Mosi Platt – from Miami Heat Index – sent me the following e-mail this weekend:

I don’t know if you saw/heard but they ran a graphic on NBATV showing the starting lineup for the ’80-’81 Pistons because that was the last time Detroit started the season 7-17.

The lineup was:

G: Keith Herron

G: Larry Wright

F: Phil Hubbard

F: Terry Tyler

C: Paul Mokeski

I’d love to read a post comparing the two teams!

As readers know, I was born in Detroit (hence I have spent a lifetime as a disappointed Lions fan).  So I don’t need much encouragement to discuss the Pistons.

Let’s start the conversation with where the Pistons are today.  As fans of the Pistons know (and as documented at Pistons by the Numbers earlier this month), this has gotten ugly.

This Pistons collapse against the Toronto Raptors in Saturday dropped the team’s record to 7-18.  And unfortunately, this outcome is not a surprise.  The Pistons only won 27 games last year; and after such a disaster of a season, Detroit (specifically, Joe Dumars) made the odd choice of retaining eleven players from the 2009-10 team.  Given what happened last year, and the fact that the team only added rookie Greg Monroe and Tracy McGrady (each has only started one game), we should not be surprised that this team is on pace to win only 24 games in 2010-11.

The following table reveals where these wins will come from.  Leading the way is Ben Wallace, who is once again posting a WP48 [Wins Produced per 48 minutes] mark that is well above average.  Beyond Big Ben, though, only Rodney Stuckey and McGrady have been above average.

And that means that Ben Gordon and Charlie Villanueva are both below average.  This is consistent with what we saw from each player before these two were signed by the Pistons in the summer of 2009.  In other words, no one should be surprised that the investment in Gordon and Villanueva hasn’t paid off.

Okay, the Pistons today are not good.  Let’s now look back thirty years and see if we can uncover some hope in a review of history.

Before we get to the 1980-81 season, let’s take a quick look at two seasons earlier.  

Back in 1978-79 the Pistons won only 30 games.  When we look at efficiency differential and Wins Produced, we see a team that should have won 34 games.  The 34 wins were produced primarily produced by Kevin Porter (13.1 wins), M.L. Carr (9.9 wins), and Terry Tyler (7.7 wins).  And since Bob Lanier missed 29 games due to injury, and produced less than what one should expect when he did take the court, one might think the Pistons in 1978-79 were not far removed from a spot in the playoffs (the Nets made the playoffs with a record of 37-45 that season).

After the 78-79 season, though, the Pistons made a number of moves that were supposed to make the team better (like signing Gordon and Villanueva today), but that ultimately didn’t work out (like signing Gordon and Villanueva today).

• The Pistons drafted Greg Kelser with the 4^th pick in the 1979 draft, passing on Sidney Moncrief.  As I noted in August of 2009, Moncrief went on to produce 126.8 wins while Kelser finished his career with 6.5 Wins Produced. Kelser, though, did win an NCAA title at Michigan State – a team led by Magic Johnson – so who can blame Dick Vitale for drafting him? (yes, that is sarcasm).
• In July of 1979 Kevin Porter signs with Washington and the Pistons receive a 1980 first round pick.
• In September of 1979, the Pistons sent two first round picks (their own and the pick acquired from Washington) to the Boston Celtics (which turned out to be the 1^st and 13^th pick in the 1980 draft) for Bob McAdoo.  As noted last August, that move didn’t quite work out.
• In February of 1980 the Pistons sent Bob Lanier (who is in the Hall-of-Fame) to the Milwaukee Bucks for Kent Benson (the number one pick in the 1977 draft and someone who is not in the Hall-of-Fame) and a number one pick in the 1980 draft (who became Larry Drew).

Just to review… from the summer of 1979 until early 1980 – or across about eight or nine months – the Pistons lost Kevin Porter, M.L. Carr, and Bob Lanier (and ultimately the first pick in the NBA draft).  The team added Greg Kelser, Bob McAdoo, and Kent Benson.  This trio combined to produced 1.3 wins in 1979-80.  And in 1980-81 – as the following table reveals – Larry Drew and this trio combined to produce -1.0 wins.

In sum, the Pistons saw a number of productive players depart in a very short period of time.  When the team failed to replace these players with productive talent, the fortunes of the team declined considerably.  In 1979-80, the Pistons were the worst team in the NBA with a mark of 16-66. The team’s number one pick (along with the pick from Washington), though, was sent to the Boston Celtics in 1980.  These picks were transformed into Robert Parish and Kevin McHale (and the rest – as they say – is history). 

