Remembering Mike Mitchell

About a week ago, Mike Mitchell – an All-Star NBA player from the late 1970s and 1980s – lost a two year battle to cancer.  Mitchell’s passing prompted jbrett (the person responsible for the infamous jbrett codes) to ask the following:

“…does anyone have WP numbers for the late, lamented Mike Mitchell? He always seemed an efficient player, and as a Laker fan, he always made my palms sweatas much as anyone on those Spurs teams of the 80′s. Saddened to hear he’d left us.”

Before we get to the numbers, let’s just review some of the highlights from his career.  From the San Antonio Express

Mike Mitchell spent 10 seasons in the NBA, averaging 19.8 points and 5.6 rebounds.

With the Spurs, he averaged 20.1 in seven seasons. His 9,799 points rank sixth in franchise history.

… A one-time, NBA All-Star with the Cleveland Cavaliers, Mitchell was a first-round draft pick out of Auburn University in 1978.

He played in the All-Star Game at home at the Richfield Coliseum in 1981.

But within a year he would be shipped off to San Antonio to join the Spurs and coach Stan Albeck, who had served as Mitchell’s coach in Cleveland for one season.

Playing for the Albeck-coached Spurs, Mitchell made an immediate impact.

The 6-foot-7, 215-pound forward teamed with All-Star guard George Gervin and later with All-Star center Artis Gilmore to help the franchise win back-to-back Midwest Division titles.

After the Spurs claimed regular-season, division titles in both 1982 and ’83, Mitchell enjoyed perhaps the greatest moments of his career in playoff battles against the Los Angeles Lakers.

Both years, the Lakers with Kareem Abdul-Jabbar and Magic Johnson eliminated the Spurs in the Western Conference finals.

But not before Mitchell would have his say in the matter. Both years, the former Atlanta high school standout lit up the Lakers, averaging more than 25 points in each series.

He averaged 25.7 and 8.3 rebounds in the 1982 West finals, when the Spurs were swept 4-0.

Bolstered with the addition of the 7-2 Gilmore in the 1983 series, the Spurs put up more of a fight before falling in six games to the defending NBA champions.

Once again, with Lakers perimeter defenders Jamaal Wilkes and Michael Cooper focused on Gervin, Mitchell broke loose with his mid-range game to average 25.6 points and 10.3 rebounds.

When we think of the Spurs today we think of a title contender.  Since the 1999 season, the Spurs have won four NBA titles.  And even before the 1999 championship team, the Spurs and David Robinson consistently won 50 games.  But before the Admiral began playing in 1989, the Spurs had not won 50 games since the 1982-83 team.

As the above article noted, Mitchell was considered a star of that team (and as jbrett notes, that fits his memory as well).  Mitchell averaged 19.9 points per game, a mark that was second to the 26.2 points scored per game by George Gervin.  And since scoring drives perceptions, it is not surprising that people thought Mitchell was an important part of this team.  But what story does Wins Produced tell?

The following table reports the Wins Produced of each player employed by the Spurs in 1982-83.

As one can see, the Spurs in 1982-83 were led by Artis Gilmore.  The team also received above average production (average WP48 – or Wins Produced per 48 minutes – is 0.100) from Johnny Moore, Gene Banks, and George Gervin.  Of the team’s 50.8 Wins Produced, 47.5 wins could be linked to the production of this quartet.

What about Mitchell?  As one can see, Mitchell didn’t have much of an impact. Yes, he could score.  But his overall production was below average.

Part of this is because I think – given this team’s roster – that Mitchell might have spent quite a bit of time at power forward.  What if we think of Mitchell as just a small forward?

The above table reports Mitchell’s career Wins Produced numbers (if he is considered strictly a small forward).  Not surprisingly (if you read Stumbling on Wins), Mitchell’s most productive season was when he was 24 years of age (and playing in Cleveland). This was the year before he played in the All-Star game, and the only season where Mitchell was an above average player.

Obviously Mitchell at his peak was very different from what he was the rest of his career. What explains this difference?

At his peak, Michell was well above average with respect to shooting efficiency and taking shots from the field.  He was also above average with respect to rebounds, turnovers, blocked shots, and personal fouls.  So although he didn’t draw many fouls, pass the ball very often, or get steals; he was a productive player.

