Rebounding is a Mental Skill

Stumbling on Wins offers the following two observations regarding rebounding in the NBA:

  • A player’s per-minute rebounding is very consistent across time.  Players who excel at rebounding, seem to always excel at rebounding.  Players who do not excel at rebounding seem to never learn this skill.
  • In moving from college to the NBA, rebounding appears to be a skill that continues.  In other words, players who are good at rebounding in college tend to be good at rebounding in the pros.  And those who do not rebound well in college do not rebound well in the pros.

All of this suggests that rebounding is a skill.  Yesterday Jonah Lehrer –– author of How We Decide (an excellent book on behavioral economics and decision-making) – posted Basketball and Jazz at wired.com.  This post reviews research explaining the mental aspect of rebounding.

A few years ago, a team of Italian neuroscientists conducted a simple study on rebounding. At first glance, rebounding looks like a brute physical skill: The tallest guy (or the one with the highest vertical) should always end up with the ball. But this isn’t what happens. Instead, some of the best rebounders in the history of the NBA, such as Dennis Rodman and Charles Barkley, were several inches shorter than their competitors. What allowed these players to get to the ball first?

The rebounding experiment went like this: 10 basketball players, 10 coaches and 10 sportswriters, plus a group of complete basketball novices, watched video clips of a player attempting a free throw. (You can watch the videos here.) Not surprisingly, the professional athletes were far better at predicting whether or not the shot would go in. While they got it right more than two-thirds of the time, the non-playing experts (i.e., the coaches and writers) only got it right about 40 percent of the time. The athletes were also far quicker with their guesses, and were able to make accurate predictions about where the ball would end up before it was even airborne. (This suggests that the players were tracking the body movements of the shooter, and not simply making judgments based on the arc of the ball.) The coaches and writers, meanwhile, could only predict a make or miss after the shot, which required an additional 300 milliseconds.

What allowed the players to make such speedy judgments? By monitoring the brains and bodies of subjects as they watched free throws, the scientists were able to reveal something interesting about the best rebounders. It turned out that elite athletes, but not coaches and journalists, showed a sharp increase in activity in the motor cortex and their hand muscles in the crucial milliseconds before the ball was released. The scientists argue that this extra activity was due to a “covert simulation of the action,” as the athletes made a complicated series of calculations about the trajectory of the ball based on the form of the shooter. (Every NBA player, apparently, excels at unconscious trigonometry.) But here’s where things get fascinating: This increase in activity only occurred for missed shots. If the shot was going in, then their brains failed to get excited. Of course, this makes perfect sense: Why try to anticipate the bounce of a ball that can’t be rebounded? That’s a waste of mental energy.

The larger point is that even a simple skill like rebounding reflects an astonishing amount of cognitive labor. The reason we don’t notice this labor is because it happens so fast, in the fraction of a fraction of a second before the ball is released. And so we assume that rebounding is an uninteresting task, a physical act in a physical game. But it’s not, which is why the best rebounders aren’t just taller or more physical or better at boxing out – they’re also faster thinkers. This is what separates the Kevin Loves and Kevin Garnetts from everyone else on the court: They know where the ball will end up first.

Such research suggests that rebounding may not be a skill that is easy to teach.  If some people can see where the ball might be going before the shooter even takes the shot, these players will always have the advantage in the rebounding game.  And hence, the players with this mental skill will tend to be good rebounders (and those without the skill will not).

This suggests that NBA decision-makers should not believe that poor rebounders in college will some how change this behavior in the NBA.  It may be the case the poor rebounders are not suffering from a lack of physical skill or desire.  These players might just lack the ability to see where the ball is going.

Let me close by noting another result reported in Stumbling on Wins.  Stacey Brook, Aju Fenn and I recently published a study (a study detailed in the book) of what factors impact where a player is drafted.  Of the factors in the box score, rebounding and turnovers are the only factors that do not have a statistical impact on draft position.

Will that change this year? Kenneth Faried was an amazing rebounder at the college level.  Again, that suggests Faried will be a good rebounder in the NBA.  So will teams take notice and focus on Faried?  Or will the scorers (a skill that doesn’t translate so well) once again get chosen first?

