Editor’s Note: The following is from Andres (Dre) Alvarez of NerdNumbers

I decided to look at Chicago’s Win Produced numbers after I heard for the millionth time that

• Rose was MVP (Thanks to the Stat Heads who dispute this!)
• There was no way Kevin Love could be considered MVP

An amazing thing stood out to me – the Bulls don’t have bad players! An average player has a WP48 [Wins Produced per 48 minutes] of 0.100. Giving us a little wiggle room, let’s define a “bad” player as one that is ½ the value of a good player, or a WP48 of 0.050 or less.  Keeping that in mind, let’s take a look at Chicago this season.

As one can see, Chicago has had the fewest “bad” players suit up for them. Furthermore, the Bulls have had a remarkably low 1,215 minutes allocated to those “bad” players. This is a whopping 700 fewer than the next closest team (the San Antonio Spurs).

To put this in perspective the Nuggets have given Al Harrington over 1,500 minutes, and received about -2.0 wins as a result. All of the Bulls “bad” players put together aren’t even as bad as many teams’ worst player.

Now let’s also take a quick look at Minnesota. The Timberwolves have had 13 “bad” players.  These players have played over 12,000 minutes and combined to offer -10.0 Wins Produced.

What does all this mean?  Not only does Derrick Rose have some very productive teammates (think Carlos Boozer, Joakim Noah, Ronnie Brewer, etc. . .), unlike other teams he hasn’t had to play with many “bad” players.  In contrast, when Kevin Love looks around the locker room, “bad” players are everywhere.

Just to hammer this point home, let’s put how good Chicago is playing in historical perspective.

Chicago, despite injury problems, has been able to get away with having the 9^th lowest total of “bad” minutes played in the last 33 years. Of all the teams in front of them, only the Kansas City Kings failed to make the playoffs*.

And except the 1983 and 2001 Kings’ teams, every team in front of Chicago made it all the way to the Conference Finals. In short, Chicago is in historic company.

How did Chicago do this?  The front office essentially followed a very good formula: keep all of the team’s good players from 2009-10 and get most of the good players from Utah. This formula has produced a very good team. 

Unfortunately in the NBA, all of the regular season awards are individual based. This means Derrick Rose will get the credit for what was essentially a team effort. While it is worth virtually nothing, I would like to award the Chicago Bulls with the Most Valuable Team award this season and reiterate that Rose is not the MVP.

One last note…

Some might argue that Chicago’s players are essentially “not bad” because of Rose and/or Coach Thibodeau.  But if we look at the productivity of these players this season and what these veterans did in 2009-10, we see that this team’s results are not surprising.  As the following table indicates (numbers from NerdNumbers), most players on this team are offering essentially the same production seen last year. 

The primary exceptions – Derrick Rose, Ronnie Brewer, and Carlos Boozer – are easy to explain. 

• Rose is young, and young players get better.
• Brewer is essentially offering what he did prior to 2009-10
• And Boozer – who has been hurt – is offering less this year

In sum, we don’t need to argue that this team is succeeding because of its dynamic point guard or amazing coach.  The Bulls story is really about choosing productive players.  And the Bulls – as the study into “bad” players indicates – have been very good at making these choices.      

-Dre

*An explanation for Kansas City. First, they did share the same record as the Nuggets and were thus the 6^th Seed in the playoffs.  But unfortunately they lost the tie-breaker with Denver. Second, unlike all of the other teams on this list, Kansas City was the only one without a Star (WP48 > 0.200) or Superstar (WP48 >0.250) on their team.

David Biderman – of the Wall Street Journal – has looked at how often teams with two starting All-Stars have played as badly as the Knicks have played since Carmelo Anthony came to the Big Apple.  The answer… not often.

Okay, the Knicks – despite defeating the Magic in Monday night – have not been good.  Could anyone have expected this outcome?

Before this trade happened, I thought the Knicks were about a 50 win team with Carmelo.  At least, that’s what I told the Wall Street Journal.  But that forecast required that we not only know the productivity of the players the Knicks employ, but also the minutes each player would player.

Now that the Knicks have played 20 games with Anthony, we now know the minutes.  So let’s re-visit that forecast.  The following table reports what we should have expected each player to do in the past 20 games, given the performance this season before “the trade” and minutes played after “the trade”.  The table also reports what has actually happened.

The team’s record with Anthony is 8-12.  Given performance before the trade (and again, minutes after the trade), we would have expected this team to be about 10-10.  In other words, now that we know who has actually played, the forecasted wins for a season would be revised from about 50 wins (or what I told the Wall Street Journal before the trade) to about 41 victories. 