Across his career, though, we see a somewhat different story.  Shooting efficiency from the field was essentially average.  And he was below average with respect rebounds and blocked shots.  So although he took a large number of shots, his inability to hit these shots at an above average rate – or do anything else at a significantly above average rate – resulted in Mitchell’s relatively poor Wins Produced numbers.

So consistent with jbrett’s memories, Mitchell was capable of being an above average player.  But it was not in San Antonio where this happened.  No, it looks like Mitchell was an above average small forward who departed Cleveland.  One senses, though, that this departure did not quite have the same impact on the city of Cleveland as a similar story about 30 years later.

- DJ

 

 

 

Don’t Blink: A Review of the NBA Finals

The following is from Andres (Dre) Alvarez.

I re-read Blink this weekend. This book has a special spot in my heart, as Gladwell mentioned The Wages of Wins and this is what drew me into the Wages of Wins Network. One of the key points of Blink is that we may make a decision on a first impression — and despite evidence to the contrary — we will stick with our initial impressions.

For example… at the start of the season many people thought the Miami Heat were the odds on favorites for the title. At the same time, some thought Dallas was old and banged up and its window had passed (me included). How accurate was this initial read?

Rank Team MP WP48 WP
1 Miami Heat 19780 0.148 61.1
2 Chicago Bulls 19830 0.146 60.5
3 Los Angeles Lakers 19830 0.139 57.5
4 San Antonio Spurs 19780 0.136 56.2
5 Orlando Magic 19830 0.135 55.7
6 Boston Celtics 19780 0.134 55.0
7 Denver Nuggets 19705 0.131 53.8
8 Dallas Mavericks 19705 0.126 51.9
9 Oklahoma City Thunder 20005 0.124 51.8
10 Memphis Grizzlies 19880 0.114 47.3

Table 1: Top 10 2011 NBA Teams Season Total Wins Produced

When the season ended on the surface a lot seemed very clear. The Heat and Bulls were the new contenders out East. The old guard of the Lakers and Spurs would be battling for the West. Dallas was certainly in the mix, but as the 8th best team in the playoffs and 4th best out West, they certainly shouldn’t have been considered a contender.

But let’s slice the data a little differently.

Who We Thought They Were

Rank Team MP WP48 WP
1 Miami Heat 13540 0.151 42.5
2 San Antonio Spurs 13515 0.146 41.1
3 Boston Celtics 13035 0.142 38.6
4 Los Angeles Lakers 13705 0.138 39.3
5 Chicago Bulls 13085 0.138 37.5
6 Orlando Magic 13730 0.137 39.2
7 Dallas Mavericks 13440 0.121 33.7
8 Denver Nuggets 13680 0.116 33.1
9 Oklahoma City Thunder 13185 0.115 31.5
10 New Orleans Hornets 14045 0.111 32.5

Table 2: Top 10 2011 NBA Teams Pre All-Star Game Wins Produced

If we had ended the season after the All-Star break, then our pre-season reads would have indeed been correct. Miami was playing at the highest level in the league. Dallas was still a good team, but was certainly not at the same level of the top teams in the league.

Things Change

Rank Team MP WP48 WP
1 Denver Nuggets 6025 0.165 20.8
2 Chicago Bulls 6745 0.164 23.0
3 Oklahoma City Thunder 6820 0.143 20.3
4 Miami Heat 6240 0.143 18.7
5 Los Angeles Lakers 6125 0.142 18.1
6 Houston Rockets 6050 0.142 17.9
7 Dallas Mavericks 6265 0.139 18.2
8 Orlando Magic 6100 0.130 16.5
9 Memphis Grizzlies 6000 0.125 15.6
10 Portland Trail Blazers 6290 0.120 15.7

Table 3: Top 10 2011 NBA Team Post All-Star Game Wins Produced

After the All-Star break, many interesting things happened. Some good trades turned Denver and Oklahoma into contenders. Health brought Chicago improvement. While Dallas’ rank hadn’t improved, their performance relative to other top teams had. In fact barring Denver and Chicago, Dallas was playing at the same level as several other title contenders.

