -0.083 WP48

And here are the players that are departing.

• Rashard Lewis: 31 years old, -0.016 WP48
• Vince Carter: 34 years old, 0.131 WP48
• Mickael Pietrus: 28 years old, 0.024 WP48
• Marcin Gortat: 26 years old, 0.172 WP48

Here are some quick thoughts on this trade:

• Jason Richardson is slightly more productive than Vince Carter, four years younger, and cheaper.  So that move helps, but not enough to catch the Heat and Celtics.
• Losing Gortat hurts.  According to Yahoo.com, Ryan Anderson replaces Gortat as the back-up center.  And Earl Clark – who has yet to be a productive NBA player – replaces Anderson as the back-up power forward.  One suspects, though, that Turkoglu is actually going to be spending time at power forward.
• This suspicion comes from the fact the team is now over-loaded at guard.  Right now the team has Jameer Nelson, J.J. Redick, Jason Richardson, Quentin Richardson, Gilbert Arenas, and Jason Williams at guard.  For these players to see the floor, someone is going to be playing small forward.  And that moves Turkoglu to power forward.
• All of that means, the Magic are probably worse off after this move.  The loss of Gortat forces this team to play people out of position throughout the roster.  So although the team gains a bit moving from Carter to Richardson, the Magic move backwards in a number of other places. 

So the Magic – as currently constructed – are probably not as good as the Heat and Celtics. 

• This means that Dwight Howard is not likely to win a title this year. 
• And that means Howard is going to end this season with a playoff loss. 
• And such a loss is probably going to lead Howard to think about playing elsewhere after the 2011-12 season.

One last thought on this move.  It appears the acquisition of Turkoglu means the Magic are trying to repeat the 2008-09 season when the team advanced to the NBA Finals.  Turkoglu, though, only produced 6.8 wins for the Magic that season [with a 0.115 WP48].  His ADJ P48 that season was 0.292.  Last season he posted a 0.280 mark.  And this year his ADJ P48 is 0.282.  At small forward, these marks are consistent with an average player.  At power forward, Turkoglu will be below average.  So again, it is hard seeing how this move really helps the Magic contend for a title.

- DJ

P.S. By the way, I am obviously not the only one commenting on this move.  Around the Wages of Wins network one should also read the analysis of Arturo Galletti and Ty Willihnganz.

Ben Gulker – who has offered posts in this forum in the past – now has his own blog.  And today at Pistons by the Numbers, Ben offered the Pistons some simple answers to their questions.  Below is Ben’s post in its entirety.

Over at Pistons.com, another Q&A with Keith Langlois and Joe Dumars has been released. The first two question drew my attention immediately. Keith asks,

KEITH LANGLOIS: Let’s start with a question I asked some of the players after the win over Atlanta. Was that the type of performance you envisioned when you put the roster together?

JOE DUMARS: Yes. When you put the roster together, you envision that particular team playing a certain style and a certain way. That changes based on your roster. With this particular roster, the idea is to have depth; the idea is to be able to go to your bench and have little to no dropoff. When you see a game like the Atlanta game, you sit there and you say that’s how this team is supposed to play. That’s the game plan right there – to be able to go nine or 10 deep and to be able to sustain for 48 minutes.

Okay, that’s fine as far as it goes. When Dumars was assembling this team, he envisioned a team that would be able to compete with and win against Playoff teams. Got it. Yet, this team struggles to do so, and by my count, the win against Atlanta is the first win against a quality opponent this season.

KL: The followup to that is a simple question and I suspect not a simple answer. Why in your mind has that type of performance been elusive?

JD: Tough answer. The Atlanta game is how it’s supposed to work. When we have these lulls and these droughts, when we have games where we don’t close out the fourth quarter like we’ve done so many times this year, you sit there and you look for answers. I can’t give you a simple answer why that is, but the Atlanta game is – if you just look at that – that is the game plan of how we’re supposed to play.

So our inability to compete isn’t lost on Langlois or Dumars, but the reasons why appear to be.

Winning in the NBA

I started this blog in order to offer a very specific type of statistical analysis, and that analysis might illumine these reasons. That analysis also suggests a very simple answer. The reason that victories similar to the one over Atlanta remain elusive is that the collection of players Dumars has assembled simply isn’t effective at doing the things it takes to win in the NBA.

I’ve provided several tables (like this one) detailing the individual win contributions of each player. (If you’re interested in a more recent table, you can check out Dr. Berri’s recent analysis here)

For this post, however, instead of creating another such table, I thought we could look at some very simple team stats and compare those team stats to the rest of the league. Where do the Pistons as a team rank relative to other NBA teams? (All statistics courtesy of www.basketball-reference.com)

Before we get to the stats, let me state in my own words my understanding of what NBA teams need to do in order to win basketball games in very basic terms:

• Make efficient use of their own possessions, i.e., score the ball efficiently and maintain possession of the ball (not give possessions away via turnover, in other words);
• Secure possession of the ball effectively (which also denies the opponent possession of the ball), because you can’t win in basketball without having the ball, i.e., grab plenty of rebounds and the get the occasional steal;
• Make it difficult for the opponent to make efficient use of their possessions, i.e., play good defense.

