How the Spurs upset the Jazz

I’ll admit I was a little tongue and cheek with the title. A better one could have perhaps been: “How the Spurs made the Jazz upset.” Three games into the series the Spurs already had the Jazz waving the white flag. The Spurs were one of two teams to win 50 games in the shortened season. Chicago has been decimated by injuries to two of its top players giving the 76ers hope. The Jazz were not as lucky. Let’s run down what happened.

The Spurs showed no weakness

2012 San Antonio Spurs Playoffs Round 1 Totals
Player Pos G MP WP48 WP PoP/48 PoP/G
Tony Parker 1.0 4 131.1 0.253 0.69 4.8 3.3
Tim Duncan 4.5 4 120.5 0.235 0.59 4.2 2.7
Boris Diaw 4.5 4 96.3 0.227 0.46 4.0 2.0
Stephen Jackson 2.7 4 97.8 0.206 0.42 3.3 1.7
Kawhi Leonard 2.5 4 79.8 0.236 0.39 4.3 1.8
Danny Green 2.4 4 98.1 0.178 0.36 2.5 1.3
Gary Neal 1.2 4 52.4 0.270 0.30 5.3 1.5
DeJuan Blair 4.8 4 46.2 0.256 0.25 4.9 1.2
Manu Ginobili 2.5 4 98.7 0.101 0.21 0.0 0.0
Matt Bonner 4.0 4 64.5 0.137 0.18 1.2 0.4
Patty Mills 1.0 3 16.6 0.445 0.15 10.8 1.2
Tiago Splitter 5.0 3 45.7 0.086 0.08 -0.4 -0.1
James Anderson 2.5 4 12.3 -0.055 -0.01 -4.8 -0.3

The Tony Parker and Tim Duncan of old returned. In their last title run the Spurs were a three-headed beast consisting of Parker, Duncan and Ginobili. Ginobili’s first round was below his norms but the Spurs didn’t mind as they had the true Rookie of the Year Kawhi Leonard to hold up their backcourt. Leaving Charlotte has done wonders for Diaw and he played like a star against lesser competition.

The truly scary thing about the Spurs was their lack of weaknesses. Only two players played below average — Tiago Splitter and James Anderson — and they combined for less that 60 minutes played! The other thing is that heading into the playoffs this was the norm. In the last month of the regular season only Anderson, Jackson, Bonner and Cory Joseph played below average. Only Cory Joseph played truly poorly and he did not suit up for the playoffs. Jackson and Bonner picked it up and James Anderson only played limited minutes.

I have to give a shout out to the ultimate Spurs Fan E.J. Fischer (@glorioushubris) who saw the signs:

*Spurs opponents should be afraid and Bulls fans should be upset.

The Jazz’s depth hurt them

2012 Utah Jazz Playoffs Round 1 Totals
Player Pos G MP WP48 WP PoP/48 PoP/G
Derrick Favors 4.5 4 116.5 0.138 0.33 1.2 0.7
Al Jefferson 4.6 4 140.9 0.074 0.22 -0.8 -0.6
DeMarre Carroll 3.1 4 72.7 0.093 0.14 -0.2 -0.1
Josh Howard 2.2 4 62.8 0.079 0.10 -0.6 -0.2
Blake Ahearn 1.0 3 7.6 0.512 0.08 12.8 0.7
Jeremy Evans 3.0 2 7.4 0.500 0.08 12.5 1.0
Enes Kanter 5.0 4 43.0 -0.021 -0.02 -3.7 -0.8
Paul Millsap 3.5 4 138.9 -0.013 -0.04 -3.5 -2.5
Gordon Hayward 2.4 4 122.5 -0.057 -0.14 -4.8 -3.1
Alec Burks 2.0 4 63.0 -0.117 -0.15 -6.7 -2.2
Jamaal Tinsley 1.0 4 64.7 -0.238 -0.32 -10.5 -3.5
Devin Harris 1.0 4 119.9 -0.148 -0.37 -7.7 -4.8

Unlike the Spurs, who had almost everyone playing well, the Jazz had only one player above average in Favors. The playoffs may have actually exposed a problem for the Jazz. They came right up against the Top Heavy Playoffs. The concept is in the playoffs you shorten your bench and only play your best players — which typically leaves you with your top six players. This was actually a problem for the Jazz. Using the NBA Geek regular season totals for the Utah Jazz here’s a brief rundown of the Jazz’s top players and their position for the season:

  • Paul Millsap – PF
  • Gordon Hayward – SF
  • Al Jefferson – C
  • Derrick Favors – PF
  • Devin Harris – PG
  • Earl Watson – PG
  • Enes Kanter – C

The players that helped the Jazz had an astonishingly deep front court during the regular season. They didn’t have much in terms of the wings but hey, during the regular season being able to always have an above average big on the floor is huge. In the playoffs Earl Watson didn’t suit up. Haywood and Harris got torched by the Spurs backcourt. The Jazz’s deep front court couldn’t match up against the Spurs. And in fact in an attempt to play their top bigs Millsap played more at the SF, which may have hurt his performance.