The Tipping Point

Name Pos G MP WP48 WP
Jason Kidd 1.0 16 554 0.295 3.4
Dirk Nowitzki 4.0 16 623 0.212 2.8
Tyson Chandler 5.0 16 481 0.190 1.9
Shawn Marion 3.3 16 516 0.163 1.7
Jason Terry 1.9 16 519 0.120 1.3
Jose Barea 1.5 16 284 0.165 1.0
Peja Stojakovic 2.8 16 333 0.065 0.4
Brendan Haywood 5.0 16 265 0.043 0.2
Brian Cardinal 3.7 4 7 0.863 0.1
Corey Brewer 2.7 6 23 -0.067 0.0
Ian Mahinmi 5.0 3 6 -0.384 0.0
DeShawn Stevenson 2.5 16 254 -0.225 -1.2
Grand Total 3.0 157 3865 0.144 11.6

Table 4: 2011 Dallas Mavericks Playoff Wins Produced Entering the Finals

  Name Pos G MP WP48 WP
  LeBron James 3.2 16 709 0.324 4.8
  Dwyane Wade 1.9 16 635 0.264 3.5
  Chris Bosh 4.5 16 641 0.143 1.9
  Mike Miller 2.3 13 147 0.352 1.1
  James Jones 2.7 12 272 0.116 0.7
  Mario Chalmers 1.0 16 358 0.046 0.3
  Joel Anthony 4.5 16 481 0.016 0.2
  Jamaal Magloire 5.0 3 18 0.113 0.0
  Zydrunas Ilgauskas 5.0 9 104 -0.015 0.0
  Juwan Howard 4.5 6 31 -0.120 -0.1
  Udonis Haslem 4.5 7 147 -0.085 -0.3
  Eddie House 1.6 5 23 -0.596 -0.3
  Mike Bibby 1.0 16 350 -0.143 -1.0
  Grand Total 3.0 151 3915 0.132 10.8

Table 5: 2011 Miami Heat Playoff Wins Produced Entering the Finals

Once the playoffs got underway things changed. The Mavericks started playing like a better team than the Heat.  More specifically, Dallas got great production from some old favorites in Kidd, Dirk, Chandler and Marion. Additionally a magical tattoo and good timing helped Terry and Barea provide excellent support. Miami, on the flip side, did indeed get great play from LeBron and Wade, with good support from Bosh. Miller additionally played well, but with limited minutes. That said, heading into the Finals the Heat had a very top heavy team playing about as well as a slightly more rounded Mavericks. So what happened?

Final(ly)

Name Pos G MP WP48 WP
Jason Kidd 1.0 6 225 0.174 0.8
Tyson Chandler 5.0 6 224 0.166 0.8
Jason Terry 2.0 6 195 0.190 0.8
DeShawn Stevenson 2.8 6 103 0.262 0.6
Dirk Nowitzki 4.0 6 242 0.102 0.5
Shawn Marion 3.2 6 215 0.100 0.4
Brendan Haywood 5.0 3 25 0.041 0.0
Jose Barea 1.6 6 128 -0.012 0.0
Ian Mahinmi 5.0 3 27 -0.214 -0.1
Peja Stojakovic 2.8 4 26 -0.261 -0.1
Brian Cardinal 3.5 5 30 -0.262 -0.2
Grand Total 3.0 57 1440 0.115 3.4

Table 6: 2011 Dallas Mavericks Finals

Name Pos G MP WP48 WP
Dwyane Wade 2.0 6 234 0.428 2.1
LeBron James 3.0 6 262 0.161 0.9
Mario Chalmers 1.0 6 174 0.163 0.6
Mike Miller 2.3 6 94 0.067 0.1
Mike Bibby 1.0 5 87 0.021 0.0
Eddie House 1.5 2 25 0.040 0.0
Juwan Howard 4.5 5 29 -0.044 0.0
Joel Anthony 4.5 6 123 -0.108 -0.3
Udonis Haslem 4.5 6 176 -0.109 -0.4
Chris Bosh 4.5 6 237 -0.108 -0.5
Grand Total 3.0 54 1440 0.084 2.5

Table 7: 2011 Miami Heat Finals

There’s a ton of stories to tell about the finals. My favorite for the record is that Tyson Chandler deserved Finals MVP. With just six games (a very small sample), it’s almost virtually impossible to prove any particular story.  But I do have a few observations to make.

Both Teams’ Stars Showed Up:

This series had two of the top teams in the league playing. It’s easy to point out that top players’ regular season numbers dropped. The point, though, is night in and night out most teams don’t have to play a top team in the league. LeBron and Wade still combined for 3.0 wins for Miami and Kidd, Chandler,Nowitzki and Marion combined for 2.6 wins. They didn’t play spectacularly (with the exception of Wade), but they did play above average and help contribute to their team winning.