Regardless of one’s feelings on how successfully Wins Produced allocates win production to individual players, the three points above appear to be generally well accepted. So with that in hand let’s explore how the Pistons are performing as a group relative to these three things.

Efficiently Using Possessions?

When it comes to making use of our own possessions, we can examine three things easily. First is how efficiently we are scoring the ball. Looking at effective field goal percentage (explained here), the Pistons are shooting 48.2%, good for 22nd in the league (league average 49.7%).

Second is turnovers. The Pistons are better at taking care of the basketball than they are scoring it. Given that the pistons play at a relatively slow pace, it will be more useful to consider turnover percentage instead of totals, where the Pistons 13.1% turnover rate is good for 8th best in the league.

Finally is free throw attempts, but thus far the Pistons aren’t exceptional at getting the to free throw line — one of the most effective ways to score in the game.

So in sum, while we are good about retaining possession of the ball when we have it, we’re not very good about putting the ball in the hoop.

Securing Possession of the Ball?

When it comes to securing possession of the ball, we can examine rebounds and steals. When it comes to rebounding totals, the Pistons are 22nd in the league — not very encouraging. However, rebounding totals are also affected by the fact that the Pistons are currently playing at the 2nd slowest pace in the league — so again, we can compare rates over totals for a more complete picture.

Relative to offensive rebounding, the Pistons are respectable, posting numbers only slightly below the league average (25.9% relative to 26.3%). Given that we miss our fair share of shots, it’s nice to have players who hit the offensive glass. Relative to defensive rebounding, however, the Pistons are struggling mightily, posting numbers that rank them 22nd in league and well below the league average.

How about steals? In terms of totals, the Pistons rank 22nd in the league. Cellar dwellers, as it were.

So in sum, the Pistons are not very good at securing possession of the ball. The Pistons are respectable on the offensive glass, very poor on the defensive glass, and not very good at forcing turnovers.

Making Things Difficult for Opponents?

When it comes to making it difficult for opponents to use possessions efficiently, we already know that our defense doesn’t force many turnovers, and we can add that we rank 24th in the league in terms of blocked shots. Further, we know that the Pistons allow opponents to shoot 47.7% from the field and score 100 points per game (relative to our 44.5% and 94.7ppg). Moreover, our poor defensive rebounding means that we surrender the 11th most offensive rebounds to our opponents, i.e., we give the opposition several free possessions each game (in spite of not turning the ball over at a high rate). So the story the statistics tell is that we don’t make it very difficult for our opponents to do what they need to do to win.

Is the answer simple or not?

Okay, this post claims it will offer a simple answer. Here goes…

KL: The followup to that is a simple question and I suspect not a simple answer. Why in your mind has that type of performance been elusive?

Keith, the answer is actually quite simple. This type of performance has been elusive because the current cast of Pistons players hasn’t performed well — neither this season nor historically — relative to the things NBA teams must do in order to win basketball games. We don’t score the ball well, we don’t rebound the ball well, and we don’t defend well, and as a result, we don’t win much.

Ultimately, it’s not magic, rocket science, bad chemistry, or bad coaching, Keith and Joe. It’s just not-very-effective players playing not very effectively.

Ben
www.twitter.com/brgulker

The discussion of the problems facing the Detroit Pistons led Italian Stallion – a person who frequently comments in this forum – to argue that the Pistons could learn from the New York Knicks.  According to IS, the Knicks pursued a strategy of getting worse before getting better.  And the key part of this strategy was clearing cap space which was used to acquire productive veterans.

My take on the Knicks, though, is a bit different.  And to see these differences, let’s look back at some recent history.

The Knicks under Isiah Thomas clearly didn’t find much success.  As detailed in Stumbling on Wins, the Knicks under Isiah led the NBA in spending.  All that spending, though, didn’t lead to many wins. 

When Isiah finally departed in 2008 the Knicks were clearly in a mess.  The team’s roster was both expensive and unproductive.  To fix this mess, Donnie Walsh apparently decided to do everything he could to clear salary cap space.  With space in hand, Walsh planned on adding expensive yet productive talent.  In sum, Walsh and Thomas didn’t have a tremendously different approach. Both believed in spending money.  But Walsh, though, hoped to find better expensive talent.

The shedding of salary took time, and last year the process had not yet been completed.  So the results on the court in 2009-10 weren’t great, as the team only won 29 games.  When we look at efficiency differential (offensive efficiency minus defensive efficiency)– and corresponding Wins Produced – we see a team that  should have won 31 games. 

Of these 31 Wins Produced, 12.6 were linked to the play of David Lee.  Not only did Lee lead the Knicks in overall production, he was also the only player on the roster to post a WP48 [Wins Produced per 48 minutes] in excess of 0.109 (average WP48 is 0.100).  Given this lack of productive players, it is not surprising this roster wasn’t very successful.

Again, though, this team wasn’t supposed to be successful.  The goal was to clear cap space and then spend a large sum of money during the summer of 2010.  To execute this plan, David Lee was removed from the roster.   And then people in New York hoped that LeBron James would take much of the cap space of this team off its hands. 

