The Bottom Line on the NBA Finances Part 2: The BRI Strikes Back

Arturo Galletti is the Co-editor and Director of Analytics for the Wages of Wins Network. He is an Electrical Engineer with General Electric on the lovely isle of Puerto Rico, where he keeps his production lines running by day and night (and weekends) and works on sport analysis with his free time.

In Part 1, I used all available public sources to break down the finances of every NBA Team (check it out for the full explanation)

The truth of the matter is that the bottom five teams come out as losers for their owners on the bottom line. For the most part this is is a function of location (7 of the bottom 10 are in my list of franchises in overextended markets), which again is not the player’s fault even though their being asked to pay for it.

Let’s talk new deals.

The owners wanted a 47/53% BRI split in their favor. That looks like so:

Weird, the league makes money as whole here, but 17 teams lose money on their tax returns.

Let’s try the current proposal, the proposed 50% split:

Huh. I still get 19 teams in the red. Something must be wrong; why in the world would the owners propose something that costs them money? Oh wait, I only used the Tax Return Numbers!

If I go by league claims the numbers make no sense. Add in all the other benefits to the equation and everything suddenly does. A 50/50 split sees 29 teams in the black.

The one question left on my mind is: how would this table look like at the players’ proposed 51/49 BRI split?

That still leaves 29 of 30 teams in the black. Add in some relocation and some revenue sharing and you are done (but this also is not up to the players). Relocation, I’ve already explained. Revenue sharing is a tougher cookie, which I’ll get to tomorrow.

-Arturo

Disclaimer: I do not have access to the NBA’s books. Everything in this article is put together from public statements or logical inferences. I do not claim to have this perfectly right. However, I do feel like I am in the ballpark. The sources I used are listed, please update me if there is a better location to get my data.

The Bottom Line on the NBA Finances


Arturo Galletti is the Co-editor and Director of Analytics for the Wages of Wins Network. He is an Electrical Engineer with General Electric on the lovely isle of Puerto Rico, where he keeps his production lines running by day and night (and weekends) and works on sport analysis with his free time.

Damn it all,  the angel of Stern has struck, throwing gasoline on a fire, and so the season hangs by a thread. We really are so close to where we need to be to make it happen. I was not a happy camper, but I thought to myself: what else is a mathematically inclined and bored NBA fan left with? What is left for me but to wait?

Thankfully, inspiration struck (like a podcast you might say). What if I took a stab at laying out the finances of every team? Would that level the playing field enough to get this deal to happen? Then again, I might just make everything worse.

Let’s start with the gate & concessions. For that I needed a few pieces of information:

  • Attendance numbers for the 2010-11 NBA Season
  • Information on the average amount of money spent on concessions.  That study in particular comes up with something called:
    • The Fan Cost Index™ which comprises the prices of:
      • four (4) average-price tickets
      • two (2) small draft beers
      • four (4) small soft drinks
      • four (4) regular-size hot dogs
      • parking for one (1) car
      • two (2) game programs
      • two (2) least-expensive, adult-size adjustable caps.

If I take the attendance figures (divided by four) and multiply them by the The Fan Cost Index™ I get:

The top five teams in the league (Lakers, Knicks, Bulls,  Heat, and Celtics) make three times as much money at the gate as the bottom two teams (Grizzlies and Pacers).  Thirteen teams make twice as much as the bottom two. A smart person might even ask: why only one team in New York (right Mikhail?). This is what the media refers to when they talk about small versus large markets, and this is before we get to the TV money (national and local) and all the other incomes.

Now comes the first tricky bit. You see, while the national tv money is easy to determine, the local tv money and the division of other income is harder to come by. Of course, like any good engineer, I figured out a good workaround:

That is the pricing for NBA tickets from the secondary ticket markets. This is publicly available data (The internet is a wonderful thing). Using that data as a guideline and what I know about the NBA’s finances I came up with this:


That is my estimate for each team’s Net Operating Income (NOI), or Basketball Related Income (BRI) as it’s become known, as well as team valuations. A couple of quick notes here:

  • The share of the national TV contract is not quite split equally amongst the 3o teams. All 26 non-ABA teams get 1/30th of the money. The owners of the Spirits of St. Louis get a 1/28 th share (go here for full detail) and each former ABA team gets a 1/30th share minus a fourth of that Spirits share.
  • I estimated Team valuations at 2.8 times the NOI (BRI) for each team. I am not including other assets such as stadia. For a fuller estimate go here. You’ll note that I am not that far off.