Denied the top pick in the draft – and unable to add any other talent that was able to produce wins in large quantities –the Pistons in 1980-81 only won 21 games.  Of the team’s 23.9 Wins Produced, about half can be tied to the play of Terry Tyler. Tyler – like Ben Wallace – was a productive second round draft pick who could produce wins in large quantities without scoring in large quantities. 

After Tyler, the Pistons in 1980-81 had only two other players who were above average (just like this year).  And they had three players who played more than 500 minutes who were producing in the negative range (that could also happen this year).

So there are substantial similarities between the Pistons today and what we saw 30 years ago.  In each case, the Pistons saw productive talent depart (or simply age) and the team’s management failed to find adequate replacements. 

If history continues to repeat itself, though, that will be good news for the Pistons.  In 1981 the Pistons drafted Isiah Thomas.  And in February of 1982 –two years after Bob Lanier left town – Bill Laimbeer arrived.  As I noted in June of 2007, Laimbeer was a very productive center. 

In 1983-84 – or a few years after Laimbeer and Thomas arrived – the Pistons received 30.6 wins from Thomas and Laimbeer as the team won 49 games (and eventually the team added Dennis Rodman, and the rest – as they say – is history).

So what is the lesson this history teaches? 

If you lose productive talent and add less productive players, then your team will decline.  If you wish for your team to get better, go find productive players.

All of this means the Pistons are going to have change their strategy.  The current approach is to bring back the same talent and hope for different results.  History teaches, though, that if you want different results, your best bet is to find different – and better – players.  Until that happens in Detroit, though, look for the “ugliness” to continue.

- DJ

The Miami Heat are not loved by many people outside of Miami.  And when the “Superfriends” struggled to start the season, joy was heard throughout the land (outside of Miami).

Naysayers noted, though, that the Heat’s early struggles were somewhat due to luck.  The team’s efficiency differential (offensive efficiency minus defensive efficiency) consistently ranked the Heat among the league’s best teams.   So even though their won-loss record indicated the Heat were close to “average”, stats people tended to say “we still expect this team to be among the league’s best”. 

Well, after just 23 games – yes, life changes fast at the start of a season in the NBA – we see the following:

• With a record of 15-8, the Heat are tied for 8^th in the NBA in winning percentage (not the best record, but no longer “average”)
• The Heat are only four games behind the Spurs (the team with the best record)
• More importantly, the Heat’s efficiency differential of 9.298 ranks third in the league, behind only the Celtics (9.302) and the Spurs (9.57)
• The mark of 9.30 bests the mark of the Orlando Magic in 2009-10, the team that led the NBA last season with a differential of 7.95

In sum, Miami is actually a very good team.  But as illustrated with the following table, Miami is not quite as good as the performance of the Heat’s players from 2009-10 would suggest.

This team’s Wins Produced (and efficiency differential) suggest that the Heat are on pace to win 64 games this year.  But last year’s player performance suggest this  team should win 70 games this year. 

Looking at the numbers for the individual players we see that the players who have declined the most are none other than the two stars the Heat added this past summer.  LeBron James and Chris Bosh are on pace to offer 16.9 fewer wins than the performance of these players in 2009-10 would indicate. 

For Chris Bosh, this result is not that surprising.  Prior to 2009-10, Bosh had never offered an ADJ P48 mark in excess of 0.500 (go HERE to see what ADJ P48 means).  So his mark 0f 0.440 this year is not completely different from what we saw before last year.

What we see with respect to King James, though, is surprising.  LeBron’s ADJ P48 mark of 0.463 is quite similar to what we saw before the 2006-07 season.  However, relative to last year, LeBron has seen his per 48 minute productivity decline by 0.158.  In other words, LeBron’s drop-off is equivalent to the Heat completely losing the services of an above average NBA player (average WP48 – or Wins Produced per 48 minutes – is 0.100).

Of course it is obvious why LeBron is offering less.  This must be another classic example of diminishing returns.  As a player’s teammates improve, we expect the player to offer less.  LeBron now has better teammates, so now he must be offering a lower level of productivity.  Right?

Well, that may not be the big story about LeBron.  Although diminishing returns is something that data clearly says happens in the NBA (after all, there is only one ball), the fall of King James is mostly about something else.  Consider the data reported in the following table. 

When we think of diminishing returns, we first think about shot attempts (where the effect is the largest).  And we do see that LeBron – relative to last year – is attempting fewer field goals and free throws.  King James is also grabbing fewer rebounds, but that is probably not diminishing returns.  Relative to LeBron’s 2009-10 teammates in Cleveland, his new teammates have a lower defensive rebounding percentage.  So although LeBron is grabbing fewer defensive rebounds (the study reported in Stumbling on Wins suggests we don’t see diminishing returns with respect to offensive rebounds), LeBron’s drop-off with respect to defensive rebounds is probably not about diminishing returns.