Summing up

The Jazz as they are currently constructed are a team for the regular season. That is not a bad place to be! Having a plethora of above average bigs — most at a discounted price – is a good thing. If they fill in their backcourt they will be even stronger and if they can get a star, or Favors can become the star they need, they could be contending again in no time.

The Spurs as they are currently constructed are a team built for the regular season….and the postseason. They are both top heavy and deep. The Spurs of old have come together yet again and they are joined by young talented players and role players playing great. If you’re a Spurs fan the playoffs being exciting is nothing new. We’ll have to see how they stack up against their next opponents, who will hopefully put up more of a fight.

-Dre

How the San Antonio Spurs are Moneyballing the NBA

You know the Moneyball story (who am I kidding, you’re at this blog, of course you know it! That said, I love repeating parts of it). A small market team with no hope of attracting or retaining top talent finds a way to compete by exploiting market inefficiencies and using advanced stats. Now there’s often a question of if that could happen in the NBA. The answer is that it already has! And the team that is doing it is the San Antonio Spurs.

Now, most people won’t dispute the Spurs are a small market team. Saying this still feels wrong. After all, the Spurs have had the good fortune of getting one of the top centers of all time and one of the top power forwards of all time. They won their first title on the back of two #1 draft picks playing great. And yet, the truth is the Spurs have stayed great. They stayed great in the face of David Robinson retiring. They’ve stayed great in the face of Tim Duncan aging like milk. Wrap your head around this, since the 1997-1998 season the Spurs have won fourteen consecutive 50 game seasons (if you adjust the 1999 lockout season to 82 games). With just one more win this season they’ll stretch that to fifteen consecutive seasons. It’s all been Duncan right?

Of course not! Don’t get me wrong, you need a superstar to compete. But you can’t put them out there with nothing. They need a good surrounding cast to be competitive and the Spurs have put out great casts over and over. They’ve been good for too long! They haven’t had the luxury of great picks like Chicago and Oklahoma City or being a premier destination like Miami. Yet, they are one of just four teams to have crossed the forty win mark this season. Let’s take a look at where the Spurs’ production is coming from currently.

2011-2012 San Antonio Spurs with more than 500 minutes
Player Pos G MP WP48 Wins Acquired
Kawhi Leonard 2.6 55 1344.0 0.290 8.1 Draft 15
Tony Parker 1.0 53 1725.8 0.137 4.9 Draft 28: Re-signed
Danny Green 2.4 56 1339.1 0.174 4.9 FA
Tim Duncan 4.5 52 1476.6 0.124 3.8 Draft 1: Re-signed
Manu Ginobili 2.3 26 619.3 0.288 3.7 Draft 57: Re-signed
Tiago Splitter 5.0 50 954.1 0.177 3.5 Draft 28
Matt Bonner 4.0 55 1144.3 0.132 3.1 Trade: Re-signed
DeJuan Blair 4.7 56 1172.4 0.081 2.0 Draft 37
Gary Neal 1.6 48 1060.0 0.035 0.8 Undrafted FA

Is Tim Duncan’s support staff a plethora of great free agents that wanted to play next to him? Not at all. The Spurs wanted another great player and moved up in the draft. They bypassed the conventional tanking wisdom needed to move up and just traded there  (where there is still value as others have told you) and got a great young player. Barring Duncan and Leonard though, none of the Spurs talent was found in the top half of the first round.