- DJ

P.S. Hat Tip to John in the comments for alerting me to the Jonah Lehrer article (although I would have seen it eventually since I read Lehrer at wired.com on a regular basis).

An Elite Duo in Miami: How Often Does this Happen?

The following is from Andres Alvarez.

The story in Miami this year has often been about the “Big Three”.  But although Chris Bosh is a very good player (at least, if we ignore his current finals performance), the Miami Heat are really the LeBron and Dwyane’s show. An amazing fact stands out when we check the Wages of Wins MVP candidates (the top five players in Wins Produced for 2011)

Player Team Pos MP WP48 WP
Kevin Love Minnesota 4.2 2611 0.474 25.8
Dwight Howard Orlando 5.0 2935 0.382 23.4
LeBron James Miami 3.2 3062 0.356 22.7
Chris Paul New Orleans 1.0 2865 0.358 21.4
Dwyane Wade Miami 2.0 2823 0.322 18.

Here is a helpful guide from the Wages of Wins Network on Evaluating Players:

  • 0.100 WP48 – Average Player.
  • 0.200 WP48 – Star Player (twice as good as average)
  • 0.250 WP48 – Super Star Player. Usually required for a shot at the title.
  • 0.300 WP48 – Elite Player. Most title teams had one.

When viewing the MVP candidates we can see all of the players were “Elite”.  And Miami has two of these players.  So how often has this happened?  How often has one team had two MVP candidates?

More specifically, how often has one team had two players in the top 10 in Wins Produced (who were also “Elite” players)?  Let’s take a stroll down memory lane and review.

1980 Los Angeles Lakers

  • Kareem Abdul-Jabbar: 22.2 WP, #1 in the League, 3143 MP, 0.340 WP48
  • Magic Johnson: 20.6 WP, #4 in the League, 2795 MP, 0.353 WP48
  • Accomplishments: 60 Wins, Champions

With just Kareem in the latter 1970s, the Lakers were good but not great. When the Lakers drafted Magic, though, this team tore through the league and was a contender immediately. Sadly, Magic Johnson was injured in 1981, which was Kareem’s last season in the top 10. Had Kareem been a few years younger, then this tandem could have been even greater than they already were.

1981 Boston Celtics

  • Larry Bird: 20.5 WP, #1 in the League, 3239 MP, 0.304 WP48
  • Robert Parish: 15 WP, #10 in the League, 2298 MP, 0.314 WP48
  • Accomplishments: 62 Wins, Champions

Not sure people remember Robert Parish as an “Elite” player . But he was very productive.  And in 1981, Bird and Parish led the Celtics to yet another title.

1983 Boston Celtics

  • Larry Bird: 25.6 WP, #2 in the League, 2982 MP, 0.413 WP48
  • Robert Parish: 15.9 WP, #8 in the League, 2459 MP, 0.311 WP48
  • Accomplishments: 56 Wins, Lost in Eastern Conference Semi-Finals

The 1983 playoffs is remembered for the Fo-Fo-Fo 76ers.  Oddly enough, this Boston team actually lost to the Milwaukee Bucks.  Larry Legend and the Chief still played great, though, and the Celtics did manage another 55+ win season. However, they’d have to wait another year to get their next title.

1991 Chicago Bulls

  • Michael Jordan: 27.6 WP, #2 in the League, 3034 MP, 0.437 WP48
  • Scottie Pippen: 19.7 WP, #10 in the League, 3014 MP, 0.314 WP48
  • Accomplishments: 61 Wins, Champions

Michael Jordan finally found his way to a finals. Really this happened when Pippen matured into his own and showed he was an Elite player himself.  In other words, contrary to popular belief, MJ didn’t win titles by himself.

1992 Chicago Bulls

  • Michael Jordan: 24.5 WP, #2 in the League, 3102 MP, 0.380 WP48
  • Scottie Pippen: 20.4 WP, #6 in the League, 3164 MP, 0.309 WP48
  • Horace Grant: 17.9 WP, #9 in the League, 2859 MP, 0.300 WP48
  • Accomplishments: 67 Wins, Champion

Horace Grant — just barely — was an Elite player; giving the Bulls three players at this level (so much for diminishing returns). Dave brought up a while back that this was the greatest trio in the turnover era. The 2011 Heat seem to have a similar strategy: a top shooting guard, small forward and power forward. We will see if the 2011 Heat have the same finish.