Dallas had more support than Miami

The biggest surprise for me was the play of Terry. I have blasted him for quite a while for costing Dirk a title in 06’ in game 6. He has redeemed himself in arguably winning a title for Dirk in 11’ in game 6. Most of the players outside of Dallas’ top 4 played great. No player with more than 48 minutes, other than Barea (can we say overrated yet?),  had a poor performance. Miami, on the other hand, had 5 players who played more than 48 minutes and played poorly. LeBron (who got most of the attention from the media) did not live up to his regular season standards, but his drop off was about as bad as Dirk’s. Bosh and Miller playing poorly was a bigger reason for Miami falling than LeBron’s “collapse”.

Summing Up

The key to the Finals is that it defied our expectations. We expected Miami to be good and they were. Dallas was not expected to be a contender (again, their window was supposed to be closed). While Miami was arguably the favorites the whole way through, the truth is their margin of being the favorite lowered and lowered to the point where this Finals should not be classified as an upset. Small things definitely impacted the winner of the Finals and that’s key. When small things can influence the winner, it means that the teams are close in skill.

This also means the fans and management in Miami shouldn’t overreact. For the most part things went as expected. Miami finished the regular season playing some of the best ball in the league. The made it to the Finals. In the Finals everything didn’t go according to plan. Two normally mediocre players in Terry and Stevenson played very well, while two good players in Bosh and LeBron played well below their normal levels. That said, it was a surprise because it defied our expectations not because it defied the numbers. In fact a few analysts were able to predict it or safely bet on it. There will be many stories about what happened in this series. The most boring — and most accurate — will be that two teams very close in skill played some very close games, and in the end one of them won*.

-Dre (@nerdnumbers)

*I have to make sure I give props to Ben Gulker of Pistons by the Numbers, who pointed this out in the Twitterverse to me long before I ran the numbers.

Notes and Links on the 2011 NBA Finals

When the 2010 finals ended last summer, I quickly put up some numbers and offered a few thoughts.  This year (as I noted on Sunday), I am a bit distracted.   So I am going to simply link to a host of numbers and thoughts offered by others.

Let’s start with some numbers.  Arturo Galletti has all the numbers (and more thoughts and comments).  And these numbers tell us that Dwyane Wade, LeBron James, and Mario Chalmers were above average for the Heat in the Finals. But Chris Bosh – the lesser light of the Heat’s Trio – didn’t really help.  For the Mavericks, Dirk Nowitzki gets the most attention.  But Jason Kidd and Tyson Chandler led the team in Wins Produced in the Finals.  And Jason Terry and DeShawn Stevenson were also quite productive.

Across the entire NBA playoffs, the two most productive players were Wade and James.  But of the next five, the Mavericks employed three (Kidd, Chandler, and Nowitzki).

The importance of Tyson Chandler seems to be understated by observers of the Mavericks.  Chandler really was the key addition to the Mavericks in the offseason.  And  Ty Willihnganz – with Marginal Win Score –  argues  that Chandler was the most productive player on the Mavericks in the Finals.  Ty also noted recently that in the 1960s – when players like Bill Russell and Wes Unseld won MVP awards without scoring 20 points per game (or leading the league in assists like Steve Nash) —  people seemed to understand that players like Tyson Chandler (rebounders who don’t score much) are really quite valuable.  As Ty notes, this idea seems to have been lost over time.

Ty also made another interesting observation about history and stats.  Throughout the playoffs, commentators kept noting various “historical statistics”.  As Ty recently argued, this practice is often quite misleading.

Surprise, ESPN’s historical “statistics” can be misleading!

The Dallas Mavericks lost Games One and Three of the NBA Finals, and yet won the NBA title. The Boston Red Sox lost their first six games of the season, and yet they now appear to be a likely playoff participant (Coolstandings: 80%). Each turn of events has brought a smile to my face because each has cut against one of the more annoying practices at ESPN – the naked historical citation.

It drives me wacko when ESPN tries to overdramatize the significance of certain outcomes by providing historical statistics without also providing context for those citations.