In fact, for players that have over 500 minutes this season the only real below average player is Gary Neal. Of course Neal is young and costs the Spurs nothing. Excluding Steph Jackson, it’s hard to find much fault with this team. We can also take a look at a few ways the Spurs find their excellent talent:

  • Gaming the draft: Do you need a top pick to find good talent? The Spurs haven’t. This season they’ve even found a rare star in Leonard. There is talent all over the place in the draft. You just have to look past the conventional wisdom.
  • The international daft: Oh man, do the Spurs love to grab undervalued international players. But unlike teams like the Bucks and Raptors, the Spurs take their talent late in the draft. Does it matter than those players might take a few seasons to come over? Not at all!
  • Players other teams give up on too quickly: Matt Bonner and Danny Green were young cheap players on bad teams. If you’re a bad team frankly young and cheap players are a good way to go. Yet, the Spurs traded an almost 30 Rasho Nesterovic with a $7 million dollar contract for a young Bonner. They picked up Danny Green out of the Cavs discard pile. This is just one of many distinctions between San Antonio and bad teams.
  • They get their good players back: We can focus on the draft for the Spurs. After all, Leonard, Splitter and Blair are all still on rookie contracts. That said, much of the Spurs talent comes from great players that willingly re-signed or even took a pay cut. Not only are the Spurs great at finding underrated talent, they’re great at keeping it once the league is onto the secret.
  • Gary Neal: I still want to give some credit here. He’s not that great. But as a backup he’s incredibly cheap. Unlike teams like the Bulls and Thunder that think over $3 million for old backups are worth it, the Spurs have found their roster fillers cheaply.

Richard Jefferson and Steph Jackson

Ok, I’d feel bad not including these two. I have no idea what the Spurs were thinking signing Jefferson. Trading him for Jackson was clearly a cost saving move. That said, after all the praise I’ve placed on San Antonio I’d feel bad if I didn’t at least point out their mistakes.

Summing up:

Beckley Mason is one of my favorite writers at True Hoop. In the crazy world of tanking he had the sense to say that the Oklahoma City Thunder are not the norm. He’s also noticed the greatness of Kawhi Leonard, who would be Rookie of the Year in a fair world. Taking this one step further though we can see the Spurs aren’t the pinnacle team to explain why tanking works. Sure, they did that fifteen years ago. Since then though, they’ve gone a completely different route. They’ve found talent where other teams didn’t. I will not dispute that “lucking” into a great player is key for a team to win a title. Beyond waiting for that opportunity, a team has to do the right moves to be good. As Arturo often says “Hope is not a plan.” The Spurs have shown how to have a plan and a good one. And that’s why without the big market, the top draft picks, or the Miami weather they’ve stayed a force for so long.

-Dre

Why tanking doesn’t work in the NBA

Summing up the successful top three draft lottery picks in one picture.

Over and over we hear it: losing NBA teams tank in order to secure a better position in the NBA draft and draft young talent — talent that they hope will eventually lead to an NBA championship. This is an observable fact that actually jives with conventional wisdom. But what is also true is that this tanking doesn’t actually work. Don’t get me wrong — tanking does help to secure a better position in the NBA draft. But this doesn’t mean that landing a lottery pick will actually help out your team. The proof is in the results accumulated over the past 27 years of the NBA lottery.

Table 1: Results within 4 years of drafting a top three pick

Criteria Absolute Percentage
Total # of players: 81 100.00%
Teams missing playoffs: 25 30.86%
Teams losing in 1st round: 21 25.93%
Teams losing in 2nd round: 18 22.22%
Teams losing in Conf. Finals: 3 3.70%
Teams losing in NBA Finals: 9 11.11%
Teams winning Championship (1st 4 years): 2 2.47%
Teams winning Championship (career with team): 5 6.17%

After four years — the amount of time on rookie scale contracts — about 31% of the teams with top three picks hadn’t made the playoffs even once. Almost 26% of these teams’ best showing was only the first round. And a further 22% of teams topped out in the second round. Only 17% of teams have managed to do better than the second round, with only two teams managing to win an NBA championship within four years of drafting their top three pick. Who were these two teams? In 1999, San Antonio won a championship in Tim Duncan‘s second season. And in 2004, the Detroit Pistons won a championship in Darko Milicic‘s rookie season. But Milicic only played in 159 regular season minutes that year. So we are being generous when we say that two teams have managed to win a championship within four years of landing a lottery pick.

Perhaps it takes more than four years for lottery players to have an impact on the team that drafted them? Well, only five players taken in the lottery have won a championship with the team that drafted them: the aforementioned Duncan and Milicic, as well as David Robinson, Sean Elliott, and Jason Kidd. It took Robinson eleven years to win with his drafting team, and Elliott was actually traded away and then reacquired before winning his…nine years after being drafted. Jason Kidd was also traded away and then reacquired before winning a title with his drafting team, and that took him 16 years. So let’s break it down, in the draft lottery era a top three pick resulted in a title for:

  • Getting an amazing franchise player with a top three pick – San Antonio with Duncan and Robinson
  • Reacquiring a top draft pick – Dallas with Kidd and arguably San Antonio if you believe Elliot mattered
  • An already stacked Detroit Pistons that drafted a bench warmer

“Ah,” I hear you say, “it’s hard for top three picks to win a championship with the team that drafted them because so few franchises have won a championship during the lottery era.” This is true; only eight franchises have managed to win at least one NBA championship since 1985. But there’s a reason why only a few franchises have won an NBA championship: the NBA has a competitive balance issue. Teams that are good stay good, and teams that are bad stay bad.