1994 San Antonio Spurs

  • Dennis Rodman: 29.5 WP, #1 in the League, 2989 MP, 0.474 WP48
  • David Robinson: 22.3 WP, #3 in the League, 3241 MP, 0.330 WP48
  • Accomplishments: 55 Wins, Lost in the Western Conference First Round

Rodman’s time in San Antonio is not fondly remembered. People have said he didn’t get along with David Robinson. That said, they played together very well. Unfortunately there wasn’t much support and a top Utah Jazz team managed to “upset” them in the first round.

1995 San Antonio Spurs

  • David Robinson: 22.9 WP, #1 in the League, 3074 MP, 0.358 WP48
  • Dennis Rodman: 17.2 WP, #9 in the League, 1568 MP, 0.526 WP48
  • Accomplishments: 62 Wins, Lost in the Western Conference Finals

David Robison rightfully took home the MVP. Hakeem may have used that as incentive to upset him in the playoffs. Dennis Rodman, in spite of missing over 30 games due to injury and suspension, still played amazingly well and helped the Spurs to a top record. In typical fashion, though, the postseason helped convince the Spurs to move Rodman. That move worked out well (for the Bulls at least)

1996 Chicago Bulls

  • Michael Jordan: 24 WP, #2 in the League, 3090 MP, 0.372 WP48
  • Dennis Rodman: 18 WP, #9 in the League, 2088 MP, 0.415WP48
  • Accomplishments: 72 Wins, Champions

Jordan and Rodman had both been on top tandems before. It only made sense for them to team up to form the greatest team of all time. What should make this team even more incredible is the fact that both players were past their prime and over 30.  By the way, Pippen just missed the mark for MVP status at the 12th most productive player in the league.

1997 Utah Jazz

  • Karl Malone: 21.5 WP, #2 in the League, 2998 MP, 0.344 WP48
  • John Stockton: 18.9 WP, #4 in the League, 2896 MP, 0.314 WP48
  • Accomplishments: 64 Wins, Lost in the Finals

The Stockton-Malone duo had been teetering on making this list their whole career. When they finally reached the list they also reached the NBA finals. Although Pippen and Jordan had dropped just below Elite status, they were still a force and managed to dispatch the Jazz in the finals.

2000 San Antonio Spurs

  • Tim Duncan: 18 WP, #5 in the League, 2865 MP, 0.302WP48
  • David Robinson: 16 WP, #10 in the League, 2558 MP, 0.300 WP48
  • Accomplishments: 53 Wins, Lost in the Western Conference First Round

Duncan and Robinson remind me of Magic and Kareem. Had their ages been a little closer we might have seen many more years of greatness. In 2000, both players played at the top of their game. Duncan, though, went down with injury and the Spurs missed a shot at repeating (this duo won the title in 1999).

2006 Phoenix Suns

  • Shawn Marion: 22.3 WP, #3 in the League, 3268 MP, 0.328WP48
  • Steve Nash: 18.5 WP, #6 in the League, 2801 MP, 0.317 WP48
  • Accomplishments: 54 Wins, Lost in Western Conference Finals

Nash and Amare right? Not quite. Nash and Marion are up there with Malone and Stockton as the greatest duo to never win a title. Dirk managed to exact revenge on Steve Nash for leaving Dallas before falling to Dwyane Wade in the finals.

2007 Phoenix Suns

  • Shawn Marion: 19.9 WP, #4 in the League, 3010 MP, 0.318 WP48
  • Steve Nash: 19 WP, #5 in the League, 2682 MP, 0.340 WP48
  • Accomplishments: 61 Wins, Lost in the Western Conference Semi-Finals

Marion and Nash came back strong and with a healthy Amare were able to crack 60 wins. In a case of bad luck, though, they missed their window in the playoffs.

Summing Up

Only 12 times before this season (at least, since 1977) have we seen a situation like the current Miami Heat. All of these teams were successful in the regular season.  The playoffs, though, didn’t always work out (which may be because the playoffs are a small sample).