For example before and after both Game One and Game Three of any given playoff series, you can bet your newborn’s college fund that Stuart Scott will mention that the winner of Game One goes on to win the series 80% of the time, and that the winner of Game Three does something similar.  And, you can also be sure that in the first few weeks of a baseball or football season (but, curiously, no other sport), if a “favorite” team loses their initial “x” number of games, ESPN will waste time digging up statistics showing how few teams have reached the playoffs or won the championship after such a start. This, you see, artificially enhances the significance of early contests, whether early in a given season, or early in a given playoff series.  Whereas most fans would probably conclude that the losing team in each case still had ample opportunity to recover, ESPN provides historical numbers to try to dissuade such thinking.

The figures they use are accurate, I don’t contend they are not.  But the way ESPN presents the figures is misleading because they present them without contextual explanation.

For instance, the reason most teams that win Game X or Game Y of a series go on to win the series is, often, they are simply the better team.  A fair number of NBA playoff series throughout the Association’s history have been lopsided affairs.  But the Miami-Dallas contest was a fairly even match. So yes, the likelihood of ultimate success diminished with each loss by either team, but given the even nature of the contest, the impediment caused by the loss was not as great as ESPN suggested.

And the “beginning of the season” statistics are even more misleading, especially when applied to a team with obvious talent.  I would venture to guess that nearly 70% of the teams in history that have started a Major League or NFL season with 3 consecutive losses have sucked (less so in baseball, I guess, but the baseball citation is clearly the more preposterous given the enormous number of remaining games).  Most of those teams had little or no chance to qualify for the playoffs or win a championship, whether they started 0-3 or 3-0.

But that should not persuade one to conclude that a distinctly stronger team in the same situation would face the same low odds. It wouldn’t. If most houses in town are made of straw, then one can conclude that most of the houses in town will not survive a windstorm. But that does not make it more likely that the few houses made of brick will suffer the same fate.

Of course, making such a distinction neccesarily involves a certain amount of dispassionate, critical thinking on a person’s part, something ESPN tries to discourage.  Its bad for ratings.

Final Links to Contrarian Opinions

Let me close with three links to alternative views on the finals. Much of the attention has focused on how happy people are that LeBron has lost.  Matthew Yglesias – with The Progressive Case For The Miami Heat – and Jonathan Weiler – with In Defense of LeBron James – both offer a different perspective on LeBron James (that will likely upset some people… and I am okay with that).

Yglesias also offers a broader lesson on what we can learn from the Mavericks winning the title.  With Dirk Nowitzki And The Virtues Of Immigration, Yglesias notes  the important benefits of immigration.

One last note… Andres Alvarez should be along later today (or at least soon) with even more comments on the Finals.  And soon we are going to start commenting on the NBA Draft.

- DJ

Presenting Sports Economics at the Western Economic Association

For the past few weeks my ability to post in this forum has been limited.   And as I will explain, that should continue for a few more weeks. The reason for this is the Western Economic Association meetings, which will be held in San Diego in a few weeks.

The NAASE Sessions

These meetings (I think) are the second largest academic meeting for economists.  The North American Association of Sports Economists have organized seventeen sessions for these meetings.  Each session consists of four papers, so that means there will be 68 papers presented at the WEA meetings in the NAASE sessions.

These papers are being presented by economists from around the world.  And for those interested in reviewing the titles and authors, the preliminary program has been posted.

Here are the specific NAASE sessions (again, look at the program for the specific papers being presented):

Session 13: The Economics of American Footbal

Session 34: The Economics of Baseball

Session 51: Basketball: Market Structure and Labor Issues

Session 72: The Economics of Football I: Labor Issues

Session 87: Leagues, Facilities, and Events

Session 104: Consumer Demand in Sports

Session 114: The NCAA: Earnings and Incentives

Session 129: Hockey: Economic Outcomes

Session 147: The Economics of Football II

Session 168: Contest Theory and Performance

Session 185: Competitive Balance in Sports

Session 203: Women and Sports I

Session 223: Topics in Sports Economics I

Session 238: Topics in Sports Economics II

Session 254: Women and Sports II

Session 271: Topics in Sports Economics III

Session 272: Topics in Sports Economics IV

These sessions were organized by Tony Krautmann, Brad Humphreys, and I.  And as you can see, our ability to come up with session titles is very limited.

Incentives at Academic Meetings

These sessions are not a media event (although members of the media can attend, and surprisingly, have done so in the past).  And they are not televised.  So I thought I would comment briefly on how these sessions work.