And that brings us back full circle. Teams that win a top three pick in the draft generally do so because they are bad. One or two top three picks is usually not enough to help these franchises advance far into the playoffs because — even assuming you draft well, which is definitely not a given — it takes more than one or two good players to have a successful team. So to reiterate: losing to win is a bad strategy. Hoping the draft will get you a top player is a bad strategy. And it doesn’t matter how many times we go over NBA history, this has been the case.

-Devin

In unrelated news: Dre’s brother Dan, who has been absent from the podcast, has a good reason. He’s been working with Blurred Pictures. They’re making a short film. If you want to help out a cool project you can check out their Kickstarter page here.

It’s not 2008 anymore

This post uses the Wins Produced metric. For longtime fans we’ve made a few changes in the offseason, you can read up on them in the walkthrough. For all fans you can find up to date numbers at the NBA Geek.

I listened to a very enjoyable video cast over at Truehoop yesterday with Haralabos Voulgaris (@haralabob) and he had a great line that I can’t agree with more:

You shouldn’t call a player that’s not currently playing at an All-Star level an All-Star regardless of what he did in the past

It is common to consider a player’s legacy when discussing their skill. This season Kobe has not been playing well. However, I have consistently ended up in twitter fights where Kobe’s legacy is included to justify his current performance. The idea that experience helps a player is a bit off.

In Stumbling on Wins Berri and Schmidt showed that players do not age like wine, they age like milk. This especially matters to Kobe, who is 33 this season. Of the 405 players that have suited up this season only 41 of them are 33 or older. In that group of veterans there are some players with some great legacies. In fact if we jump back to Kobe’s MVP season we can see how close these players are to greatness.

Greats over 33 years of age in 2012 back in 2008
Player Age MPG WP48 WP League Rank
 Chauncey Billups  31 32.3 0.287 15.1 4
 Marcus Camby  33 34.9 0.257 14.8 6
 Steve Nash  33 34.3 0.253 14.6 7
 Kevin Garnett  31 32.8 0.298 14.4 8
 Jason Kidd  34 36.3 0.236 14.3 9
 Kobe Bryant  29 38.9 0.194 12.9 14
 Tim Duncan  31 34.0 0.233 12.9 15
 Shawn Marion  29 36.7 0.253 12.2 18
 Paul Pierce  30 35.9 0.195 12.7 22
 Ray Allen  32 35.9 0.181 9.9 30
 Dirk Nowitzki  29 36.0 0.162 9.4 34
 Vince Carter  31 36.8 0.151 9.3 35
 Ben Wallace  33 32.5 0.174 8.0 49

Using the WP48 metric a player is generally considered a star if they have a WP48 above 0.200 (twice as good as an average player). They are considered a good player if they have a WP48 above 0.150 (50% better than an average player). In 2008 seven of our thirteen greats were playing at star level. All of them were playing much better than average and all ranked in the top 50 in the league for production. How big of a difference does four years make?

Greats over 33 years of age in 2012 (through January 10th 2012) via the NBA Geek
Player Age MPG WP48 WP
Ray Allen  36 34.9 0.334 1.7
Marcus Camby  37 25.2 0.264 1.3
Steve Nash  37 29.3 0.222 1.2
Ben Wallace  37 12.9 0.178 0.5
Jason Kidd  38 28.1 0.168 0.8
Shawn Marion  33 27.1 0.153 0.9
Kevin Garnett  35 30.4 0.126 0.6
Kobe Bryant  33 36.4 0.115 1.0
Paul Pierce  34 30.4 0.099 0.3
Chauncey Billups  35 30.6 0.089 0.3
Vince Carter  35 20.8 0.066 0.3
Dirk Nowitzki  33 31.0 0.059 0.4
Tim Duncan  35 25.2 =0.002 0.0

Excluding Ray Allen, Marcus Camby and Ben Wallace all of our former greats have degraded since their old days. Even Camby and Wallace are hard to give much credit to as their production is around the same on far fewer minutes. All of our players have decreased their playing time (I have no doubt the insane lockout induced schedule has contributed to that). In 2008 over half of our players were stars. Four years later less than half of them are much better than average. In fact, a few have fallen off a cliff.