When we look at actual Wins Produced, the team should be about 9-11.  In sum, the Knicks – as a team – are not really performing much different from expectations.  And again, these are expectations we would have if we knew minutes played (which we didn’t know before the trade).

To understand the reduced expectations, let’s go back to the explanation behind the 50-win forecast.  Here is what I said in February:

In the article it is noted that I think the Knicks could be a 50-win team with this trade.  Forecasting is of course difficult.  Especially about the future.  But here is a quick summary of my thinking on this move.  Essentially I see the trade as having three key components:

• Carmelo Anthony replaces Wilson Chandler
• Chauncey Billups replaces Raymond Felton
• Someone (probably Ronny Turiaf) takes the minutes of Timofey Mozgov

A month ago I offered some numbers that indicated these three components improved the Knicks to about 50 wins (or about 8 wins better than they were across a complete season).  Now that we see the minutes played, though, we see that two of these three aspects of the trade didn’t quite happen.

Specifically, Billups has been hurt.  So he hasn’t played as much as expected.  In addition, the minutes that went to Mozgov have essentially been replaced in the frontcourt by Jared Jeffries.  Soon after this trade happened, Jeffries was cut by the Houston Rockets and signed by the Knicks.  Although Jeffries has been somewhat productive in the past, this year he has been about as good as Mozgov.  And that means the small gain I expected the Knicks to realize with Mozgov playing elsewhere haven’t been realized.  In fact, because Jeffries plays more than Mozgov, the “swap” of Mozgov for Jeffries has really not helped.

The injury to Billups and the addition of Jeffries are not the only observations we could make about the Knicks.  Since the trade…

• Landry Fields is still the most productive player on the team, but he has declined.  So he is not leading by as much as he was before.
• Amare Stoudemire – who some people saw as an MVP candidate earlier in the year – was below average before the trade.  He is still below average (and maybe I should offer a post on that issue in the future).
• Carmelo Anthony was above average before the trade and is above average in New York. But he is not very far above average.  And he is not really a star; at least, not in terms of production.
• Tony Douglass and Roger Mason have both played well since the trade.  So the strength of this team is not their star forwards (i.e. Amare and Melo).  The strength is in the backcourt.
• And that strength in the backcourt would be improved if Chauncey Billups played all the time and produced as he did in Denver.  In other words, with a healthy Billups the Knicks would be a bit better than average.  But even with Billups healthy, this is not a contending team.

Although the Knicks are getting productive play from their guards, once again, it is not enough to turn this team into a contender.  And there is a simple explanation for this outcome:  The Knicks do not have enough productive players to contend for a title.

Yes, they have two starters from the All-Star game.  If this starting duo had been taken from a group including LeBron James, Dwyane Wade, Dwight Howard, or Chris Paul; then the Knicks would be contenders.  The Knicks, though, have acquired relatively unproductive stars.  Consequently, fans of this team shouldn’t expect to see a contender until more productive players are added.

And just to note… changing the coach –without changing the players – is probably not going to make any difference.

- DJ

The Utah Jazz entered the All-Star break with a 31-26 record and a playoff berth a real possibility.  And then Deron Williams – the teams leading scorer – was sent to the New Jersey Nets.  Since this trade happened, the Jazz have only won 5 out of 17 games.  Such a mark has dropped the Jazz out of playoff contention and started fans of this team dreaming about a lottery pick this summer (I know this since I talk to these fans everyday).

The situation in Utah bears some similarity to what has recently happened in Memphis and Denver.  Like the Jazz, the Grizzlies and Nuggets also recently lost a major scorer.  But unlike Utah, both Memphis and Denver have done quite well without Rudy Gay and Carmelo Anthony.  Why haven’t the Jazz survived the loss of Williams?

To understand the difference, let’s consider the productivity of the Jazz players this season.  The following table reports the Wins Produced of the players employed by Utah in 2010-11.

As one can see, the Jazz have been led in Wins Produced in 2010-11 by Williams, Paul Millsap, Al Jefferson, and Andrei Kirilenko.  Of Utah’s 33.1 Wins Produced, 31.3 can be traced to the play of this quartet.  And if we look at performance in 2009-10, we can see that it was expected that this quartet would lead the Jazz this season.

Across the past 17 games, though, the Jazz have obviously not had Williams.  The team has also missed Millsap for five games and seen Kirilenko play less than 30 minutes (or simply not play) in eight contests.  So although Jefferson has played (and actually played better without Williams), the Jazz have struggled. 