One should also note that these duos (or in one case, a trio) all had more than one year of success.  With LeBron James and Wade both in their 20s, we should expect (and this is not surprising), Miami to contend for a few more years.  Of course, Miami fans are also hoping that this duo is the next Jordan-Pippen (and not the next Nash-Marion).

-Dre

Is it worth it to take a foreign player in the lottery?

Below is another post from Shut Up and Jam, a new blog in the Wages of Wins Network from James Brocato. 

The NBA Draft is coming up, and experts are projecting it to be a big year for drafting foreign players. In fact, 4-5 foreign players are projected to go in the lottery. But, doesn’t it seem like foreigners are usually flops? Think Darko Milicic or Andrea Bargnani. On the other hand, players like Pau Gasol and Dirk Nowitzki, though they are rare, have been perennial stars in the league. Still, it seems like there is more risk in drafting a foreign player than a college player. This observation can be at least somewhat contributed to the difference in foreign style of play and the lack of familiarity of scouts with the foreign leagues compared to American college basketball, which is largely due to the fact that there are a number of different leagues across the world form which NBA teams choose players. So I thought I’d raise the question: is it worth it to take a foreign player in the lottery? The following is a table showing the success of foreign players (who didn’t play at an American college) drafted in the lottery in the last 10 years:

Year Player Drafted Career Minutes Career Wins Produced Career WP48
2001 Pau Gasol 3 26258 118.4 0.217
2001 Vladimir Radmanovic 12 15265 1.1 0.003
2002 Yao Ming 1 15815 73.2 0.222
2002 Nikoloz Tskitishvili 5 1945 -6.8 -0.167
2002 Nene Hilario 7 15621 46.1 0.142
2003 Darko Milicic 2 8161 -1.4 -0.008
2003 Mikael Pietrus 11 10645 7.4 0.033
2004 Andris Biedrins 11 9863 47.3 0.230
2005 Fran Vazquez 11 0 0.0 0.000
2005 Yaroslav Korolev 12 169 -0.5 -0.137
2006 Andrea Bargnani 1 11095 -15.0 -0.065
2006 Mouhamed Sene 10 260 -0.1 -0.011
2007 Yi Jianlian 6 5835 -3.5 -0.029
2008 Danilo Gallinari 6 5263 5.5 0.050
Averages 9014 19.4 0.103

Though this is a relatively small sample size, what immediately jumps out is the lack of players around the average mark. While together the data comes out right about average, only two players, Nene and Gallinari, come within .050 of the mark of an average player, which is 0.100. Perhaps more alarming is the number of foreign lottery picks who have actually cost their teams wins over the years. 6 out of the 14 foreign lottery picks in the last 10 years, which is about 43%, have produced in the negative range. But is this out of the ordinary? Consider the averages of all lottery picks from 2001 to 2005. These players have on average produced at a rate of 0.131 Wins Produced per 48 minutes over their collective careers. And only about 16% of those players have produced in the negative range. About half of the lottery picks over the five year period have been above average for their careers, while only one third of the foreign lottery picks have. But is the possibility of the reward worth the risk? About 20% of the foreign players have produced at star level (0.200) over their careers, while 16% of all the lottery picks have hit this mark. So it doesn’t seem like it is worth it to pick a foreign player high without a great deal of confidence in the pick. The probability of drafting a flop is just too high.

It should be noted that these numbers are not entirely conclusive. The sample size of foreign players picked in the lottery is very small. Perhaps more importantly, every player is unique. It might be unfair to lump all foreign players into a category together because each is a different player. Still, the results are interesting. To cap this post off, here are the Win Scores of the foreign players in DraftExpress’s top 100 prospects for the 2011 draft (7.1 is average):