The big story in LeBron’s decline is not diminishing returns (despite what we see with respect to shot attempts).  The big story is his decline in shooting efficiency.   Last year LeBron had a 54.5% adjusted field goal percentage.  This year his mark is only 49.6%. 

As noted a couple of days ago, changes in shooting efficiency has the largest impact on a player’s WP48.  And LeBron appears to illustrate this point. 

Consider his performance last year.  When we consider net possession (rebounds + steals – turnovers), LeBron wasn’t much different from an average small forward.  So how did he produce more wins than any other player in the NBA? King James hit his shots at a very high rate (and it helped that he got to the free throw line and dished out a few assists). 

What’s interesting about LeBron’s shooting efficiency this year is that I think people would expect LeBron to be more proficient.  After all, LeBron is now surrounded by better scorers.  And I have heard that when a player is surrounded by more proficient scorers, the player’s shooting efficiency improves. 

Well, actually we don’t see that in the data.  A player’s shooting efficiency does not appear to be related to the shooting efficiency of his teammates (a result reported in Stumbling on Wins).  So it was not guaranteed that LeBron would shoot better with better teammates.

One might also expect that fewer shots taken would result in more efficient scoring (the classic usage story).  But again – as we report in Stumbling on Wins – that effect appears to be exaggerated.  We do find that increases in field goal attempts lead to lower levels of shooting efficiency, but the impact is very small (see the book for the exact numbers).  And with respect to LeBron this year, this small effect is not appearing (the effect we estimate is what we see in general, not in every instance). 

Okay, we know LeBron has declined.  We can see this isn’t really about diminishing returns.  So what’s going on?

And this is where I run out of answers.  Shooting efficiency is not as stable as other facets of player performance in the NBA (although it is still more stable than quite a bit of what we see in football).  So maybe this is just a random fluctation.  Or maybe there is a better explanation (and I sense people will offer some stories in the comment section).

Regardless of why LeBron is offering lower levels of shooting efficiency, we do know…

• LeBron is still the most productive player on the Heat.
• The Heat – even with LeBron offering less – are still one of the best teams in the NBA.
• There is a good chance that the Heat — even if LeBron doesn’t return to form — are going to disappoint all the “haters” (can I note that I “hate” the “haters” label – even if I just used it?)

And if LeBron starts hitting his shots, there is an excellent chance the Heat will claim the top spot in the NBA (after all, they are almost there in terms of efficiency differential).

- DJ

The one question I am most often asked is “how about those Jazz?” 

Okay, I live in Utah (and these questions from Jazz fans).  And right now, there is some excitement about our local NBA team.

The Jazz currently sit on top of the Northwest division standings.  And if the Western Conference playoffs began today, the Jazz would currently have the third seed (ahead of the LA Lakers!).

The team’s current record of 16-6 projects to a 60-22 mark across 82 games.  If this pace continues, the Jazz will reach 60 wins for the first time since 1997-98.  Last year the Jazz only won 53 games, so it would appear that the Jazz have improved.  At least, this is the story I hear in Utah.

The Diminishing Jazz

When we look at efficiency differential, though, it is a somewhat different story.  After 22 games the Jazz have scored 105.2 points per 100 possessions while allowing –again, per 100 possessions — 100.5 points.  Therefore the team’s efficiency differential (offensive efficiency minus defensive efficiency) is 4.7.   Such a mark is consistent with a team that will win 53 games across an 82 game season.  Last season the team had a differential of 5.5, so the Jazz – contrary to the story told by the team’s current won-loss record – have declined ever so slightly from what we saw last year.

When we move from efficiency differential to Wins Produced [and WP48 or Wins Produced per 48 minutes], we can see that the Jazz are actually a bit better than the performance of these players last year would suggest (in other words, this team should have declined further).  Performance last year suggests this team (given the minutes and position played this year) should be on pace to win 46 games.  So the Jazz – when we look at the players employed this year (and again, the performance last year) – have improved.

And who is responsible for this seven game improvement? Well, Deron Williams and C.J. Miles are doing a bit more (while Andrei Kirilenko is doing less).  But the big leap is seen in the play of Paul Millsap.