As noted, each session consists of four papers.  And as one can see in the program, there are also four discussants.  So here is how a session functions.  The author(s) of each paper has fifteen minutes to present their research.  After that presentation, a discussant stands up to offer about five minutes worth of comments.

A few years ago a veteran researcher explained how one should discuss a paper (as he explained to one of his graduate students):

  • First, say something nice about the paper.
  • Second, spend about five minutes reviewing all that is wrong with the paper.
  • Finally, conclude by saying something nice about the paper.

In sum, the discussant spends much of their time explaining how the paper can be improved.  And if everyone stays within their time limits, we still have time in each session for the audience to take a few shots as well.

As one can sense, the focus in each session is on finding issues with each paper.  The reason for this focus (I think) is the incentives facing the participants.  The participants are professors (or graduate students) who are ultimately judged on publications.  In other words, conference presentations don’t count for much (if anything at all).  Ultimately for these papers to count they must be published in refereed journals.   Space in these journals, though, is limited (which is why the journals that publish the papers my co-authors and I write tend to reject the majority of papers submitted).  Given this limited space, we all have an incentive to critique other papers that might take a slot we would like for one of our papers.

Beyond this issue, these papers are not going to be published without another review process.  After the meetings, people will be submitting their papers to journals, and there is a chance one of us will have to review it again.  If we can see the paper isn’t very good now, though, we would like to convey this sentiment to the author(s).  After all, our time is also limited and we would also like to avoid reviewing a paper that really shouldn’t be submitted in the first place.  Furthermore, it doesn’t make much sense for other people to spend their limited time on a paper that is ultimately going to be rejected.

The process you see at academic meetings like the WEA seems different from what we often see when “research” is reviewed on-line.  About five years ago I offered a critique of John Hollinger’s Player Efficiency Rating.  Hollinger offered a quick response (the only time, I think, he has ever responded).  This response included the following statement:

I’ve been trying real hard not to say anything about Wages of Wins, because it would only come across as self-serving to knock the work of another person in the field.

In other words, Hollinger didn’t think it was appropriate to critique the work of other people.  A similar sentiment was expressed in the APBR forum some time ago (I don’t have a link since this forum was unfortunately brought down by some fairly sad people).  The APBR people were trying to critque adjusted plus-minus (with an emphasis on “trying”).  At one point (as I recall), an APM person responded by saying “aren’t we all friends here?”  Again, criticism was not something people thought was appropriate.

I am not suggesting that criticism never occurs.  But it is often muted and tentative.  And within the group, it seems people are much more comfortable offering praise and encouragement (even if the “research” is awful).

My explanation for this behavior focuses again on incentives.  On-line forums do not have a space limitation.  And no one is getting fired because they fail to publish.  So these incentives to criticize do not exist.  In addition, the members of the group are going to repeatedly interact with each other.  If you spend your time “attacking” (another word for criticizing) other people’s work, the group is not going to want you to hang around.  So there is an incentive to limit your criticism of people within the group (of course, there is no such constraint with respect to criticism of people outside the group).

Let me also note that I imagine this criticism of the on-line process will bring some criticism (again, I am not really part of this group).  But that’s okay.  As noted, I have been criticized before :)

A Few More Notes on the NAASE and WEA

Let me close with a few more observations on the WEA meeting.  First, if you go through the program you will see that I am part of the following seven papers (with ten different co-authors).  Here are the papers my co-authors and I will present:

  • Berri, David, Brad Humphreys, Rob Simmons. “On the Evaluation of Offensive Lineman in the National Football League.”
  • Berri, David J., Michael Leeds, Peter von Allmen. “Monoposonistic Exploitation in the NBA.”
  • Berri, David J., Jennifer Van Gilder, and Aju Fenn. “Is the Sports Media Color-blind?”
  • Van Gilder, Jennifer, Kaitlyn Myers, Rob Simmons, and David Berri. “White Men Can’t Run:  An Empirical Investigation of the Impact of Skin Tone Shade on Running Backs in the National Football League.”
  • Berri, David and Anthony Krautmann.  “Perceptions of Performance in the WNBA”
  • Craft, R. Kim, Graham Cheever, and David Berri. “Thoroughbred Racehorse Market Efficiency: Do Wealthy People Play Rationally?”
  • Schmidt, Martin and David Berri. “On the Evolution of Competitive Balance in Professional Sports.”