With the sharing from the national TV contract included, the previously noted disparity is somewhat reduced (the Lakers and Knicks only make 2.5 times as much money as the Pacers and T-Wolves, not 3 times :-)), but it’s not quite enough. The problem is that the gate and concessions for the larger market teams are on par with the total income for the small market teams. There can be no real parity until there is actual revenue sharing of the gate at least (the NFL has a 60/40 Home/Road split). A good source for more info on this is here.

That takes care of direct incomes, so let’s get to the bone of contention. Let’s talk player salaries. Again, I needed some sources of information:

  • All salary data is from here. Thanks to ShamSports. I’ll do something fun with it later.
  • Salary Cap/Luxury cap information from the inimitable Larry Coon.

Remember how everyone talks about the 57% Share of BRI for the Players?

That’s correct for the entire league. It’s incorrect for individual teams, and therein lies the problem. Twelve teams have player salaries at less than 57% of their BRI (including the Knicks, Bulls and Heat, yes those Heat, at less than 40% ). The other eighteen are not so lucky.  There are in fact four teams at 80% or greater.

Let’s add in expenses and get to what the league is claiming as their bottom line (backed by their tax returns). (Note: I used $266 as the loss number since the closest I could find for a number was about $300 million).

Those are the league’s claims — near as I can figure it — in technicolor. Add in playoff revenues and about 19 of those teams claimed losses on their tax returns.

There are two very important things missing:

  • The Tax Break: the tax break in question is the Roster Depreciation Allowance (RDA -see here). To put it very simply, the RDA allows you to claim the value of your franchise as a loss in your books over a period of 15 years and in essence save 35% of that amount on your tax returns (this is known as the 15/100 Rule of Thumb [see here for more detail]). You can claim that loss on whatever schedule you like. You want to claim 90% in Year 5? Go right ahead. No loss claim in Year 11? Good for you. For this estimate, I’m assuming 1/15 th of the value of each franchise is available to be claimed and the value has to be multiplied by 1.35 (1 for the loss, .35 for the tax break).
  • The increase in franchise value: The average value of an NBA franchise has increased 78% since 2000 (see page 26 of this report). I’m going to use 4% as my value increase number to be nice.

When I add those in we get:

That looks closer to the truth. I know that not every team is claiming the RDA, but that’s not the player’s fault.  The bottom five teams come out as losers for their owners on the bottom line. For the most part this is is a function of location (7 of the bottom 10 are in my list of franchises in overextended markets), which again is not the player’s fault.

Tomorrow we’ll get into how these numbers will look with the various deals being thrown around during the lockout. I hope you can wait that long!

-Arturo

Disclaimer: I do not have access to the NBA’s books. Everything in this article is put together from public statements or logical inferences. I do not claim to have this perfectly right. However, I do feel like I am in the ballpark. The sources I used are listed, please update me if there is a better location to get my data.

Michael Jordan: The best and worst owner of 2011

Michael Jordan took over the Charlotte Bobcats in 2010, just after Charlotte had reached the playoffs for the first time in franchise history. With a six-time champion at the helm things could only get better, right? It turns out that in his first season as a GM, Michael Jordan may very well have been one of the worst owners in the NBA. However, Jordan’s actions helped out three other teams. Let’s take a look.

Jordan helps gets New York back to the Playoffs

When Jordan took over, the Bobcats’ point guard, Raymond Felton, was a free agent. Rather than re-sign Felton, Jordan decided to let him walk. He signed with New York, where he played quite well and helped New York back to the playoffs. Of course, New York thanked him by sending him to Denver for some aging and overrated players, but that’s another story.

Jordan gets Dallas a Title

Rather than send Tyson Chandler and Boris Diaw to Toronto for a much needed point guard replacement in Jose Calderon, Jordan instead traded Chandler to Dallas for Erick Dampier, Eduardo Najera and Matt Carroll. Of the three, only Dampier had played well recently. Jordan then cut Dampier (the only good part of the trade). Najera and Carroll played fewer than 1,000 minutes combined.  And Chandler went on to play like a top 25 player for Dallas and was arguably the finals MVP.

Jordan Keeps Portland Respectable

While Portland had just come off of back-to-back 50 win seasons, Eduardo the knee fairy was acting up again and Portland looked to be in danger of missing the playoffs. Jordan, being a nice guy, traded Portland his only star — Gerald Wallace — in exchange for Sean Marks (useless), Dante Cunningham (useless), and Joel Przbilla (once good, but now injured). Jordan also got some draft picks in the deal, but do we really think the guy who once drafted Kwame will use them well?