The Suprising Story of Millsap’s Improvement

It is of course easy to understand why Millsap has improved.  Last year the Jazz employed Carlos Boozer, a player who led Utah in rebounding.  As we can see at 82games.com, the four leading line-ups that employed Millsap last year also included Boozer.  So with Boozer in Chicago, all those rebounds should now go to Millsap.  And since

• diminishing returns are HUGE for rebounds in the NBA, and
• rebounds are THE PRIMARY determinant of a player’s Wins Produced

it makes sense that taking Boozer away would boost the WP48 [Wins Produced per 48 minutes] numbers of Millsap.

And you can see this when you look at Millsap’s numbers in 2009-10 and 2010-11.  In 2009-10, Millsap grabbed 11.8 rebounds per 48 minutes.  And this year he is grabbing…. okay, only 11.4.  It turns out Millsap’s improvement this year isn’t about rebounds.  The key for Millsap is that – relative to last year – he is hitting a higher percentage of his shots from the field (and free throw line) and committing fewer turnovers.  Yes, despite a career high in usage, Millsap had increased his shooting efficiency.

The Diminishing Returns Story Again and Again and Again

Of course, the Millsap story is just an anecdote.  To understand the issue of diminishing returns and what determines a player’s wins produced we need some systematic evidence.  For diminishing returns, that evidence can be found in the academic literature (and a couple of books you might have heard about).

For example, four years ago Tony Krautmann and I published “Shirking on the Court: Testing for the Dis-Incentive Effects of Guaranteed Pay” in Economic Inquiry.This paper – which had originally been presented at the Western Economics Association meetings in 2005 – argued that a player’s productivity will fall as his teammates improve.   And looking back at papers I have presented in the past; way back in 2001 I presented at the Western Economic Association that also noted that as a player’s teammates offer more the player will offer less (yes, I have been telling the diminishing returns story for at least ten years).

Given my history with this tale, it is not surprising that the diminishing returns story was also mentioned in The Wages of Wins (you might have heard about this book published in 2006). In fact, the diminishing returns story – or the argument that better players must make their teammates worse – was one of my favorite stories in this book (and yet – oddly enough – I have read that I deny the existence of diminishing returns).

A few years later the story was told again when I published (with Michael Leeds, Eva Marikova Leeds, and Michael Mondello) “The Role of Managers in Team Performance” in the International Journal of Sport Finance.  As part of a study looking at how NBA coaches impact player performance it was shown that player productivity declines as the quality of his teammates increases.  Again, that is diminishing returns. 

And that story was told again in Stumbling on Wins (you might have heard about this book).  Stumbling on Wins also explored diminishing returns with respect to each of the individual statistics.  What was reported – in a study of 30 years of player data (in a model that controlled for a number of other factors that determine player productivity) – is that a player’s points, field goal attempts, free throw attempts, defensive rebounds, assists, and blocked shots all decline as their teammates do better with respect to these statistics.  Offensive rebounds, turnovers, shooting efficiency, and personal fouls are not related to the productivity of teammates.   Of these, the biggest effects were seen with respect to points and shot attempts.  Yes, scoring definitely comes at the expense of your teammates – and yes, that is one more reason why scoring is overvalued in the NBA.

The big issue is the size of the diminishing returns effect.  A few weeks ago I wrote a post discussing the departure of Carlos Boozer in Utah.  This post presented evidence that the impact of diminishing returns (across all statistics) – on a player’s per-minute performance [or WP48] – appears “small”.   Specifically, the following was observed with respect to Al Jefferson:

What does it mean to move from a team where the players are quite bad to a team with much better teammates? For an answer we turn to our study of NBA coaches.  This study considered the impact a variety of factors (beyond coaching) had on player performance.  The list of various factors we considered included the productivity of a player’s teammates, or more precisely, teammate WP48.  This study – across 30 years of data – indicated that teammate WP48 had a statistically significant and negative impact on player performance. The coefficient on this factor was -0.300.  And this tells us that the Jefferson’s WP48 should decline by 0.025 as he moves from Minnesota to Utah [-0.300 * (0.109 – 0.025)].

If we look back at Jefferson’s ADJ P48 in 2009-10 and 2010-11, we see that Jefferson has actually declined by 0.025.   Is all of that decline diminishing returns?  Probably not, since other factors do play a role in determining changes in player productivity. But once again, the impact of diminishing returns on per-minute performance appears “small”.

What Determines WP48?

What about the role rebounds play in WP48?  To answer this question we need data.  Well, how about more than 8,700 player observations from 1977-78 to 2007-08?  Across this data WP48 was regressed upon the following statistics: Points per field goal attempt, free throw percentage, rebounds, turnovers, steals, assists, blocked shots, and personal fouls.  These statistics were adjusted for position played and measured on a per-minute basis. 