Unfortunately, the Knicks discovered that hope isn’t a very good plan.  As every NBA fan knows, LeBron decided to join Dwyane Wade and Chris Bosh in Miami. 

New York, though, did manage to spend some money while bringing in many new faces.  Of the ten veterans who have taken the floor for the Knicks this year, six are new players for the Knicks.  When we look at these six, two of the most important are Amare Stoudemire and Raymond Felton.  Last season, Stoudemire produced 9.7 wins and posted a 0.162 WP48 for the Phoenix Suns while Felton produced 8.5 wins with a 0.154 WP48.   So this duo produced about 18 wins in 2009-10.

This season both are again above average.  And combined, Stoudemire and Felton are on pace to produce about 20.1 wins.  However, the remaining veterans – as the following table reveals – are only on pace to produce about 13 wins.  In other words, the ten veterans the Knicks are employing are only on pace to produce about 33 victories this year.  Such a mark is quite consistent with what this team has achieved the past decade (across the past nine years the Knicks have averaged 31 wins per season and never won more than 39 games in a season).

That means if the Knicks were just relying on the veterans this team employs, the results for this team would be quite similar to what we saw this century.  Yes, Stoudemire has offered a bit less.  And Felton is doing a bit more this year (while Wilson Chandler is doing quite a bit more).  But the veterans as a group are doing about as much as we would expect given what these players did last year.

Of course, the Knicks are better than they were the past ten years.  So if it isn’t the veterans, what is the explanation? 

Okay, my answer should be obvious to anyone who has been reading The Wages of Wins Journal this season.  The key addition has been Landry Fields.  After 25 games, Fields is on pace to produce 17.7 wins and post a 0.330 WP48.  He is easily the most productive rookie in the NBA.

To illustrate the contribution of Fields, imagine the Knicks found a shooting guard who could post a 0.100 WP48 this year.  Such a mark is average, but better than what the team employed in 2009-10.  In other words, average would have been an upgrade.  But this average shooting guard – coupled with all the other changes the team made – would have left the Knicks on pace to win 34 games this year.  Yes, even with Stoudemire and Felton, the Knicks are not much better than what we have seen recently without the Amazing Landry Fields.

So why is Fields so good?  When we look at the stats we can see he is a very efficient scorer and prolific rebounder.  Okay, those are the numbers.  Why is he getting these numbers?

One could think of a few explanations. 

• Maybe it is the coaching – or more specifically the system – of Mike D’Antoni.  After all, look at how much better the veteran additions to this team are playing in D’Antoni’s system (okay, I don’t see a very dramatic difference and coaching generally doesn’t make a difference).
• Or maybe Fields is benefitting from playing with Amare Stoudemire.  After all, shooting guards with Stoudemire always post WP48 numbers in excess of 0.300 (okay, that has never actually happened before).
• Or maybe Fields is just a very good player.  In other words, maybe the numbers that Fields is putting up are really mostly about Fields.

As one might guess, I am somewhat partial to the third explanation.  I tend to think the numbers we see for NBA players are mostly about those specific NBA players.  Players who can shoot do so because they can shoot.  And players who grab many rebounds do so because they are good rebounders.  Likewise, players who can’t shoot very well are players who don’t shoot very well.  And players who can’t grab many rebounds really aren’t very good at rebounding. 

Yes, it is a simple explanation.  But surprisingly, an explanation people often overlook in evaluating players. For some reason, people think that given a different coach or a different set of teammates, individual players can dramatically change what they do.  This may very well be true in a sport like football, where player performance is very inconsistent (see Peyton Manning this year).  But in basketball – where player performance is more consistent (not perfectly consistent, just more consistent) – I suspect performance is mostly about the talents a player possesses and not the team that employs the player.

And that observation brings me to my decoding of the secret rebuilding plan employed by the Knicks.  The plan was to employ the same approach as Isiah Thomas.  Yes, spend as much money as possible on NBA veterans.  There was just one twist added.  And that twist was…find an amazing talent in the second round of the draft that NBA scouts completely missed. 

We can see that this plan has produced a team that is capable of winning.  Unfortunately every team can’t count on every other team missing out on amazing second round talents.  So unfortunately, it is not clear that other teams can systematically employ this specific plan. 

The general idea, though, should be heeded.  The key to building a successful NBA team is not finding the right coach or right team chemistry.  The key is finding players who can produce wins.  And that means, you need to find players who hit their shots (i.e. make the orange ball go in the hoop on a high percentage of attempts), and when the shot doesn’t go in, find a way to grab the rebound.  Yes, I do think it is that simple.

- DJ

P.S. If you want another take on Landry Fields, see Ty Willihnganz discussion at Courtside Analyst (it really isn’t a different take, just another take).

Update: Andres Alvarez quickly chimed in with this observation on the Knicks “secret” plan…..Isiah also found Lee (the rumor is he had to be convinced to pick him though) and Balkman in the draft. The difference here with Fields is that he is actually getting minutes. So the Knicks plan remains

1. Pay a ton for scoring veterans
2. Luck out in the draft.
3. (Brand new part): Actually play your good players