Jordan Torpedoes the Bobcats and then Complains

In addition to the moves above, the Bobcats decided to sign Shaun Livingston and Kwame Brown as free agents and traded away Nazr Mohammed. Those moves completed an ignominious feat: taking a playoff roster and getting rid of the 1st, 2nd, 5th, and 6th best players from the previous season. Arguably, the Bobcats made one decent move in signing Dominic McGuire, who played rather well for them.  But of course they waived him late in the season.

And all that means… Jordan took a decent franchise with some upside and tore it apart. Then, during the lockout, he had the gall to fight against the players.

Summing Up

From his record last season, we can see that Jordan and the Bobcats helped turn around the fortune of not one, not two, but three teams. Not many owners can even claim that of one team, so in that regard Jordan is quite a success. Of course, none of those teams were his own, which is a bit of a problem. In fact, when it came to the Bobcats, Jordan was an overwhelming failure; we can’t even applaud Jordan from a cost cutting angle. Teams make money based on their home gate revenue, and that is driven by winning. As all of Jordan’s moves have in fact cost his teams wins, he is a poor owner from the financial side as well. In the lockout negotiations Jordan may claim that the league is losing money and blame the players, but if the league is losing money, it may be the fault of bad owners.  And Jordan stands as a great example of how an owner can be “less than good”.

-Dre

Michael Jordan’s Lockout Stance is fueled by Kobe Hate

The most recent news is that Jordan is part of a group of owners prepared to lose the season. But it goes further than that with Jordan: he was apparently one of those pushing for a 47% BRI split. Jordan is being labeled a sell-out. For a man that’s made millions selling underwear, that’s not anything out of the ordinary.

However, I have a different theory why Michael Jordan is fighting for such a hard BRI line. Simply put, Jordan enjoys his status as greatest of all time. He holds the record for the two largest single season salaries, with $30 million in 1997 and $33 million in 1998. In fact, Michael Jordan is the only player to crack $30 million in salary. However, Kobe Bryant will hit $30 million in 2014. If Jordan cuts the BRI, he can keep Kobe Bryant off the list of $30 millioners. Even better, if he locks Kobe out for a season, he lowers Kobe’s shot of hitting six titles. So all of Michael Jordan’s greed and selling out may just be a clever ploy to hide his status as the ultimate Kobe hater.

-Dre

Weekend Podcast: Sports Economist Rodney Fort on NBA Lockout and Roster Depreciation Allowance

Sports economist Rodney Fort, an expert on roster depreciation allowance,  joined the weekend podcast to discuss the NBA Lockout and the WoW Network’s analysis of NBA owners using the RDA to hide profits.

Podcast Details

How to listen: Download the MP3, subscribe to the RSS feed or go to the iTunes store.

Podcasters: Mosi K. Platt and Rodney Fort

Recorded: 11/4/11 3:08 PM EDT

Background

In the article “Better Angels”, WoW blogger Arturo Galletti explained his theory that NBA owners were able to turn the profits reported by Forbes into the losses reported by David Stern using a tax advantage called the Roster Depreciation Allowance (RDA). The RDA was created after businessman Bill Veeck purchased a Major League Baseball team in 1946 and convinced the IRS that the roster of players was a depreciable asset that reduced his tax obligation.

Several readers, like A.K.S. and emuhd, took issue with Arturo’s analysis. The WoW network asked Fort, an economics professor from the University of Michigan, to weigh-in on the impact of the RDA on the NBA Lockout and collective bargaining with the National Basketball Players Association. Fort and his co-author Edward Coulson analyzed the RDA in the paper, Tax Revisions of 2004 and Pro Sports Team Ownership.”

Questions

Why does the RDA have “illogical foundations”?
“A possible parallel is the depreciation of livestock that is purchased for work, breeding, or dairy purposes but not kept in an inventory account. Apparently, these types of livestock ‘wear out’ in their relative productive roles and the IRS allows them to be treated as depreciable assets for tax purposes.”
If players are treated like chattel for tax purposes, then was Bryant Gumbel so far off calling David Stern a “plantation owner”?

If pro sports owners and the IRS agreed that 100% of the team’s value comes from the players in the 2004 revision to the RDA, then is 50% of league income a fair split for the players?

Is Arturo’s analysis accurate in Better Angels? Are owners using the RDA to claim operating losses?

Are the 2004 tax revisions to the RDA responsible for the spike in prices of NBA franchises?

The paper Tax Revisions of 2004 and Pro Sports Team Ownership” outlines the impact of the 100/15 rule on hold and sell strategies for team owners. Arturo mentioned that NBA owners are using a blended strategy where they “hold” onto the team by selling it to relatives running shell corporations. Is that the case?

Companion Reading

Fort’s answers to these questions referenced the material linked below.