Such a result teaches a simple and obvious lesson: When a team loses productive players, winning happens less often.  In contrast – as the Nuggets and Grizzlies have learned – losing a player who is not amazingly productive (like Rudy Gay and Carmelo Anthony) does not matter as much.

So where do the Jazz go from here?  Williams is not coming back.  And for this team to contend, it needs replace that production.  So what are the possibilities?

• Because both the Nets and Jazz are missing the playoffs, Utah has two lottery picks in 2011.  And lottery picks can be productive players.  Of course, that requires that you pick the right player.  Last year the Jazz decided to demonstrate – as Stumbling on Wins (and a study I published with Aju Fenn and Stacey Brook) contends – that appearing in the Final Four enhances a player’s draft position.  By selecting Gordon Hayward – the star of the Butler Bulldogs team that appeared in the NCAA title game in 2010 – the Jazz were able to land a player who was a Final Four star but not yet a productive NBA player.  The Jazz have two opportunities to avoid that mistake this year.  And maybe one (or both) of those opportunities will work out.
• The trade of Deron Williams also landed Derrick Favors, the youngest player in the NBA.  Right now Favors is below average.  But young players do get better.  So maybe Favors can replace Williams.  Of course, Favors also plays the same position as Millsap and Jefferson.  So even if Favors does get better, it is hard to see how he gets major minutes.
• Then there is Jeremy Evans.  After selecting Hayward in the lottery, the Jazz chose Evans in the second round of the 2010 draft.  Like Hayward, Evans is a small forward. But unlike Hayward, Evans has been quite productive in limited minutes.  In just 344 minutes, Evans has posted a 0.344 WP48 [Wins Produced per 48 minutes].  Average WP48 is 0.100, so Evans is quite a bit above average.  In fact, on a per-minute basis he has done more than Williams.

But so far, minutes for Evans have been limited.  He has yet to play more than 20 minutes in a game (in fact, he has only played 20 minutes in a game once).  In contrast, Hayward has averaged 20.6 minutes in the 64 games he has played.

The minutes Hayward and Evans have seen illustrates another observation made by the academic research examining the NBA draft: Players taken earlier in the draft will get more minutes, even after we control for player performance.

Should the Jazz resist this bias with respect to Hayward and Evans?  Both are young and neither have played much (although Hayward has played more than Evans).  So we cannot be sure yet who will be a better NBA player. 

That being said, Evans has shown in limited minutes that he can be amazingly productive.  And Hayward has shown in more minutes (although still limited), he has yet to be productive at all.  So maybe the Jazz should invest more minutes in Evans.  He just might be the player the Jazz need to replace Williams.  

Let me close by noting that the Jazz don’t necessarily need to find another point guard as productive as Deron Williams.  Yes, having a productive point guard – as the Jazz have seen – is helpful.  But what matters most is just having productive players someplace on the roster.  The Jazz have a few such players.  But obviously they need more to contend again.  And as long as they can get those players on the court – and that means not have all those players at the same position – the Jazz will win again.

- DJ

If it’s the weekend, then it’s time for another Wages of Wins Network podcast.   Mosi Platt once again served as moderator. What follows is his summary of our conversation.

You can listen to the podcast one of three ways:

• By downloading it from nerdnumbers.com,
• Subscribing to the RSS feed or
• Going to iTunes.

The cast:

• Mosi Platt from the Miami Heat Index
• Arturo Galletti from Arturo’s Silly Little Stats
• David Berri from The Wages of Wins Journal

The synopsis:

Derrick Rose and Tom Thibodeau are the media’s prohibitive favorites for the MVP and Coach of the Year awards because they’re the leading scorer and defensive architect (respectively) of the #1 team in the Eastern Conference, but are they getting too much credit for the Bulls’ success?

• ESPN reported that MVP & Coach of the Year have come from the same team 11 times, but Dave describes why Rose’s performance has been more comparable to Kyle Lowry than an MVP candidate and why Thibodeau may not be the reason the defense has been the best in the NBA.
• Mosi and Arturo discuss whether the Bulls can challenge the Heat and Celtics for a trip to the Finals.
• This great Bruce Blitz youtube clip is discussed. Dave explains why Tim Legler and other television analysts say crazy things like “Rose is the most dominating point guard since Magic Johnson.” For giggles and grins, Arturo takes a stab at estimating the difference between Magic and Rose off the top of his head.
• Mosi called Rose a chucker in this comment, but his college coaches, John Calipari and Rod Strickland, said on NBA TV that Rose was a deferential, pass-first point guard when he came to Memphis and they convinced him to shoot more. Dave gave his theory on why coaches do that.