DX Rank Player Age Position Height Weight Team PAWS40
4 Jonas Valanciunas 19 C 6’11″ 240 Lietuvos Rytus 12.6
6 Jan Vesely 21 SF/PF 6’11″ 240 KK Partizan Belgrade 8.2
7 Bismack Biyombo 18 PF/C 6’9″ 240 Baloncesto Fuenlabrada 8.8
8 Enes Kanter 19 C 6’11″ 260 Kentucky 1.4
9 Donatas Motiejunas 20 PF/C 7’0″ 215 Benetton Treviso 6.6
18 Nikola Mirotic 20 PF 6’10″ 210 Real Madrid 9.5
22 Lucas Nogueria 18 C 7’0″ 225 MMT Estudiantes N/A
28 Davis Bertans 18 SF 6’10″ 210 Union Olimpiga Ljubljana 7.2
33 Bojan Bogdanovic 22 SG/SF 6’7″ 216 Cibona VIP Zagreb 5.9
51 Jeremy Tyler 19 PF/C 6’11″ 260 Tokyo Apache 7.8
59 Michael Dunigan 21 C 6’10″ 240 BC Kalev/Cramo Tallinn 7.2
62 Xavi Rabaseda 22 SG/SF 6’7″ 205 Baloncesto Fuenlabrada 4.2
63 Giorgi Shermadini 22 C 7’1″ 248 Union Olimpiga Ljubljana 8.3
67 Jamine Peterson 22 SF/PF 6’6″ 230 New Mexico Thunderbirds 7.3
69 Joffrey Lauvergne 19 SF/PF 6’10″ 220 ES Chalon-Sur-Saone 6.5
70 Leon Radosevic 21 PF/C 6’10″ 210 Cibona VIP Zagreb 6.8
71 Furkan Aldemir 19 PF 6’9″ 220 Pinar Karsiyaka 10
79 Milan Macvan 21 PF 6’9″ 265 KK Hemofarm 10.8
80 Nihad Djedovic 21 SG/SF 6’6″ 195 Lottomatica Roma 7.8
81 Antonie Diot 22 PG 6’4″ 188 Le Mans Sarthe Basket 8.2

It looks like whoever takes Enes Kanter, who is projected to go top 5 in a lot of mock drafts, will be very disappointed. Oh, and Ricky Rubio, who it looks like will finally make his debut for the Timberwolves after being drafted a few years ago, posted a Win Score in 2010-11 of about 7.7.

Beware of these numbers because many of these players played in different leagues against different competition.

-James

A Weekend Wages of Wins Network Podcast and Many Notes on the Many Topics Discussed

Bloggers from the Wages of Wins Network discussed Jim Tressel’s resignation from Ohio State University, Shaquille O’Neal’s career, the NBA Finals and Donnie Walsh’s impact on the New York Knicks.
You can listen to the podcast one of several ways:

The Cast

The Synopsis

  1. Jim Tressel Resigns
  2. Shaquille O’Neal’s Retirement
  3. The NBA Finals
  4. Donnie Walsh and the New York Knicks
  5. The NBA Labor Dispute

Here are some notes and thoughts on each topic we discussed.

Story One:  Jim Tressel Resigns
On Monday, Jim Tressel – head football coach – at Ohio State University.  After months of stories and speculation, apparently a story in Sports Illustrated – SI investigation reveals eight-year pattern of violations under Tressel – pushed Tressel out the door.

The SI story reveals the basic problem in college sports.  The top players generate substantial revenue for universities.  As Robert Brown notes in an article in Journal of Sports Economics (published in 2010), an examination of comprehensive data from the 2004-05 college football season indicates that a premium player’s marginal revenue product is approximately $1 million in annual football revenues [see Brown, R. W. (2010). “Research Note: Estimate of College Football Rents,” Journal of Sports Economics, August 2010].

At Ohio State, an attempt was made to compensate the athletes.  These attempts violated NCAA rules.  After years of denying that he had knowledge of these attempts, it was eventually revealed that Tressel knew more than he had earlier confessed.

What Tressel knew, though, is not the point.  Top athletes are “exploited” by the current NCAA system.  So it is understandable that people would justify paying these athletes.  After all, the “rule” that is being broken is simply the NCAA prohibition on paying athletes.  One could argue that it is the “rule” that is wrong.

Gordon Monson – of the Salt Lake City Tribune – also makes a good point (see Tressel’s downfall a warning for all college football coaches).
Coaches get fired if they lose.  If they win, they get paid millions.  Given this reality, a coach can choose to

a. cheat and collect millions.  If they get caught, they lose the job but keep the millions.
b. don’t cheat and lose out to coaches that do cheat.  In that case, you don’t get millions.