Estimating the regression doesn’t actually answer the question (at least, it doesn’t if you estimate a linear model).  What we want to know is the relative importance of each statistic, or the responsive of WP48 is changes in each statistic.  Another name for “responsiveness” is “elasticity” (a concept you may remember if you ever took Microeconomics).  More specifically, we need to look at how a 1% change (or a 10% change or whatever percentage change you wish) in each factor impacts WP48.

The elasticity results – derived from the aforementioned regression and reported below – might prove surprising to some:

• Points per field goal attempt: 5.2%
• Rebounds: 3.2%
• Free throw percentage: 1.2%
• Personal fouls: -1.1%
• Assists: 1%
•  Turnovers: -0.9%
• Steals: 0.7%
• Blocked shots: 0.2%

Rebounding certainly matters.  After all, getting and keeping possession of the ball is important; and rebounds are the primary way a team gains possession (without letting the other team score).  But WP48 is more “responsive” to shooting efficiency from the field.  A 1% change in points per field goal attempt (or adjusted field goal percentage times two) leads to a 5.2% change in WP48.   

And that result re-enforces a story that has been told again and again.  Scoring totals – by themselves – are not what matters in the NBA.  What matters is the ability to put the ball in the hoop.  In sum, shooting efficiency is important and players who score inefficiently are not really helping.   Furthermore, metrics like Player Efficiency Rating and NBA Efficiency – which do not properly capture the importance of shooting efficiency, do not properly capture a player’s impact on wins.

Of course, one should add that this isn’t just about performance metrics.  The importance of shooting efficiency also reminds us that the emphasis placed on scoring totals in the NBA – which we can see in the study of free agents, the voting for post season awards, the allocation of minutes, and the NBA draft – is misguided.  Inefficient scorers may be rewarded by decision-makers.  But these players do not contribute much to wins.

Let me close with a brief comment again on diminishing returns.  Again, I think this effect is quite real (and makes for a very interesting story about how “great” players make their teammates worse).  But I also think it is a “small” effect.  Even if it is “small”, though, why can’t we just play with the coefficients used to calculate Wins Produced to take this into account?

My answer is twofold:  First, we actually did this and reported the results in Stumbling on Wins (I don’t think it made much difference).  And secondly… well, read what the Sport Skeptic had to say about this last weekend.   It is a very interesting read.

And one last note… I am going to post in the next few days (or few weeks?) at stumblingonwins.com a document that reports my answers to frequently answered questions.  Most (if not all) of these questions have been addressed (in this forum, in articles, or in books).  But it might be good to have one place where people can look for answers.  So hopefully I can get that done soon.

- DJ

A few weeks ago, Thomas Van Riper wrote an article for Forbes.com detailing the Most Overpaid players in the NBA.  And today, Van Riper has an article – again at Forbes.com – listing the Most Underpaid players in the league.  Topping the list is a player who will surprise some, and anger some fans in Cleveland.

Here is how the Van Riper article begins…

Cleveland has been in quite a huff. The selfish, ungrateful King, LeBron James, abandoned the city, taking his talents to South Beach. Cavs owner Dan Gilbert went ballistic, fans burned his jersey and then turned LeBron’s return last week with the Miami Heat into an insult-fest akin to a George W. Bush visit to Berkeley.

Talk about ungrateful. Instead of vilifying James, Clevelanders ought to be thanking him for the great ride. Gilbert should be thanking him too–the salary he doled out to James was a pittance compared to the victories and money that rolled in during his Cleveland reign.

Yes, at $15.8 million, LeBron was the NBA’s most underpaid player in 2009-’10. At almost 30 points and nine assists per game, 50.5% shooting and 39 minutes a night on the floor, James produced more wins for his club (27.2) than any player in the league. All while earning less than Zach Randolph and Pau Gasol, and about the same as slightly lesser stars Dwight Howard and James’ new Miami runningmate, Dwayne Wade. James edges out Oklahoma City’s Kevin Durant and Boston’s Rajon Rondo as the player who delivered the most for the money last season.

Yes, King James – when we consider Wins Produced, the average cost of a win in the  NBA —  was the most “exploited” player in the NBA in 2009-10 (and once again, this story relies upon the somewhat “crude” method I have offered in the past in this forum).

Van Riper’s article includes a very cool slide show which reveals the top ten “underpaid” players.  The other names on the list include Kevin Durant, Rajon Rondo, and Dwight Howard.  For the rest of the names, check out the slide show. And for even more names, check out the post I offered on the overpaid list (yes, I sort of jumped the gun a few weeks ago).

- DJ