Why are the Nuggets getting better results from their trade with the Knicks if their General Manager said they ‘got killed’ in the trade?

• The Nuggets’ former Director of Quantitative Analysis, Dean Oliver, said the Carmelo Anthony trade rumors had a negative psychological impact on the team that degraded the team’s performance. The impact of Melo in Denver and New York is debated.
• Is history repeating itself in New York?
• The Nuggets have the second-best defensive efficiency in the NBA since trading Carmelo Anthony. Is that a result of George Karl’s coaching? Is it sustainable?

What’s crazier about March Madness—shots like this one Jimmer Fredette hit to help send the BYU-Florida game into overtime or how much money schools like Brigham Young University make off their star players’ performance without giving them any fair compensation?

• Dave describes findings from sports economics research on the exploitation of college athletes.
• And then Mosi provided some numbers from some of this year’s men’s basketball programs.

As Mosi noted… after Jimmer Fredette scored 43 points to beat San Diego State in January, Darren Rovell reported the following:

1. “BYU spokesman Michael Smart told CNBC that sales of basketball-related merchandise at the arena on Wednesday night’s alone surpassed the season-long merchandise totals from each of last 15 seasons.”
2. #32 BYU jerseys cost $55. The bookstore only had four left in stock after the game on January 28th and were back-ordered out to a month (2/25/11).
3. “Since the NCAA doesn’t admit to this being specifically Fredette’s jersey—his name is not allowed to be on the back—Fredette himself will not receive any royalties from the sales of his gear.”

•  
  • 2009 BYU operating expenses (game day) per player – $34,586
  • 2009 Total expenses for BYU men’s basketball team – $3.6 million
  • 2009 Total reveneues from BYU men’s basketball – $3.9 million

These colleges would seem to have profited the most from exploiting their basketball stars since they had the most players on NBA rosters at the beginning of the 2011 season (according to rpiratings.com):

UCLA – 14 players. 2009-10 Expenses & Revenues:

• $51,424 operating expenses per player
• $6.3 million total expenses
• $12.4 million in revenue

Duke – 13 players. 2009-10 Expenses & Revenues:

• $137,612 operating expenses per player
• $12.3 million total expenses
• $26.7 million in revenue

U. of Kentucky – 13 players. 2009-10 Expenses & Revenues:

• $198,147 operating expenses per player
• $11.6 million total expenses
• $16.8 million in revenue

U. of Kansas – 12 players. 2009-10 Expenses & Revenues:

• $97,873 operating expenses per player
• $11 million total expenses
• $16.1 million in revenue

U. of North Carolina – 12 players. 2009-10 Expenses & Revenues:

• $79,021 operating expenses per player
• $6.6 million total expenses
• $20.6 million in revenue

U. of Connecticut – 11 players. 2009-10 Expenses & Revenues:

• $117,074 operating expenses per player
• $6.9 million total expenses
• $7.7 million in revenue

U. of Texas – 10 players. 2009-10 Expenses & Revenues:

• $148,783 operating expenses per player
• $8.9 million total expenses
• $15.6 million in revenue

U. of Arizona – 10 players. 2009-10 Expenses & Revenues:

• $115,400 operating expenses per player
• $5.8 million total expenses
• $19.3 million in revenue

Revenue and expense data for universities’ men’s basketball programs taken from ope.ed.gov.

- Mosi Platt

After the 2009-10 season, Rudy Gay had posted the following career numbers (in four NBA seasons):

• 10.6 Wins Produced
• 0.045 WP48 [Wins Produced per 48 minutes]

Average WP48 is 0.100, so these numbers say that Gay was below average.  Despite these numbers, Gay was signed to a contract for about $82 million.  Of course, the Memphis Grizzlies were not looking at Wins Produced numbers in making this decision.  Given how decisions are made in the NBA, here are the numbers the Grizzlies probably considered:

• 20.1
• 18.9
• 19.6

These numbers are how many points Gay averaged per game from 2007-08 to 2009-10.  Scoring – as has been documented in published studies – dominates player evaluation in the NBA.  And given these scoring numbers, if Gay left Memphis this past summer the Grizzlies would obviously be in trouble.  After all, how could the Grizzlies replace all the shots Gay “created” if he left town?  Since “creating” shots is difficult, Memphis obviously had to pay Gay more than $80 million. 