Given those choices, we probably should expect that Tressel is not the only coach that violates NCAA rules.

In fact, coaches like SteveSpurrier advocate paying players out of their own pockets. Of course, it’s only fair since the only reason they’re allowed to make millions of dollars is because the players don’t get paid. Tim Tebow addressed that issue on The Daily Show.

Story Two: Shaquille O’Neal Retired
In the wake of Shaq’s retirement, many people have contemplated his place in the history of the game. Dave did the same in this article, “The Missing Greatness of Shaq and Superman.”

Story Three: The NBA Finals
Did the Heat choke? Are the Mavericks just amazing?  And who will ultimately prevail?

Beyone our discussion, one can also see Ty Willihnganz’s discussion of how the Mavericks came back (where he notes that the Heat’s strategy was probably correct) and here is Arturo’s discussion of Game Two.

Story Four: Donnie Walsh and the New York Knicks
Donnie Walsh and James Dolan, Chairman of Madison Square Garden, mutually agreed that Walsh will not return when his contract expires at the end of June. The bloggers discussed the impact Walsh had on the Knicks in the last three years.

Story Five: The NBA Labor Dispute
The podcast ended with a discussion of the lockout looming over the NBA Finals. The first game of the finals had the highest TV ratings for a first game in the NBA Finals since 2004 (Lakers-Pistons).  The first game even had a higher rating than the first game of Lakers-Celtics (from last year).
The Finals are not an anomaly.  Much about the NBA’s economy looks promising.  From the USA Today

  • Total regular-season attendance rose 1% to 21.3 million, just shy of the league record 21.8 million for the 2006-07 season, before the economic downturn.
  • NBA arenas were filled at or over 90% capacity for the seventh consecutive season. Average game attendance of 17,306 was the fifth highest. The record is 17,757 during 2006-07.
  • TV partners TNT and ABC/ESPN saw audience gains of 42%, 38% and 28%, respectively.
  • As stars including James, Carmelo Anthony,  and Amar’e Stoudemire changed teams and donned new jerseys, merchandise sales rose 60% at NBAStore.com and 20% globally.

Some additional thoughts on the labor dispute:

  • Here is David Stern’s take on the NBA’s successful economy… “The owners generate $4 billion a year, more than that actually,” Stern said. “The players get well over $2 billion in salaries and benefits. We just need something that continues our business success and revenue generation — but which lightens the player expense load on the owners.”
  • Dave’s reaction to Stern’s comment:  Stern appears to be saying that the owners create the revenue and are being kind enough to share it with the players.  In reality, players generate revenue (no one pays to see the owners).  Owners in business provide capital (i.e. machinery and buildings) to workers, and thus generate a return from this contribution.  Much of each team’s capital, though, is actually generated by the government (see the NBA’s demand on Sacramento for that city to build the Kings a new arena).  So it is not really clear what the owners are doing.
  • Stern also contends that 22 teams are losing money and that all teams should be profitable.  Capitalism does not guarantee anyone a profit.  If you make bad decisions you should lose money.  Furthermore, given the nature of the NBA (teams essentially have local monopolies), it is hard to believe Stern’s claims about each team’s finances.
  • If teams are paying to much in salary – as Stern contends – this is their own fault.  Teams negotiate these salaries with players.  No one makes the owners pay such high salaries to unproductive players like Carmelo Anthony, Rudy Gay, and Joe Johnson.

Even more on the NBA’s claims….

  • The league’s salary cap (more precisely a cap on payrolls) – which is based on the league revenues – was set at record $58.044 million this past season.  That suggests a league where revenues are growing.
  • The NBA set an attendance record in 2006-07.  There has been some decline since then (with close to this record in 2010-11), but that might be due to the recession.  Again, though, revenues are growing (and we should remember, the NBA is in the midst of a record national TV contract that pays the league more than $900 million per season)
  • This article at Forbes.com captured some of the skepticism people have regarding the NBA’s story.
    • The Wizards and Warriors –two of the worst teams in the NBA – just sold for an average of sale price of $500 million (Wizards for $550 million, Warriors for $450 millions)
    • NBA revenues last season topped $3.8 billion and player salaries are capped at 57% of revenues. The 57% is based on basketball-related income which excludes 60% of arena signage and luxury suite revenues as well as 50% of naming rights revenue. So the NBA actually pays out around 54% of revenues to players. For the NBA to collectively lose money teams must spend more than $1.75 billion (or $59 million per team) on non-player costs.  Hard to believe this is true.
  • And here is a telling comment from Joe Lacob.  The new owner of the Golden State Warriors was asked if he expected to make money as owner of the Warriors.  Here is his response to that question: This is an incredible business opportunity. Turning this into a winner No. 1 and running this business better in certain ways… Look, sports franchises appreciate 10% a year on average over three decades, the last three decades. There’s no reason to think this won’t appreciate in value. So that is the least of my worries. We will make money on this team in appreciation of value.