Southern Utah University has recently promoted me to full professor. And that is my last promotion for my career (there is no “super-full professor” or “really full of it professor”).  So I really don’t need to co-author seven papers in one year (I didn’t need to do this before, but now I really don’t need to do this).  My co-authors, though, seemed to want my help (or I wanted there help… who knows?).  Plus, I have trouble saying “no” (or they have trouble saying “no”).  So I ended up with much more work to do than I now want.

Although much of this research is finished, some still needs to be done.   So that means my ability to post over the next few days will still be limited (although I still hope to offer some brief comments on some stuff that comes up). 

One final note… When these papers have been presented (and criticized by the discussants and members of the audience), my term as President of the North American Association of Sports Economists will come to an end (my one-year term ends when the meetings are over).  Although we call our organization the North American Association of Sports Economists, our membership comes from around the world.  And after my term as NAASE President expires, Rob Simmons – of Lancaster University in the United Kingdom – will become our next President.

Rob and I will have an important task during and after these meetings.  A special issue of the Journal of Sports Economics will be constructed from papers presented at these meetings (papers by Rob and I are not eligible).  So we will be selecting papers at this meetings to be submitted for this special issue. These papers will then be reviewed again, and the best will appear next summer in the JSE.

If you wish to read these papers, let me note that members in the NAASE – and non-economists are more than welcome to join –receive a subscription to the JSE.  So if you wish to read these papers, please feel free to join the fun.

- DJ

One Advanced Stat Favors Stockton Over Malone

In past years I would offer some discussion of each game in the NBA Finals.  This year, though, Arturo Galletti has that job covered.  Not only does he do more work than I ever did, his posts offer much more information.  And his posts appear soon after each game is ended (see his post after Game Five from Thursday night).

A topic related to the current NBA Finals is “who are the best players to never win an NBA title?”   Of course, James Brocato covered this topic about two weeks ago (apparently leaving me nothing to say).  Last Saturday, Kelly Dwyer at Yahoo.com also chimed in on this subject.  Dwyer’s discussion ranked Karl Malone and John Stockton as the two best players to never win a title.  In discussing this ranking, Dwyer offered the following observation:

Advanced statistics won’t rank these two as equals, Malone’s ability to rebound and score at a high efficiency rate without turning the ball over place him far ahead of Stockton in this realm.

It is not really clear what “advanced stats” Dwyer is looking at, but if we look at Player Efficiency Rating (does this really count as “advanced”?), we see that Malone had a career mark of 23.9 while Stockton’s career PER was only 21.8.

And if we look back at what Dwyer says, Wins Produced must tell the same story in this instance.  After all – as we often hear – WP favors players who rebound.  Across his career, Malone averaged 10.1 rebounds per game while Stockton only averaged 2.7. So WP must also favor the Mailman.

Just for giggles, though, let’s look at the WP numbers of each player (again, I am just looking for something I could say).  Across his entire career, Karl Malone posted the following numbers:

  • Wins Produced: 291.6
  • WP48 [Wins Produced per 48 minutes]: 0.255

At his best (from the 1989-90 season when Malone was 26 years old) Malone posted the following numbers.

  • Wins Produced: 22.8
  • WP48: 0.350

Now let’s look at Stockton’s career.

  • Wins Produced: 311.1
  • WP48: 0.313

Stockton’s best season was the 1987-88 season (when Stockton was 25 years old):

  • Wins Produced: 23.2
  • WP48: 0.392

As we can see, across each player’s entire career, Stockton was more productive.  And when we compare each player’s peak, Stockton again offered more.

How is this possible? The key issue is shooting efficiency.  Malone was an efficient scorer, with a career effective field goal percentage of 51.6%. Stockton’s career mark of 54.6%, though, was just amazing, especially for a point guard.  So although Malone scored more points and grabbed more rebounds, Stockton’s amazing ability to hit the shots he took gave him the edge.  At least with respect to Wins Produced.

Let me close with another comment on rebounding and Wins Produced.  A few days ago I linked to an article by Jonah Lehrer.  And in response, Arturo offered an extensive discussion of rebounding.  So after you finish his discussion of the NBA Finals, check out what Arturo has to say about Wins Produced and rebounds.

- DJ