Then again…

This season, Gay was averaging 19.8 points per game.  And after 57 games, the team was in playoff contention with a record of 31-26. When we look at offensive and defensive efficiency, we saw the following marks:

• Offensive Efficiency: 103.2 (points per 100 possessions)
• Defensive Efficiency: 101.5 (points per 100 possessions)
• Efficiency Differential: 1.67 (offensive efficiency minus defensive efficiency)
• Field Goal Attempts per game: 83.3

During the 57^th game, Gay was hurt.  And now we hear he is missing the rest of the season.  And that leads one to wonder… how have the Memphis Grizzlies done without the player the team had to pay more than $80 million (because he was so difficult to replace)?

Here is what Memphis had done in the past 15 games (with Gay watching):

• Offensive Efficiency: 105.1
• Defensive Efficiency: 102.3
• Efficiency Differential: 2.9
• Field Goal Attempts per game: 83.5

The team’s record without Gay has been 9-6.  In terms of efficiency differential, the team has actually improved a bit (Zach Lowe at SI.com has also noted that Memphis hasn’t struggled as much as expected without Gay). 

And all those shots that Gay “creates”?  As we see in the data, players don’t really “create” shots.  Players just “take” shots.  And who are they taking their shots from?  Of course, shots are taken from their teammates. 

This is why the Grizzlies –with and without Gay – take about the same number of field goal attempts per game.  In other words – as has been noted before – shots are something teams can easily replace.   And that means, player evaluation has to move beyond points per game.

When we move beyond scoring – and consider all the factors in the box score – we can see that Gay actually improved from 2009-10 to the current season.  In fact, as the following table indicates, in 2010-11 he has been as productive as Carmelo Anthony.  Yes, Rudy Gay is as good as one of the greatest players in the game (or so I have heard).

Once again, an average player posts a WP48 of 0.100.  Carmelo Anthony – as a small forward –exceeded this threshold last season and so far in 2010-11.  Gay – again, as a small forward – was actually a bit below average last season.  In fact, he had never been above average before the 2010-11 (and still — as I think I mentioned — the Grizzlies agreed to give him more than $80 million). 

This season, though, Gay is above average.  And his overall contribution compares favorably to Melo.   Yes, Anthony gets more rebounds and takes more trips to the free throw line.  But Gay is a more efficient scorer from the field.  When we put the entire picture together we see that although Anthony scores more points, each player has similar WP48 marks in 2010-11.

Such a mark is above average.  But not very far above average.  In other words, neither player is exactly LeBron James (who has a WP48 mark in excess of 0.300).  Replacing a player who posts a WP48 beyond 0.300 is difficult because these players are very scarce.  Players with marks around 0.150, though, are more abundant. 

As we have seen, the Denver Nuggets have managed to win a few games without Melo.  Who is producing wins for Memphis now that Gay is on the bench?

As one can see, Gay has improved.  But his leap is not the largest.  Memphis is actually getting more production from both Zach Randolph and Mike Conley.  In fact, Zach Randolph is twice as productive as Gay.  And that means, losing Randolph – which could happen this summer – would probably have a bigger impact on this team’s fortunes.

In addition to Randolph and Conley, Memphis is also getting above average production from Tony Allen and Shane Battier. In fact, the trade for Battier has done much to replace what the Grizzlies lost from Gay (at least on a per-minute basis).

So what are the lessons we learn from this story?

• The data said before this season started that the Grizzlies could survive without Gay.  So paying Gay more than $80 million wasn’t necessary.
• Across the last 15 games, Memphis has now seen more evidence that Gay’s contract was unnecessary.  At least, it should be clear that Memphis can find someone else who can “create” shots.

Okay, those are the lessons Memphis should have learned.  Let’s now repeat the much bigger story.

Scoring dominates player evaluation in the NBA. But the Rudy Gay story (like the Allen Iverson story and Carmelo Anthony story) demonstrates why this focus is misplaced.  Players do not create shots in the NBA.  Players simply take shots.  Therefore, paying players maximum contracts to take shots from their teammates is not a good idea. 

The focus on scoring has led teams to pay players – like Gay, Melo, Iverson, Stephon Marbury, etc… — who do not produce many wins a great deal of money .  It also gives players the incentive to focus more on their shot attempts than they do on winning.  And since fans really care about winning (really, that’s what drives revenue), maybe NBA teams should start focusing on the factors that create wins (i.e. shooting efficiency and factors that get and keep possession of the ball for the team).

- DJ