To summarize the labor dispute….

  • One suspects – given all we know about league revenue and franchise values – that the NBA is simply making a stunning claim in an effort to extract some salary concessions from the players.
  • If the players do buy into the league’s story, this will not likely lead to further cuts in ticket prices.  Prices in the sports are driven primarily by demand, not player costs.  In other words, higher player salaries do not lead to higher ticket prices.  And lower player salaries will not lead to lower ticket prices.
  • If the players do not buy into the league’s story, then we will probably have a work stoppage.  If this happens, people will argue that fans will be permanently offended and future attendance will decline.  There is no evidence, though, that labor disputes lead to less future attendance.  In other words, fans seem to always come back (see the Wages of Wins for more on this topic).

- Mosi Platt and DJ

The Missing Greatness of Shaq and Superman

Shaquille O’Neal has finally retired.  And now it is time to wonder where Shaq ranks among the all-time great players in NBA history.

Shaq was obviously a “HUGE” player.  This is obviously true in a physical sense.  And it is true in a statistical sense as well.  He was an outstanding rebounder; and as a scorer, he was both efficient (from the field) and prolific.  But he did have one deficiency.  He never really learned how to hit free throws consistently.

Across his entire career he only hit 52.7% of his shots from the charity stripe.  And only once – in 2002-03 – did he hit more than 60% in a season.

A couple of years ago I looked at how this one weakness impacted Shaq’s career production.  Now that Shaq’s career is finished (assuming he doesn’t come back), let’s update this examination.

Across Shaq’s career he posted the following numbers:

  • 252.8 Wins Produced
  • 0.289 Wins Produced per 48 minutes [WP48]

His most productive season was 1999-00, when he produced 27.1 wins and posted a 0.411 WP48.

Now let’e imagine how this story changes if Shaq converted about 75% of his free throws (about the NBA average).  With this one change to Shaq’s production, the above numbers would be as follows:

  • 333.9 Wins Produced
  • 0.382 Career WP48
  • 33.1 Wins Produced in 1999-00 with a 0.502 WP48

Here is how these WP48 marks compare to a sample of all-time great players (with all-time beginning in 1977).

As one can see, the inability to hit free throws consistently leaves Shaq a bit short of players like Magic, MJ, Sir Charles, the Admiral, and Bird.

As I noted two years ago, a similar story is playing out with another Orlando Magic center.  Dwight Howard is also an amazingly productive big man who has trouble hitting his free throws.  Across Superman’s career he has only hit 59.8% of his free throws.  Despite this weakness, Howard has already produced 139.2 wins and posted a 0.328 WP48.  And this past year – his most productive so far – he produced 23.8 wins with a 0.389 WP48.  Had he converted about 75% of his free throws, though, these numbers would have jumped to

  • 0.464 WP48 in 2010-11
  • 0.387 Career WP48

And here is how Howard’s numbers compare to some current great players:

Once again, Howard’s best is not quite as good as KG, CP3, and King James at their best.  But if he hit his free throws, Superman would be the most productive player in the game today.

Obviously it is too late for Shaq to change this aspect of his game.  It is reported, though, that Howard will spend the summer working on his free throws.  And if that work pays off, Howard should be an even more amazing player next season (assuming there is a next season).

Let me close with two more observations from the above tables.

First… LeBron at his best is not quite as productive as MJ was at his best (but it is close).

And secondly… Nowitzki – despite what he did last night – is not as productive as Larry Bird, and he is not one of the top ten players of all time.

- DJ