Here’s a reminder from Stumbling on Wins how we expect players to change year to year as they age.

Player performance with age.
Age change Expected performance change from previous season
23 to 24 +2%
24 to 25 no change
25 to 26 -2%
26 to 27 -4%
27 to 28 -6%
28 to 29 -9%
29 to 30 -11%
30 to 31 -17%
31 to 32 -22%
32 to 33 -35%
33 to 34 -57%
34 to 35 -146%

Players peak around 25. Up until they’re around thirty their decline is slow. Once they hit thirty-two though their degradation is very swift. All of our greats are now in that range and some of them were already there four years ago.

When players age in sports it’s not a question of if they’ll stop being great it’s a matter of when. Sure some players can defy expectations. However, when we look at our current crop of older players with good resumes in the NBA it doesn’t look good to think that as a group they’ll even stay a shadow of their glory days. People can quote player awards, that they’re clutch (even if they’re not), or that they have experience. If they’re in their thirties though they’re a ticking time bomb waiting to fall apart and that even includes great players. So when someone reminds you that Kobe or Dirk was an MVP just a few seasons ago, it’s not out of line to ask what they’ve done for you lately.

-Dre

A closer look at Kobe’s clutch

The Lakers questionable moves and Kobe’s possible injury woes this season had some of us looking into the Lakers fate. While I was in the midst of doing research for that I decided to take a closer look at a common theme for Kobe fans: Kobe is clutch and wins when it matters. Henry Abbott has written about how this is not true several times. A while back I even wrote why this doesn’t matter.

However, I decided to use Youtube to actually apply the eye test to some of Kobe’s greatness and look over every “clutch” (final 24 seconds of the game) game winning/game tying shot in Kobe’s playoff career. For perspective Kobe has taken 26 “clutch” shots in his playoff career and connected on a grand total of 7 of them. It gets worse.

The Youtube test for Kobe’s playoff clutchness

2000 Game winner in game 2 against Phoenix - Takes a terrible game winning shot in a series that’s decided in 5 games.

Verdict: Kobe clutch! (or lucky, take your pick)

2002 Game winner in game 4 against San Antonio - Loses the ball. Derek Fisher recovers it and drives and Kobe’s game winner is a put back.

Verdict: I give this one to Derek Fisher. Also, ironically Kobe’s “clutch” comes via rebounding not shooting.

2004 Game advancing shot in game 5 against San Antonio  - Kobe makes a good shot off a screen from Karl Malone. The thing is Tim Duncan makes a “clutch” shot to put the Spurs up. Right after that with 0.4 seconds left Fisher makes the game winner.

Verdict: Kobe’s clutch is upstaged by both Tim Duncan and Derek Fisher. I say we only get one clutch player per game and Fisher wins it and Kobe comes in third.

2004 Game tying shot in game 2 against Detroit – Kobe makes a deep three to send the game to overtime. It may have come off a questionable no-call on a drive by Chauncey Billups.

Verdict: Kobe clutch! (with an assist from the refs)

2004 Game tying shot in game 4 against Phoenix – Kobe makes a game tying shot to take the game to overtime. However this comes off a Smush Parker steal and then a perfect feed from Devean George. So he was clutch but it came on the back of some other arguably more clutch play.

Verdict: I’ve got to give the clutch to Smush Parker here. That said. . . 

2004 Game winning shot in game 4 against Phoenix – Kobe akes a pull up jumper for the game winner.

Verdict: Kobe clutch!

2008 Game winning shot in game 5 against San Antonio – Kobe makes a nice pull up jumper for the game winner.

Verdict: Kobe clutch!

Kobe clutch in 2006 vs. Phoenix?

Of Kobe’s seven clutch makes in the playoffs two of them came in one game and I have to credit Smush Parker with more of the clutchness in that. In that same series it should also be noted that Kobe was on one of only eight teams to lose a 3-1 lead in a series and he missed a clutch shot in game 6. So while he did have one clutch game the whole series was very anti-clutch.

Kobe fails the eye test

On the whole Kobe really only earns three of his seven clutch honors fully. It’s hard to really consider that winning when it matters. If the Lakers decline this season people may attribute it to the lack of Kobe’s winning attitude. While losing Kobe will certainly hurt it should be noted his “win while it matters” atttitude may be overrated. In fact I’d wager losing Odom hurts a lot more.

-Dre